Infinite games with finite knowledge gaps

Infinite games where several players seek to coordinate under imperfect information are deemed to be undecidable, unless the information is hierarchically ordered among the players. We identify a class of games for which joint winning strategies can be constructed effectively without restricting the direction of information flow. Instead, our condition requires that the players attain common knowledge about the actual state of the game over and over again along every play. We show that it is decidable whether a given game satisfies the condition, and prove tight complexity bounds for the strategy synthesis problem under $\omega$-regular winning conditions given by parity automata.Comment: 39 pages; 2nd revision; submitted to Information and Computatio

Doubly infinite separation of quantum information and communication

We prove the existence of (one-way) communication tasks with a subconstant versus superconstant asymptotic gap, which we call "doubly infinite," between their quantum information and communication complexities. We do so by studying the exclusion game [C. Perry et al., Phys. Rev. Lett. 115, 030504 (2015)] for which there exist instances where the quantum information complexity tends to zero as the size of the input $n$ increases. By showing that the quantum communication complexity of these games scales at least logarithmically in $n$, we obtain our result. We further show that the established lower bounds and gaps still hold even if we allow a small probability of error. However in this case, the $n$-qubit quantum message of the zero-error strategy can be compressed polynomially.Comment: 16 pages, 2 figures. v4: minor errors fixed; close to published version; v5: financial support info adde

Learning in evolutionary environments

Not availabl

Learning in Evolutionary Environments

The purpose of this work is to present a sort of short selective guide to an enormous and diverse literature on learning processes in economics. We argue that learning is an ubiquitous characteristic of most economic and social systems but it acquires even greater importance in explicitly evolutionary environments where: a) heterogeneous agents systematically display various forms of "bounded rationality"; b) there is a persistent appearance of novelties, both as exogenous shocks and as the result of technological, behavioural and organisational innovations by the agents themselves; c) markets (and other interaction arrangements) perform as selection mechanisms; d) aggregate regularities are primarily emergent properties stemming from out-of-equilibrium interactions. We present, by means of examples, the most important classes of learning models, trying to show their links and differences, and setting them against a sort of ideal framework of "what one would like to understand about learning...". We put a signifiphasis on learning models in their bare-bone formal structure, but we also refer to the (generally richer) non-formal theorising about the same objects. This allows us to provide an easier mapping of a wide and largely unexplored research agenda.Learning, Evolutionary Environments, Economic Theory, Rationality

How Much Lookahead is Needed to Win Infinite Games?

Delay games are two-player games of infinite duration in which one player may delay her moves to obtain a lookahead on her opponent's moves. For $\omega$-regular winning conditions it is known that such games can be solved in doubly-exponential time and that doubly-exponential lookahead is sufficient. We improve upon both results by giving an exponential time algorithm and an exponential upper bound on the necessary lookahead. This is complemented by showing EXPTIME-hardness of the solution problem and tight exponential lower bounds on the lookahead. Both lower bounds already hold for safety conditions. Furthermore, solving delay games with reachability conditions is shown to be PSPACE-complete. This is a corrected version of the paper https://arxiv.org/abs/1412.3701v4 published originally on August 26, 2016