Inflation targeting in Brazil: what difference does a year make?

The adoption of inflation targeting as a monetary policy strategy in Brazil was a convenient way to replace exchange rate rule by targeted inflation in an effort to anchor inflation expectations. This paper briefly evaluates the inflation target experience from three viewpoints: reasons behind the success, difficulties regarding forecasting and the risks ahead. It analyses the factors behind the success as well as the way initial doubts and a second round of mistrust were successfully dealt with. It looks at the empirical difficulties to estimate a reliable Demand Function and examines evidence on the persistence of high interest rates as captured by a Taylor rule. It points out to possible signaling problems in the transmission mechanism that might lead to a weakening of the confidence in the strategy in the future. Section 3 draws conclusions on risks that emerged together with favorable outcomes of the first year. There has been a substantial progress in the overall confidence in monetary policy's management. Inflation targeting has certainly played a relevant role in this gain. However, it looks like we have not got rid of the "thin ice economy" riding in the post-Real era, since dependence of inflation on foreign exchange availability is still high. Thus the Brazilian economy is still excessively dependent on international liquidity fluctuations. As it happened in the past six years, because of the combination of the size of interest rate movements with the persistence of effects, a double barrel destructive effect on investment and banking, good scenarios tend to be too good, and bad scenarios are seen as terrible for assets markets. An appendix note was written by Thomas Wu on the problem of finding a measurement of the output gap for the Brazilian economy.

Foreign Exchange Intervention: The Theoretical Debate and the Czech Koruna Episode

The strong appreciation of the Czech koruna over 2001?2002 and the foreign exchange interventions conducted by the Czech central bank under its inflation-targeting regime provide a good opportunity to consider the pros and cons of FX intervention, an often-controversial monetary-policy instrument. This article considers the koruna?s said appreciation, possible causation, and the policy measures taken by the central bank then to counter the appreciation. The theoretical channels through which foreign exchange intervention may influence the exchange rate, and empirical evidence of their effectiveness are presented. Finally, the FX interventions of the Czech National Bank are discussed and those conducted in a rather secret manner over July?September 2002 assessed as relatively effective.foreign exchange intervention; exchange rate; monetary policy; transmission channels

Gradualism vs Cold Turkey

The paper analyzes the incentive for the ECB to establish reputation by pursuing a restrictive policy right at the start of its operation. The bank is modelled as risk averse with respect to deviations of both inflation and output from her target. The public, being imperfectly informed about the bank’s preferences uses observed inflation as (imperfect) signal for the unknown preferences. Under linear learning rules - which are commonly used in the literature - a gradual build up of reputation is the optimal response. The paper shows that such a linear learning rule is not consistent with efficient signaling. It is shown that in a game with efficient signaling, a cold turkey approach - allowing for deflation - is optimal for a strong bank - accepting high current output losses at the beginning in order to demonstrate its toughness.Die Arbeit untersucht die Anreize der Europäischen Zentralbank, in der Startphase durch restriktive Politik Reputation aufzubauen. Die Öffentlichkeit kennt die Präferenzen der Zentralbank nicht; sie verwendet die beobachtete Inflationsrate als (imperfektes) Signal. Wird eine lineare Lernregel unterstellt - der Standardfall in der Literatur - erweist es sich als optimal, hohe Inflationserwartungen zumindest teilweise zu akkommodieren und so Reputation nur schrittweise aufzubauen. Die Arbeit zeigt aber, daß eine solche lineare Lernregel mit effizientem Signalverhalten nicht konsistent ist. Bei effizientem Signalisieren kann es für eine harte Zentralbank optimal sein, in der Startphase durch eine sehr restriktive, deflationäre Politik ihre Präferenzen zu offenbaren

