Two-echelon supply chain coordination under information asymmetry with multiple types

We analyse a principal-agent contracting model with asymmetric information between a supplier and a retailer. Both the supplier and the retailer have the classical non-linear economic ordering cost functions consisting of ordering and holding costs. We assume that the retailer has the market power to enforce any order quantity. Furthermore, the retailer has private holding costs. The supplier wants to minimise his expected costs by offering a menu of contracts with side payments as an incentive mechanism. We consider a general number of discrete single-dimensional retailer types with type-dependent default options. A natural and common model formulation is non-convex, but we present an equivalent convex formulation. Hence, the contracting model can be solved efficiently for

Analysis of the Project Supply Chains: Coordination and Fair Allocation

This research investigates how project contracts can coordinate the supply chain between a project manager and contractor and if the solutions can be ensured as equitable. The main features of this type of supply chain are the trade-offs between the selection of a higher rate of resource consumption with a consequent higher cost to the contractor and a lower rate of resource consumption leading to later delivery and a reduction of the project-reward to the project manager. This broader problem could lead to a coordination problem for the overall supply chain. This research proposed a solution to this broader problem in two different scenarios: Take it or leave it scenario and negotiation scenario. Finally, the fair allocation of the risks and benefits and the related decision-making issues are addressed as one of the behavioural barriers to the supply chain coordination. The coordination issues in a take it or leave it scenario are addressed using time-based and fixed price project contracts using Stackelberg games. Models of coordination were proposed with time-based contracts, but the fixed price contracts failed to coordinate. The coordination problems in negotiation scenario are addressed with the Nash's bargaining, the Kalai Smorodinsky bargaining, and the utilitarian approach. A cost plus contract has been found to dominate the solutions over any cost sharing contract and fixed price contract for Nash's bargaining and Kalai Smorodinsky bargaining cases. Finally, the issues of fairness of allocation of risks and benefits as one of the challenges of supply chain coordination, have been investigated. The fixed price contracts were found to coordinate the supply chain under consideration alongside the time-based contracts if the members had fairness concern. Some of the key features of this research include the incorporation of various probability distributions for the project completion time and cost, the inclusion of various forms of risk preference, and addressing the challenges of fair allocation in project supply chains

Countering the scrooge in each of us: On the marketing of cooperative behavior..

De Vrek in Elk van Ons te Lijf Gaan Over het Bevorderen van Coöperatief Gedrag Veel sociale marketers veronderstellen dat de coöperatieve consument ged reven wordt door rationele beslissingen en dat zijn kennis, voorkeuren, en overtuigingen kunnen beïnvloed worden door informatieve campagnes en rationele argumenten met het oog op coöperatief gedrag. In dit doctoraat , staan we eerder stil bij de sociale consument als iemand die zich laat leiden door vuistregels; iemand die als het ware snel en vaak automatis ch beslissingen neemt. Daarbij onderzoeken we in drie verschillende manu scripten of subtiele signalen in de omgeving aangewend kunnen worden om de kans op een coöperatieve keuze te vergroten. Het eerste manuscript onderzoekt waarom NGOs en hulporganisaties mensen op straat gemakkelijk om een donatie vragen via de verkoop van een prod uct (vb. een sleutelhanger). De resultaten suggereren dat donateurs eige nlijk al iets immaterieels kopen wanneer ze doneren (vb. een goed gevoel ) en dat ze daarom niet op zoek zijn naar de aankoop van extra donatie product. In plaats daarvan is het beter om donateurs een indicatie te ge ven van een sociaal acceptabel donatiebedrag. We moeten als het ware de transactie zo gemakkelijk mogelijk laten verlopen door er een prijs op t e plakken. In het tweede manuscript, bestuderen we hoe ons verlangen naa r voedsel ons verlangen naar geld doet toenemen en omgekeerd. We probere n een evolutionaire verklaring te bieden voor het (sterke) menselijk ver langen naar geld in onze moderne maatschappij. Ons verlangen naar geld z ou dan een moderne aanpassing zijn van ons eeuwenoud verlangen naar voed sel. Het laatste artikel test een instrument dat door non-profit organis aties en commerciële marketers kan gebruikt worden om coöperatief gedrag te bevorderen. Vier studies tonen aan dat mensen een interviewer gemakk elijker zullen helpen als ze voordien veel akkoord zijn gegaan met de in terviewers stellingen. We tonen aan (1) dat dit proces gedreven wordt do or een verhoogde perceptie van gelijkheid met de interviewer en (2) dat het proces voor een groot deel automatisch verloopt.

