Effects of Labels on Perception and its Relation to Visual Working Memory, Implicit Beliefs, and Metacognitive Ability

Labels hold a great amount of information and power, and they have been shown to affect perception and people‟s decisions when making categorical and similarity judgments. This study examines why reliance on labels found in previous studies is so common by exploring cognitive processes behind this labeling effect. We study how poor short-term visual memory, general assumptions, and an ability to think critically about one‟s own thinking relate to label use. Specifically, we investigated how visual working memory (VWM) ability, implicit beliefs, and metacognitive ability influence a participants‟ use of labels during a similarity judgment task. Participants were given a task to determine similarity between human faces. They were also given a VWM task and questionnaires to determine their implicit beliefs and metacognitive abilities. Our results indicate that VWM ability and implicit beliefs relate to the use of labels in certain conditions, with those having poor VWM ability using labels more and those whose implicit beliefs reflect an assumption that properties and traits in the world are fixed and intransient use labels more. Metacognitive abilities were not closely related to label use. These results suggest that the use of labels is not random or out of ease of use, but the result of certain cognitive processes

Processing of false belief passages during natural story comprehension: An fMRI study

The neural correlates of theory of mind (ToM) are typically studied using paradigms which require participants to draw explicit, task-related inferences (e.g., in the false belief task). In a natural setup, such as listening to stories, false belief mentalizing occurs incidentally as part of narrative processing. In our experiment, participants listened to auditorily presented stories with false belief passages (implicit false belief processing) and immediately after each story answered comprehension questions (explicit false belief processing), while neural responses were measured with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). All stories included (among other situations) one false belief condition and one closely matched control condition. For the implicit ToM processing, we modeled the hemodynamic response during the false belief passages in the story and compared it to the hemodynamic response during the closely matched control passages. For implicit mentalizing, we found activation in typical ToM processing regions, that is the angular gyrus (AG), superior medial frontal gyrus (SmFG), precuneus (PCUN), middle temporal gyrus (MTG) as well as in the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) billaterally. For explicit ToM, we only found AG activation. The conjunction analysis highlighted the left AG and MTG as well as the bilateral IFG as overlapping ToM processing regions for both implicit and explicit modes. Implicit ToM processing during listening to false belief passages, recruits the left SmFG and billateral PCUN in addition to the “mentalizing network” known form explicit processing tasks

Training methods for facial image comparison: a literature review

This literature review was commissioned to explore the psychological literature relating to facial image comparison with a particular emphasis on whether individuals can be trained to improve performance on this task. Surprisingly few studies have addressed this question directly. As a consequence, this review has been extended to cover training of face recognition and training of different kinds of perceptual comparisons where we are of the opinion that the methodologies or findings of such studies are informative. The majority of studies of face processing have examined face recognition, which relies heavily on memory. This may be memory for a face that was learned recently (e.g. minutes or hours previously) or for a face learned longer ago, perhaps after many exposures (e.g. friends, family members, celebrities). Successful face recognition, irrespective of the type of face, relies on the ability to retrieve the to-berecognised face from long-term memory. This memory is then compared to the physically present image to reach a recognition decision. In contrast, in face matching task two physical representations of a face (live, photographs, movies) are compared and so long-term memory is not involved. Because the comparison is between two present stimuli rather than between a present stimulus and a memory, one might expect that face matching, even if not an easy task, would be easier to do and easier to learn than face recognition. In support of this, there is evidence that judgment tasks where a presented stimulus must be judged by a remembered standard are generally more cognitively demanding than judgments that require comparing two presented stimuli Davies & Parasuraman, 1982; Parasuraman & Davies, 1977; Warm and Dember, 1998). Is there enough overlap between face recognition and matching that it is useful to look at the literature recognition? No study has directly compared face recognition and face matching, so we turn to research in which people decided whether two non-face stimuli were the same or different. In these studies, accuracy of comparison is not always better when the comparator is present than when it is remembered. Further, all perceptual factors that were found to affect comparisons of simultaneously presented objects also affected comparisons of successively presented objects in qualitatively the same way. Those studies involved judgments about colour (Newhall, Burnham & Clark, 1957; Romero, Hita & Del Barco, 1986), and shape (Larsen, McIlhagga & Bundesen, 1999; Lawson, Bülthoff & Dumbell, 2003; Quinlan, 1995). Although one must be cautious in generalising from studies of object processing to studies of face processing (see, e.g., section comparing face processing to object processing), from these kinds of studies there is no evidence to suggest that there are qualitative differences in the perceptual aspects of how recognition and matching are done. As a result, this review will include studies of face recognition skill as well as face matching skill. The distinction between face recognition involving memory and face matching not involving memory is clouded in many recognition studies which require observers to decide which of many presented faces matches a remembered face (e.g., eyewitness studies). And of course there are other forensic face-matching tasks that will require comparison to both presented and remembered comparators (e.g., deciding whether any person in a video showing a crowd is the target person). For this reason, too, we choose to include studies of face recognition as well as face matching in our revie

Theories of understanding others: the need for a new account and the guiding role of the person model theory

