596 research outputs found
From Heisenberg to Goedel via Chaitin
In 1927 Heisenberg discovered that the ``more precisely the position is
determined, the less precisely the momentum is known in this instant, and vice
versa''. Four years later G\"odel showed that a finitely specified, consistent
formal system which is large enough to include arithmetic is incomplete. As
both results express some kind of impossibility it is natural to ask whether
there is any relation between them, and, indeed, this question has been
repeatedly asked for a long time. The main interest seems to have been in
possible implications of incompleteness to physics. In this note we will take
interest in the {\it converse} implication and will offer a positive answer to
the question: Does uncertainty imply incompleteness? We will show that
algorithmic randomness is equivalent to a ``formal uncertainty principle''
which implies Chaitin's information-theoretic incompleteness. We also show that
the derived uncertainty relation, for many computers, is physical. In fact, the
formal uncertainty principle applies to {\it all} systems governed by the wave
equation, not just quantum waves. This fact supports the conjecture that
uncertainty implies randomness not only in mathematics, but also in physics.Comment: Small change
Is Complexity a Source of Incompleteness?
In this paper we prove Chaitin's ``heuristic principle'', {\it the theorems
of a finitely-specified theory cannot be significantly more complex than the
theory itself}, for an appropriate measure of complexity. We show that the
measure is invariant under the change of the G\"odel numbering. For this
measure, the theorems of a finitely-specified, sound, consistent theory strong
enough to formalize arithmetic which is arithmetically sound (like
Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with choice or Peano Arithmetic) have bounded
complexity, hence every sentence of the theory which is significantly more
complex than the theory is unprovable. Previous results showing that
incompleteness is not accidental, but ubiquitous are here reinforced in
probabilistic terms: the probability that a true sentence of length is
provable in the theory tends to zero when tends to infinity, while the
probability that a sentence of length is true is strictly positive.Comment: 15 pages, improved versio
What Do Paraconsistent, Undecidable, Random, Computable and Incomplete mean? A Review of Godel's Way: Exploits into an undecidable world by Gregory Chaitin, Francisco A Doria, Newton C.A. da Costa 160p (2012) (review revised 2019)
In ‘Godel’s Way’ three eminent scientists discuss issues such as undecidability, incompleteness, randomness, computability and paraconsistency. I approach these issues from the Wittgensteinian viewpoint that there are two basic issues which have completely different solutions. There are the scientific or empirical issues, which are facts about the world that need to be investigated observationally and philosophical issues as to how language can be used intelligibly (which include certain questions in mathematics and logic), which need to be decided by looking at how we actually use words in particular contexts. When we get clear about which language game we are playing, these topics are seen to be ordinary scientific and mathematical questions like any others. Wittgenstein’s insights have seldom been equaled and never surpassed and are as pertinent today as they were 80 years ago when he dictated the Blue and Brown Books. In spite of its failings—really a series of notes rather than a finished book—this is a unique source of the work of these three famous scholars who have been working at the bleeding edges of physics, math and philosophy for over half a century. Da Costa and Doria are cited by Wolpert (see below or my articles on Wolpert and my review of Yanofsky’s ‘The Outer Limits of Reason’) since they wrote on universal computation, and among his many accomplishments, Da Costa is a pioneer in paraconsistency.
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019), The Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019
Kolmogorov Complexity in perspective. Part I: Information Theory and Randomnes
We survey diverse approaches to the notion of information: from Shannon
entropy to Kolmogorov complexity. Two of the main applications of Kolmogorov
complexity are presented: randomness and classification. The survey is divided
in two parts in the same volume. Part I is dedicated to information theory and
the mathematical formalization of randomness based on Kolmogorov complexity.
This last application goes back to the 60's and 70's with the work of
Martin-L\"of, Schnorr, Chaitin, Levin, and has gained new impetus in the last
years.Comment: 40 page
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