Interpersonal Consumer Decision Making

Consumption is not an isolated phenomenon, but often involves the (in)direct presence of others. People often consume or make consumption decisions together or in the favor of others. Consequently the people in our surroundings are likely to have an influence on our consumption decisions. They influence what consumption goods we buy and how we behave in consumption contexts. In this dissertation I explore various interpersonal consumption occasions and the influence of others on consumers’ decisions

Family business agency conflict model: a study of Brazilian firms

The aim of this thesis is to deepen understanding of how agency conflict arises in the governance of family businesses. The constructs were proposed arising from empirical research, involving four case studies of different Brazilian family-owned companies, which were analysed inductively. Next, data from the literature was used to validate those constructs, which became part of the proposed Family Business Agency Conflict Model and to suggest articulated hypotheses. This model identifies factors that can potentially increase, and those which can mitigate, tensions between the actors involved representing family, ownership and management within family-owned firms. It was subsequently tested through a survey of 152 family-owned firms of varying size, which belonged to different economic sectors and regions of Brazil. Structural equation modelling was used to test the empirical validity of the model, with reference to hypotheses concerning the variables which influence agency conflict. The model was found to predict 38 per cent of the variance in agency conflict. Four variables were found which explain directly the agency conflict in family businesses: strategic alignment, social alignment, trust and impartiality. Therefore, the findings of this research besides focusing on the usual procedural aspects of governance, such as disclosure and control, include behavioural elements which constitute a step ahead in the study of corporate governance in family business

Fuelling the zero-emissions road freight of the future: routing of mobile fuellers

The future of zero-emissions road freight is closely tied to the sufficient availability of new and clean fuel options such as electricity and Hydrogen. In goods distribution using Electric Commercial Vehicles (ECVs) and Hydrogen Fuel Cell Vehicles (HFCVs) a major challenge in the transition period would pertain to their limited autonomy and scarce and unevenly distributed refuelling stations. One viable solution to facilitate and speed up the adoption of ECVs/HFCVs by logistics, however, is to get the fuel to the point where it is needed (instead of diverting the route of delivery vehicles to refuelling stations) using "Mobile Fuellers (MFs)". These are mobile battery swapping/recharging vans or mobile Hydrogen fuellers that can travel to a running ECV/HFCV to provide the fuel they require to complete their delivery routes at a rendezvous time and space. In this presentation, new vehicle routing models will be presented for a third party company that provides MF services. In the proposed problem variant, the MF provider company receives routing plans of multiple customer companies and has to design routes for a fleet of capacitated MFs that have to synchronise their routes with the running vehicles to deliver the required amount of fuel on-the-fly. This presentation will discuss and compare several mathematical models based on different business models and collaborative logistics scenarios

Urban food strategies in Central and Eastern Europe: what's specific and what's at stake?

Integrating a larger set of instruments into Rural Development Programmes implied an increasing focus on monitoring and evaluation. Against the highly diversified experience with regard to implementation of policy instruments the Common Monitoring and Evaluation Framework has been set up by the EU Commission as a strategic and streamlined method of evaluating programmes’ impacts. Its indicator-based approach mainly reflects the concept of a linear, measure-based intervention logic that falls short of the true nature of RDP operation and impact capacity on rural changes. Besides the different phases of the policy process, i.e. policy design, delivery and evaluation, the regional context with its specific set of challenges and opportunities seems critical to the understanding and improvement of programme performance. In particular the role of local actors can hardly be grasped by quantitative indicators alone, but has to be addressed by assessing processes of social innovation. This shift in the evaluation focus underpins the need to take account of regional implementation specificities and processes of social innovation as decisive elements for programme performance.