What would be an adequate theory of social understanding? In the last decade, the philosophical debate has focused on Theory Theory, Simulation Theory and Interaction Theory as the three possible candidates. In the following, we look carefully at each of these and describe its main advantages and disadvantages. Based on this critical analysis, we formulate the need for a new account of social understanding. We propose the Person Model Theory as an independent new account which has greater explanatory power compared to the existing theorie

A general model of fluency effects in judgment and decision making

Processing or cognitive fluency is the experienced ease of ongoing mental processes. This experience infl uences a wide range of judgments and decisions. We present a general model for these fluency effects. Based on Brunswik’s lens-model, we conceptualize fluency as a meta-cognitive cue. For the cue to impact judgments, we propose three process steps: people must experience fluency; the experience must be attributed to a judgment-relevant source; and it must be interpreted within the judgment context. This interpretation is either based on available theories about the experience’s meaning or on the learned validity of the cue in the given context. With these steps the model explains most fl uency effects and allows for new and testable predictions

Perceptual Pluralism

Perceptual systems respond to proximal stimuli by forming mental representations of distal stimuli. A central goal for the philosophy of perception is to characterize the representations delivered by perceptual systems. It may be that all perceptual representations are in some way proprietarily perceptual and differ from the representational format of thought (Dretske 1981; Carey 2009; Burge 2010; Block ms.). Or it may instead be that perception and cognition always trade in the same code (Prinz 2002; Pylyshyn 2003). This paper rejects both approaches in favor of perceptual pluralism, the thesis that perception delivers a multiplicity of representational formats, some proprietary and some shared with cognition. The argument for perceptual pluralism marshals a wide array of empirical evidence in favor of iconic (i.e., image-like, analog) representations in perception as well as discursive (i.e., language-like, digital) perceptual object representations

Consultation and illness behaviour in response to symptoms: a comparison of models from different disciplinary frameworks and suggestions for future research directions

We all get ill and social scientific interest in how we respond – the study of illness behaviour – continues unabated. Existing models are useful, but have been developed and applied within disciplinary silos, resulting in wasted intellectual and empirical effort and an absence of accumulation of knowledge across disciplines. We present a critical review and detailed comparison of three process models of response to symptoms: the Illness Action Model, the Common Sense Model of the Self-Regulation of Health and Illness and the Network Episode Model. We suggest an integrated framework in which symptoms, responses and actions are simultaneously interpreted and evaluated in the light of accumulated knowledge and through interactions. Evaluation may be subconscious and is influenced by the extent to which the symptoms impose themselves, expectations of outcomes, the resources available and understanding of symptoms' salience and possible outcomes. Actions taken are part of a process of problem solving through which both individuals and their immediate social network seek to (re)achieve ‘normality’. Response is also influenced by social structure (directly and indirectly), cultural expectations of health, the meaning of symptoms, and access to and understandings of the legitimate use of services. Changes in knowledge, in embodied state and in emotions can all be directly influential at any point. We do not underestimate the difficulty of operationalising an integrated framework at different levels of analysis. Attempts to do so will require us to move easily between disciplinary understandings to conduct prospective, longitudinal, research that uses novel methodologies to investigate response to symptoms in the context of affective as well as cognitive responses and interactions within social networks. While challenging such an approach would facilitate accumulation of knowledge across disciplines and enable movement beyond description to change in individual and organisational responses

Implicit and Explicit Processes in Multiple Cue Judgement

Making judgements often involves integrating multiple pieces of information, or cues, in the environment. While experts, such as physicians, are able to make accurate judgements from multiple cues, they often have poor insight into how they make their inferences. This provides some indication that judgement is influenced by knowledge that is implicit and inaccessible to verbal report. In the present thesis, the cognitive processes involved in multiple cue judgement were explored by training participants on a small number of novel cues using the multiple cue probability learning (MCPL) paradigm. In a training phase, participants predicted a criterion and received outcome feedback in response to each judgement. Learning and judgement in these tasks is often assumed to draw on explicit hypothesis-testing processes. However, a great deal of research suggests that implicit as well as explicit processes can contribute to performance on complex tasks. In eight experiments, several methods were used to examine the role of explicit and implicit processes in multiple cue judgement. While concurrent working memory loads failed to disrupt judgements after learning, we nevertheless found clear evidence that explicit processing is involved in the learning of negative, but not positive cues. Performance on such tasks was correlated with individual differences in working memory capacity, as well as measures of explicit knowledge obtained in the learning process. The results are discussed with respect to dual process theories of learning, judgement, and reasoning. The findings of the present thesis indicate that multiple cue judgement is best viewed within a dual process framework

Counter-stereotypic beliefs in math do not protect school girls from stereotype threat

The threat of being negatively stereotyped in math impairs performance of highly qualified females on difficult math tests, a phenomenon known as "stereotype threat"-ST. Perhaps more alarmingly, recent studies based on unselective samples of elementary, middle, and high-school students show that ST also operates in girls from the general population. Here we offer first evidence that ST does operate (with large effect sizes) even in middle school girls who deny the negative gender stereotype. Children's beliefs about the two genders math ability, therefore, do not necessarily moderate their susceptibility to ST, an important issue that remained unclear so far. This new finding is also of great practical significance: School girls’ counter-stereotypic beliefs cannot be taken as sufficient evidence for deciding whether the struggle against ST is or is not needed. Appropriate interventions should be the default option when aiming for true gender equality in math and science achievements