Informal Sector and Corruption: An Empirical Investigation for India

India is a country characterized by a huge informal sector. At the same time, it is a country where the extent of corruption in every sector is remarkably high. Stifling bureaucratic interference and corruption at every stage of economic activities is one of the main reasons behind high participation in informal and unregulated sectors. For economies characterized by high inequality and poverty, a useful tool for the government to pacify social unrest, is to choose a lower level of governance allowing substantial corruption in the system. Based on a study of 20 Indian states, we empirically show that higher corruption increases level of employment in the informal sector. Further, our analysis also shows that for higher levels of lagged state domestic product, the positive impact of corruption on the size of the informal sector is nullified.informal sector, corruption, state domestic product, governance, India

The “emersion” effect: an ex post and ex ante social program evaluation on labor tax evasion in Italy

We analyze how different policy interventions may incentive the transition of workers from the informal to the formal sector. We use Italian data over the period 1998-2008 to evaluate ex post whether the 2003 Italian labor market reform was able to reach the objective to reduce the share of shadow employment. Based on our empirical results, we develop an ex ante evaluation based on a search and matching model, á la Mortensen and Pissarides to determine the right combination of policy interventions which may be effective in generating a significant reduction in undeclared work together with an expansion of the formal sector. We find that in an economy where permanent and temporary contracts coexist, the combination of lower payroll taxes for permanent jobs and higher probability of being audited generates a compression of the informal sector, leaving unemployment unchanged. A similar result can be obtained through a reduction of the firing cost associated with permanent jobs, even though this causes temporary contracts to increase relatively more than permanent contracts

Migration as a Substitute for Informal Activities: Evidence from Tajikistan

How is migration related to informal activities? They may be complementary since new migrants may have difficulty finding employment in formal work, so many of them end up informally employed. Alternatively, migration and informality may be substitutes since migrants' incomes in their new locations and income earned in the home informal economy (without migration) are an imperfect trade-off. Tajikistan possesses both a very large informal sector and extensive international emigration. Using the gap between household expenditure and income as an indicator of informal activity, we find negative significant correlations between informal activities and migration: the gap between expenditure and income falls in the presence of migration. Furthermore, Tajikistan's professional workers ability to engage in informal activities enables them to forgo migration, while low-skilled non-professionals without post-secondary education choose to migrate instead of working in the informal sector. Our empirical evidence suggests migration and informality substitute for one another.remittances, migration, informal, Tajikistan

The trade-offs of social assistance programs in the labor market: The case of the “Seguro Popular” program in Mexico

In 2002, the Mexican government began a tremendous financial effort to provide health insurance, Seguro Popular (SP), to the 50 million uninsured in Mexico. In doing so, the states and municipalities offered virtually free health insurance to uncovered self-employed and informal salaried workers substantially altering the incentives for workers and firms to operate in the formal economy. We take advantage of the staggered implementation of the program across municipalities to estimate the effects of the SP in the labor market. We find that the SP had a negative effect in the creation of formal jobs, especially in small and medium sized firms. According to our estimates, had the program not been in place, 31.000 more employers and 300.000 new formal jobs should have been registered with Mexican social security. These represent 3.8% and 2.4% of the stock of registered employers and employees in 2002 when the program started.social assistance program, informality, labor market, Mexico