49,044 research outputs found
Influence of Social Context and Affect on Individuals\u27 Implementation of Information Security Safeguards
Individualsâ use of safeguards against information security risks is commonly conceptualized as the result of a risk-benefit analysis. This economic perspective assumes a ârational actorâ whereas risk is subjectively perceived by people who may be influenced by a number of social, psychological, cultural, and other âsoftâ factors. Their decisions thus may deviate from what economic risk assessment analysis would dictate. In this respect, a phenomenon interesting to study is that on social network sites (SNSes) people tend to, despite a number of potential security risks, provide an amount of personal information that they would otherwise frown upon. In this study we explore how peopleâs affect toward online social networking may impact their use of privacy safeguards. Since building social capital is a main purpose of online social networking, we use social capital theory to examine some potential contextual influence on the formation of the affect. More specifically, we adopt the perspective proposed by Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998), which views social capital as a composite of structural, relational, and cognitive capitals. Preliminary analysis of 271 survey responses shows that (a) a personâs structural and relational embeddedness in her online social networks, as well as her cognitive ability in maintaining those networks, are positively related to her affect toward SNSes; (b) a personâs affect toward SNSes moderates the relationship between her perception of privacy risk and the privacy safeguards she implements on the SNSes
Addressing climate vulnerability : promoting the participatory rights of indigenous peoples and women through Finnish foreign policy
Julkaistu versi
Governance of Dual-Use Technologies: Theory and Practice
The term dual-use characterizes technologies that can have both military and civilian applications. What is the state of current efforts to control the spread of these powerful technologiesânuclear, biological, cyberâthat can simultaneously advance social and economic well-being and also be harnessed for hostile purposes? What have previous efforts to govern, for example, nuclear and biological weapons taught us about the potential for the control of these dual-use technologies? What are the implications for governance when the range of actors who could cause harm with these technologies include not just national governments but also non-state actors like terrorists? These are some of the questions addressed by Governance of Dual-Use Technologies: Theory and Practice, the new publication released today by the Global Nuclear Future Initiative of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. The publication's editor is Elisa D. Harris, Senior Research Scholar, Center for International Security Studies, University of Maryland School of Public Affairs. Governance of Dual-Use Technologies examines the similarities and differences between the strategies used for the control of nuclear technologies and those proposed for biotechnology and information technology. The publication makes clear the challenges concomitant with dual-use governance. For example, general agreement exists internationally on the need to restrict access to technologies enabling the development of nuclear weapons. However, no similar consensus exists in the bio and information technology domains. The publication also explores the limitations of military measures like deterrence, defense, and reprisal in preventing globally available biological and information technologies from being misused. Some of the other questions explored by the publication include: What types of governance measures for these dual-use technologies have already been adopted? What objectives have those measures sought to achieve? How have the technical characteristics of the technology affected governance prospects? What have been the primary obstacles to effective governance, and what gaps exist in the current governance regime? Are further governance measures feasible? In addition to a preface from Global Nuclear Future Initiative Co-Director Robert Rosner (University of Chicago) and an introduction and conclusion from Elisa Harris, Governance of Dual-Use Technologiesincludes:On the Regulation of Dual-Use Nuclear Technology by James M. Acton (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace)Dual-Use Threats: The Case of Biotechnology by Elisa D. Harris (University of Maryland)Governance of Information Technology and Cyber Weapons by Herbert Lin (Stanford University
The challenge to privacy from ever increasing state surveillance: a comparative perspective
This article explores how internet surveillance in the name of counterterrorism challenges privacy.
Introduction
International terrorism poses serious threats to the societies it affects. The counter-terrorism measures adopted since 2001 have sought to limit the advance of terrorism but, in the process, also created enormous challenges for (transnational) constitutionalism. Long-held and cherished principles relating to democracy, the rule of law and the protection of a wide range of human rights have come under increasing strain. Legislative authority to shoot down hijacked aircrafts or to use lethal drones against suspected terrorists affect the right to life; waterboarding of prisoners and other inhumane practices contravene the prohibition of torture; extraordinary renditions and black sites circumvent constitutionally protected rights and processes, including the right to freedom and security, the right to a fair trial and due process for suspected terrorists; ill-defined terrorism offences undermine the rule of law and personal freedom; blanket suspicion of Muslims as terror sympathisers impacts on freedom of religion and leads to unfair discrimination; and mass surveillance of communication sweeps away the right to privacy.
This article explores how internet surveillance in the name of counterterrorism challenges privacy. In Part II, the article analyses the international dimension of counter-terrorism measures and the conceptualisation of data protection and privacy in the European Union (âEUâ), the United States of America (âUSâ) and Australia. Part III compares the different concepts of data protection and privacy, and explores the prospects of an international legal framework for the protection of privacy. Part IV concludes that work on international data protection and privacy standards, while urgently needed, remains a long-term vision with particularly uncertain prospects as far as antiterrorism and national security measures are concerned
Study of Fundamental Rights Limitations for Online Enforcement through Self-Regulation
The use of self-regulatory or privatized enforcement measures in the online environment can
give rise to various legal issues that affect the fundamental rights of internet users. First,
privatized enforcement by internet services, without state involvement, can interfere with the
effective exercise of fundamental rights by internet users. Such interference may, on occasion,
be disproportionate, but there are legal complexities involved in determining the precise
circumstances in which this is the case. This is because, for instance, the private entities can
themselves claim protection under the fundamental rights framework (e.g. the protection of
property and the freedom to conduct business).
Second, the role of public authorities in the development of self-regulation in view of certain
public policy objectives can become problematic, but has to be carefully assessed. The
fundamental rights framework puts limitations on government regulation that interferes with
fundamental rights. Essentially, such limitations involve the (negative) obligation for States
not to interfere with fundamental rights. Interferences have to be prescribed by law, pursue a
legitimate aim and be necessary in a democratic society. At the same time, however, States
are also under the (positive) obligation to take active measures in order to ensure the effective
exercise of fundamental rights. In other words, States must do more than simply refrain from
interference. These positive obligations are of specific interest in the context of private
ordering impact on fundamental rights, but tend to be abstract and hard to operationalize in
specific legal constellations.
This studyâs central research question is: What legal limitations follow from the fundamental
rights framework for self-regulation and privatized enforcement online?
It examines the circumstances in which State responsibility can be engaged as a result of selfregulation
or privatized enforcement online. Part I of the study provides an overview and
analysis of the relevant elements in the European and international fundamental rights
framework that place limitations on privatized enforcement. Part II gives an assessment of
specific instances of self-regulation or other instances of privatized enforcement in light of
these elements
Cyber Babel: Finding the Lingua Franca in Cybersecurity Regulation
Cybersecurity regulations have proliferated over the past few years as the significance of the threat has drawn more attention. With breaches making headlines, the public and their representatives are imposing requirements on those that hold sensitive data with renewed vigor. As high-value targets that hold large amounts of sensitive data, financial institutions are among the most heavily regulated. Regulations are necessary. However, regulations also come with costs that impact both large and small companies, their customers, and local, national, and international economies. As the regulations have proliferated so have those costs. The regulations will inevitably and justifiably diverge where different governments view the needs of their citizens differently. However, that should not prevent regulators from recognizing areas of agreement. This Note examines the regulatory regimes governing the data and cybersecurity practices of financial institutions implemented by the Securities and Exchange Commission, the New York Department of Financial Services, and the General Data Protection Regulations of the European Union to identify areas where requirements overlap, with the goal of suggesting implementations that promote consistency, clarity, and cost reduction
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