Signals without teleology

"Signals" are a conceptual apparatus in many scientific disciplines. Biologists inquire about the evolution of signals, economists talk about the signaling function of purchases and prices, and philosophers discuss the conditions under which signals acquire meaning. However, little attention has been paid to what is a signal. This paper is an attempt to fill this gap with a definition of signal that avoids reference to form or purpose. Along the way we introduce novel notions of "information revealing" and "information concealing" moves in games. In the end, our account offers an alternative to teleological accounts of communication

Signals without teleology

"Signals" are a conceptual apparatus in many scientific disciplines. Biologists inquire about the evolution of signals, economists talk about the signaling function of purchases and prices, and philosophers discuss the conditions under which signals acquire meaning. However, little attention has been paid to what is a signal. This paper is an attempt to fill this gap with a definition of signal that avoids reference to form or purpose. Along the way we introduce novel notions of "information revealing" and "information concealing" moves in games. In the end, our account offers an alternative to teleological accounts of communication

Reinterpreting Mixed Strategy Equilibria: A Unification of the Classical and Bayesian Views

We provide a new interpretation of mixed strategy equilibria that incorporates both von Neumann and Morgenstern's classical concealment role of mixing as well as the more recent Bayesian view originating with Harsanyi. For any two-person game, G, we consider an incomplete information game, IG, in which each player's type is the probability he assigns to the event that his mixed strategy in G is 'found out' by his opponent. We show that, generically, any regular equilibrium of G can be approximated by an equilibrium of IG in which almost every type of each player is strictly optimizing. This leads us to interpret i's equilibrium mixed strategy in G as a combination of deliberate randomization by i together with uncertainty on j's part about which randomization i will employ. We also show that such randomization is not unusual: For example, i's randomization is nondegenerate whenever the support of an equilibrium contains cyclic best replies.

Contests with a Stochastic Number of Players

We study Tullock's (1980) n-player contest when each player has an independent probability 0Contests, Stochastic number of players, Over-dissipation.

Order Flow and the Formation of Dealer Bids: An Analysis of Information and Strategic Behavior in the Government of Canada Securities Auctions

Using data on Government of Canada securities auctions, this paper shows that in countries where direct access to primary issuance is restricted to government securities dealers, Order-flow" information is a key source of private information for these security dealers. Order-flow information is revealed to a security dealer through his interactions with customers, who can place bids in the auctions only through the security dealer. Since each dealer interacts with a different set of customers, they, in effect, see different portions of the market demand and supply curves, leading to differing private inferences of where the equilibrium price might.Treasury auctions, Behavioural finance