Inductive inference of formal languages from positive data

We consider inductive inference of formal languages, as defined by Gold (1967), in the case of positive data, i.e., when the examples of a given formal language are successive elements of some arbitrary enumeration of the elements of the language. We prove a theorem characterizing when an indexed family of nonempty recursive formal languages is inferrable from positive data. From this theorem we obtain other useful conditions for inference from positive data, and give several examples of their application. We give counterexamples to two variants of the characterizing condition, and investigate conditions for inference from positive data that avoids “overgeneralization.

Developments from enquiries into the learnability of the pattern languages from positive data

AbstractThe pattern languages are languages that are generated from patterns, and were first proposed by Angluin as a non-trivial class that is inferable from positive data [D. Angluin, Finding patterns common to a set of strings, Journal of Computer and System Sciences 21 (1980) 46–62; D. Angluin, Inductive inference of formal languages from positive data, Information and Control 45 (1980) 117–135]. In this paper we chronologize some results that developed from the investigations on the inferability of the pattern languages from positive data

A Theory of Formal Synthesis via Inductive Learning

Formal synthesis is the process of generating a program satisfying a high-level formal specification. In recent times, effective formal synthesis methods have been proposed based on the use of inductive learning. We refer to this class of methods that learn programs from examples as formal inductive synthesis. In this paper, we present a theoretical framework for formal inductive synthesis. We discuss how formal inductive synthesis differs from traditional machine learning. We then describe oracle-guided inductive synthesis (OGIS), a framework that captures a family of synthesizers that operate by iteratively querying an oracle. An instance of OGIS that has had much practical impact is counterexample-guided inductive synthesis (CEGIS). We present a theoretical characterization of CEGIS for learning any program that computes a recursive language. In particular, we analyze the relative power of CEGIS variants where the types of counterexamples generated by the oracle varies. We also consider the impact of bounded versus unbounded memory available to the learning algorithm. In the special case where the universe of candidate programs is finite, we relate the speed of convergence to the notion of teaching dimension studied in machine learning theory. Altogether, the results of the paper take a first step towards a theoretical foundation for the emerging field of formal inductive synthesis

Are There Good Mistakes? A Theoretical Analysis of CEGIS

Counterexample-guided inductive synthesis CEGIS is used to synthesize programs from a candidate space of programs. The technique is guaranteed to terminate and synthesize the correct program if the space of candidate programs is finite. But the technique may or may not terminate with the correct program if the candidate space of programs is infinite. In this paper, we perform a theoretical analysis of counterexample-guided inductive synthesis technique. We investigate whether the set of candidate spaces for which the correct program can be synthesized using CEGIS depends on the counterexamples used in inductive synthesis, that is, whether there are good mistakes which would increase the synthesis power. We investigate whether the use of minimal counterexamples instead of arbitrary counterexamples expands the set of candidate spaces of programs for which inductive synthesis can successfully synthesize a correct program. We consider two kinds of counterexamples: minimal counterexamples and history bounded counterexamples. The history bounded counterexample used in any iteration of CEGIS is bounded by the examples used in previous iterations of inductive synthesis. We examine the relative change in power of inductive synthesis in both cases. We show that the synthesis technique using minimal counterexamples MinCEGIS has the same synthesis power as CEGIS but the synthesis technique using history bounded counterexamples HCEGIS has different power than that of CEGIS, but none dominates the other.Comment: In Proceedings SYNT 2014, arXiv:1407.493

Sciduction: Combining Induction, Deduction, and Structure for Verification and Synthesis

Even with impressive advances in automated formal methods, certain problems in system verification and synthesis remain challenging. Examples include the verification of quantitative properties of software involving constraints on timing and energy consumption, and the automatic synthesis of systems from specifications. The major challenges include environment modeling, incompleteness in specifications, and the complexity of underlying decision problems. This position paper proposes sciduction, an approach to tackle these challenges by integrating inductive inference, deductive reasoning, and structure hypotheses. Deductive reasoning, which leads from general rules or concepts to conclusions about specific problem instances, includes techniques such as logical inference and constraint solving. Inductive inference, which generalizes from specific instances to yield a concept, includes algorithmic learning from examples. Structure hypotheses are used to define the class of artifacts, such as invariants or program fragments, generated during verification or synthesis. Sciduction constrains inductive and deductive reasoning using structure hypotheses, and actively combines inductive and deductive reasoning: for instance, deductive techniques generate examples for learning, and inductive reasoning is used to guide the deductive engines. We illustrate this approach with three applications: (i) timing analysis of software; (ii) synthesis of loop-free programs, and (iii) controller synthesis for hybrid systems. Some future applications are also discussed

Apperceptive patterning: Artefaction, extensional beliefs and cognitive scaffolding

In “Psychopower and Ordinary Madness” my ambition, as it relates to Bernard Stiegler’s recent literature, was twofold: 1) critiquing Stiegler’s work on exosomatization and artefactual posthumanism—or, more specifically, nonhumanism—to problematize approaches to media archaeology that rely upon technical exteriorization; 2) challenging how Stiegler engages with Giuseppe Longo and Francis Bailly’s conception of negative entropy. These efforts were directed by a prevalent techno-cultural qualifier: the rise of Synthetic Intelligence (including neural nets, deep learning, predictive processing and Bayesian models of cognition). This paper continues this project but first directs a critical analytic lens at the Derridean practice of the ontologization of grammatization from which Stiegler emerges while also distinguishing how metalanguages operate in relation to object-oriented environmental interaction by way of inferentialism. Stalking continental (Kapp, Simondon, Leroi-Gourhan, etc.) and analytic traditions (e.g., Carnap, Chalmers, Clark, Sutton, Novaes, etc.), we move from artefacts to AI and Predictive Processing so as to link theories related to technicity with philosophy of mind. Simultaneously drawing forth Robert Brandom’s conceptualization of the roles that commitments play in retrospectively reconstructing the social experiences that lead to our endorsement(s) of norms, we compliment this account with Reza Negarestani’s deprivatized account of intelligence while analyzing the equipollent role between language and media (both digital and analog)