A Comparative Study of Inequality and Corruption

We argue that income inequality increases the level of corruption through material and normative mechanisms. The wealthy have both greater motivation and opportunity to engage in corruption, while the poor are more vulnerable to extortion and less able to monitor and hold the rich and powerful accountable as inequality increases. Inequality also adversely affects peoples social norms about corruption and beliefs about the legitimacy of rules and institutions, and thereby makes it easier to tolerate corruption as acceptable behavior. Our comparative analysis of 129 countries utilizing two-staged least squares methods with a variety of instrumental variables supports our hypotheses, using different measures of corruption (the World Banks Control of Corruption Index and the Transparency Internationals Corruption Perceptions Index). The explanatory power of inequality is at least as important as conventionally accepted causes of corruption such as economic development. We also find a significant interaction effect between inequality and democracy, and evidence that inequality affects norms and perceptions about corruption, using the World Values Survey data. Since corruption also contributes to income inequality, societies often fall into vicious circles of inequality and corruption.This publication is Hauser Center Working Paper No. 22. The Hauser Center Working Paper Series was launched during the summer of 2000. The Series enables the Hauser Center to share with a broad audience important works-in-progress written by Hauser Center scholars and researchers

Corruption, shadow economy and income inequality: evidence from Asia

A number of recent studies for Latin America show that as the size of the informal economy grows, corruption is less harmful to inequality. We investigate if this relationship is equally compelling for developing countries in Asia where corruption, inequality and shadow economies are considerably large. We use Panel Least Square and Fixed Effects Models for Asia to find that both ‘Corruption Perception Index’ and ‘ICRG’ index are sensitive to a number of important macroeconomic variables. We find that in the absence of the shadow economy, corruption increases inequality. However, with larger shadow economies in South Asia, the income inequality tends to fall

Distribution and Development in a Model of Misgovernance

This paper presents an analysis of bureaucratic corruption, income inequality and economic development. The analysis is based on a dynamic general equilibrium model in which bureaucrats are appointed by the government to implement a redistributive programme of taxes and subsidies designed to benefit the poor. Corruption is reflected in bribery and tax evasion as bureaucrats conspire with the rich in providing false information to the government. In accordance with empirical evidence, the model predicts a positive relationship between corruption and inequality, and a negative relationship between corruption and development. --Corruption,inequality,development.

Is there a trade-off between income inequality and corruption? Evidence from Latin America

Conventional economic thinking says corruption and income inequality are positively related. In contrast, this study finds that lower corruption is associated with higher income inequality. The finding of a trade-off is not unexpected in the context of Latin America, for two reasons. First, Latin America has a large informal sector and corruption-reducing polices impose a transaction cost on this sector whose members are among the poorest. Second, redistributive measures, promoted by corrupt elements in society, are often cut back with institutional reform and this serves to worsen inequality. The results imply that corruption-reducing policies aimed at lowering inequality may be misguided.corruption, Latin America, income inequality, instrumental variables, panel data.

Inequality and Corruption: Evidence from US States

High-quality data on state-level inequality and incomes, panel data on corruption convictions, and careful attention to the consequences of including or excluding fixed effects in the panel specification allow us to estimate the impact of income considerations on the decision to undertake corrupt acts. Following efficiency wage arguments, for a given institutional environment the corruptible employee’s or official’s decision to engage in corruption is affected by relative wages and expected tenure in the public sector, the probability of detection, the cost of fines and jail terms, and the degree of inequality, which indicate diminished prospects facing those convicted of corruption. In US states over 25 years we show that inequality and higher government relative wages significantly and robustly produce less corruption. This reverses other findings of a positive association between inequality and corruption, which we show arises from long-run joint causation by unobserved factors.corruption; rent seeking; inequality; Gini coefficient; efficiency wage; public sector wages

Democracy, Property Rights, Income Equality, and Corruption

This paper presents theoretical and empirical evidence on the nexus between corruption and democracy. We establish a political economy model where the effect of democracy on corruption is conditional on income distribution and property rights protection. Our empirical analysis with cross-national panel data provides evidence that is consistent with the theoretical prediction. Moreover, the effect of democratization on corruption depends on the protection of property rights and income equality which shows that corruption is a nonlinear function of these variables. The results indicate that democracy will work better as a control of corruption if the property rights system works and there is a low level of income inequality. On the other hand if property rights are not secured and there is strong income inequality, democracy may even lead to an increase of corruption. In addition, property rights protection and the mitigation of income inequality contribute in a strong manner to the reduction of corruption.Corruption, Democracy, Income inequality, Property rights

Reexamining the link between gender and corruption: The role of social institutions

In this paper we reexamine the link between gender inequality and corruption. We review the literature on the relationship between representation of women in economic and political life, democracy and corruption, and bring in a new previously omitted variable that captures the level of discrimination against women in a society: social institutions related to gender inequality. Using a sample of developing countries we regress corruption on the representation of women, democracy and other control variables. Then we add the subindex civil liberties from the OECD Development Centre's GID Data-Base as the measure of social institutions related to gender inequality. The results show that corruption is higher in countries where social institutions deprive women of their freedom to participate in social life, even accounting for democracy and representation of women in political and economic life as well as for other variables. Our findings suggest that, in a context where social values disadvantage women, neither political reforms towards democracy nor increasing the representation of women in political and economic positions might be enough to reduce corruption. --Social institutions,Gender inequality,Corruption,OECD Development Centre's GID Data-Base

Corruption and inequality

Economic inequality provides a fertile breeding ground for corruption and, in turn, leads to further inequalities. Most corruption models focus on the institutional determinants of government dishonesty. However, such accounts are problematic. Corruption is remarkably sticky over time. There is a very powerful correlation between crossnational measures corruption in 1980 and in 2004. In contrast, measures of democracy such as the Freedom House scores are not so strongly correlated over time, and changes in corruption are unrelated to changes in institutional design. On the other hand, inequality and trust-like corruption are also sticky over time. The connection between inequality and the quality of government is not necessarily so simple. The aggregate relationships between inequality and corruption are not strong. The path from inequality to corruption may be indirect, through generalized trust, but the connection is key to understanding why some societies are more corrupt than others. This study estimates a simultaneous equation model of trust, corruption, perceptions of inequality, confidence in government, and demands for redistribution in Romania, and shows that perceptions of rising inequality and corruption lead to lower levels of trust and demands for redistribution. – corruption ; inequality ; trust ; transitio

Is Corruption Really Bad for Inequality? Evidence from Latin America

This paper presents new evidence on the relationship between corruption and income inequality. Using a panel data methodology, we find that lower corruption is associated with higher income inequality in Latin America. This result is in contrast to other empirical studies but it makes sense in Latin America for a number of reasons. The finding of an inverse relationship between inequality and corruption suggests that institutional reform policies by themselves may be misguided.Corruption, Inequality, Latin America

Corruption and Competition in the Presence of Inequality and Market Imperfections

We analyze the relation between corruption, competition and inequality in a developing economy context where markets are imperfect and there is wealth inequality. We consider an economy where different types of households (efficient and inefficient) choose whether to enter the production sector or not. Due to information asymmetry and wealth inequality, the market fails to screen out the inefficient types. In addition to the imperfect screening in the credit market, the inefficient type's entry is further facilitated by corruption in the product market. We analyze the market equilibrium and look at some of the implications. We show that a rise in inequality can lead to an increase in corruption along with greater competition. By endogenising the types, we also show how in the presence of corruption, initial wealth inequality will distort the incentives of the poor and lead to trap-like situations.Corruption, Competition, Credit Market, Inequality, Screening.