Frequentist statistics as a theory of inductive inference

After some general remarks about the interrelation between philosophical and statistical thinking, the discussion centres largely on significance tests. These are defined as the calculation of $p$-values rather than as formal procedures for ``acceptance'' and ``rejection.'' A number of types of null hypothesis are described and a principle for evidential interpretation set out governing the implications of $p$-values in the specific circumstances of each application, as contrasted with a long-run interpretation. A variety of more complicated situations are discussed in which modification of the simple $p$-value may be essential.Comment: Published at http://dx.doi.org/10.1214/074921706000000400 in the IMS Lecture Notes--Monograph Series (http://www.imstat.org/publications/lecnotes.htm) by the Institute of Mathematical Statistics (http://www.imstat.org

Literal Perceptual Inference

In this paper, I argue that theories of perception that appeal to Helmholtz’s idea of unconscious inference (“Helmholtzian” theories) should be taken literally, i.e. that the inferences appealed to in such theories are inferences in the full sense of the term, as employed elsewhere in philosophy and in ordinary discourse. In the course of the argument, I consider constraints on inference based on the idea that inference is a deliberate acton, and on the idea that inferences depend on the syntactic structure of representations. I argue that inference is a personal-level but sometimes unconscious process that cannot in general be distinguished from association on the basis of the structures of the representations over which it’s defined. I also critique arguments against representationalist interpretations of Helmholtzian theories, and argue against the view that perceptual inference is encapsulated in a module

Cut Elimination for a Logic with Induction and Co-induction

Proof search has been used to specify a wide range of computation systems. In order to build a framework for reasoning about such specifications, we make use of a sequent calculus involving induction and co-induction. These proof principles are based on a proof theoretic (rather than set-theoretic) notion of definition. Definitions are akin to logic programs, where the left and right rules for defined atoms allow one to view theories as "closed" or defining fixed points. The use of definitions and free equality makes it possible to reason intentionally about syntax. We add in a consistent way rules for pre and post fixed points, thus allowing the user to reason inductively and co-inductively about properties of computational system making full use of higher-order abstract syntax. Consistency is guaranteed via cut-elimination, where we give the first, to our knowledge, cut-elimination procedure in the presence of general inductive and co-inductive definitions.Comment: 42 pages, submitted to the Journal of Applied Logi

Homotopy Type Theory in Lean

We discuss the homotopy type theory library in the Lean proof assistant. The library is especially geared toward synthetic homotopy theory. Of particular interest is the use of just a few primitive notions of higher inductive types, namely quotients and truncations, and the use of cubical methods.Comment: 17 pages, accepted for ITP 201

Rules and derivations in an elementary logic course

When teaching an elementary logic course to students who have a general scientific background but have never been exposed to logic, we have to face the problem that the notions of deduction rule and of derivation are completely new to them, and are related to nothing they already know, unlike, for instance, the notion of model, that can be seen as a generalization of the notion of algebraic structure. In this note, we defend the idea that one strategy to introduce these notions is to start with the notion of inductive definition [1]. Then, the notion of derivation comes naturally. We also defend the idea that derivations are pervasive in logic and that defining precisely this notion at an early stage is a good investment to later define other notions in proof theory, computability theory, automata theory, ... Finally, we defend the idea that to define the notion of derivation precisely, we need to distinguish two notions of derivation: labeled with elements and labeled with rule names. This approach has been taken in [2]