Gradualism vs Cold Turkey : how to establish credibility for the ECB

The paper analyzes the incentive for the ECB to establish reputation by pursuing a restrictive policy right at the start of its operation. The bank is modelled as risk averse with respect to deviations of both inflation and output from her target. The public, being imperfectly informed about the bank’s preferences uses observed inflation as (imperfect) signal for the unknown preferences. Under linear learning rules - which are commonly used in the literature - a gradual build up of reputation is the optimal response. The paper shows that such a linear learning rule is not consistent with efficient signaling. It is shown that in a game with efficient signaling, a cold turkey approach - allowing for deflation - is optimal for a strong bank - accepting high current output losses at the beginning in order to demonstrate its toughness. JEL classification: D 82, E 58Die Arbeit untersucht die Anreize der Europäischen Zentralbank, in der Startphase durch restriktive Politik Reputation aufzubauen. Die Öffentlichkeit kennt die Präferenzen der Zentralbank nicht; sie verwendet die beobachtete Inflationsrate als (imperfektes) Signal. Wird eine lineare Lernregel unterstellt - der Standardfall in der Literatur - erweist es sich als optimal, hohe Inflationserwartungen zumindest teilweise zu akkommodieren und so Reputation nur schrittweise aufzubauen. Die Arbeit zeigt aber, daß eine solche lineare Lernregel mit effizientem Signalverhalten nicht konsistent ist. Bei effizientem Signalisieren kann es für eine harte Zentralbank optimal sein, in der Startphase durch eine sehr restriktive, deflationäre Politik ihre Präferenzen zu offenbaren. JEL classification: D 82, E 5

Policy mix, public debt management, and fiscal rules - lessons from the 2002 Brazilian crisis

Despite significant progress in economic reformthroughout the 1990s, and an exemplary development of the policymaking framework in the second part of the decade, Brazil suffered a major public debt and currency crisis in 2002. Though the political origin of the uncertainty cannot be ignored, the author identifies other sources of uncertainty emanating from the policymaking framework: fiscal policy was not responsive to the shocks, public debt instruments were used with several objectives (to stabilize the currency and to lengthen maturity) and there was inadequate supervision of agents holding public debt. Most of the flaws have been fixed following the crisis: a) The primary fiscal balance has been increased, sending the signal that it is a flexible instrument that will be used to ensure commitment of the sovereign to honor its obligations. b) The central bank formally transferred to the Treasury the remaining debt-issuance functions, facilitating a more adequate balancing of different risks involved in debt management. c) Mutual funds'public debt holdings are better regulated, ensuring that end-investors have the proper information to assess the risk of the institutions in which they invest.Banks&Banking Reform,Environmental Economics&Policies,Strategic Debt Management,Payment Systems&Infrastructure,Economic Theory&Research,Economic Stabilization,Economic Theory&Research,Banks&Banking Reform,Environmental Economics&Policies,Public Sector Economics&Finance

Inflation Targeting, Between Rhetoric and Reality. The Case of Transition Economies

The paper examines the inflation targeting regime in the context of transition economies. Recent years have witnessed an increasing number of central banks in these countries moving towards the implementation of inflation targeting regimes. However, the success of such a regime depends largely on the degree to which certain general requirements are met. As experience in a number of transition economies has shown so far, targeting inflation is not an easy task. The ongoing restructuring process in these economies makes the inflation forecasting process more difficult and introduces an additional source of uncertainty in the system. By unequivocally choosing inflation as a nominal anchor the central banks could face potential dilemmas if, for example, exchange rate appreciated too much under the pressure of massive capital inflows. The paper presents the broad framework in which inflation targeting could operate efficiently and attempts to assess the extent to which such a regime, when applied to transition economies, could fit into this framework.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/40129/3/wp743.pd

Inflation Targeting - the Holy Grail of Monetary Policy?

Inflation targeting is a statement about the objective of central bank policy and not about operating procedures. Its success depends not only on the actions of the central bank, but requires a broad consensus concerning the proper role of monetary policy in the economy. It also requires the backing of a sound fiscal policy. As countries differ both in economic structure and monetary transmission mechanism, the implementation of inflation targeting must be country specific. Instability over time in the transmission mechanism also implies that inflation targeting strategies must evolve over time to avoid the fate of previous monetary policy targeting practices.International Economics; Monetary Policy; Inflation targeting; Monetary transmission mechanism

Brazil: taming inflation expectations

This paper analyzes monetary policy implementation and convergence of inflation and inflation expectations to the targets in Brazil after the crisis in 2002. It covers the initial disinflation and subsequent economic recovery, followed by the inflation rebound and corresponding policy response, and finally the consolidation of disinflation in 2005-06. Monetary policy implementation and the overall improvement in macroeconomic fundamentals have contributed substantially to create a more stable and predictable environment, evidenced by signs of reduction in inflation uncertainty. Furthermore, econometric exercises indicate the critical role played by the targets as attractors for inflation expectations.