Analysing the EAP-TLS handshake and the 4-way handshake of the 802.11i standard

The IEEE 802.11i standard has been designed to enhance security in wireless networks. The EAP-TLS handshake aims to provide mutual authentication between supplicant and authentication server, and then derive the Pairwise Master Key (PMK). In the 4 -way handshake the supplicant and the authenticator use PMK to derive a fresh pairwise transient key (PTK). The PMK is not used directly for security while assuming the supplicant and authenticator have the same PMK before running 4- way handshake. In this paper, the EAP-TLS handshake and the 4-way handshake phases have been analysed with a proposed framework using Isabelle tool. In the analysis, we have found a new Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack in the 4-way handshake. The attack prevents the authenticator from receiving message 4 after the supplicant sends it out. This attack forces the authenticator to re-send the message 3 until time out and subsequently to de-authenticate supplicant. This paper has proposed improvements to the 4-way handshake to avoid the Denial-of-Service attack

Human centric security and privacy for the IoT using formal techniques

In this paper, we summarize a new approach to make security and privacy issues in the Internet of Things (IoT) more transparent for vulnerable users. As a pilot project, we investigate monitoring of Alzheimer’s patients for a low-cost early warning system based on bio-markers supported with smart technologies. To provide trustworthy and secure IoT infrastructures, we employ formal methods and techniques that allow specification of IoT scenarios with human actors, refinement and analysis of attacks and generation of certified code for IoT component architectures

Analysing and attacking the 4-way handshake of IEEE 802.11i standard

The IEEE 802.11i standard has been designed to enhance security in wireless networks. In the 4-way handshake the supplicant and the authenticator use the pairwise master key (PMK) to derive a fresh pairwise transient key (PTK). The PMK is not used directly for security while assuming the supplicant and authenticator have the same PMK before running 4-way handshake. In this paper, the 4-way handshake phase has been analysed using Isabelle tool to identify a new Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack. The attack prevents the authenticator from receiving message 4 after the supplicant sends it out. This attack forces the authenticator to re-send the message 3 until time out and subsequently to de-authenticate supplicant. This paper has proposed improvements to the 4-way handshake to avoid the Denial-of-Service attack

Proving Properties of Rich Internet Applications

We introduce application layer specifications, which allow us to reason about the state and transactions of rich Internet applications. We define variants of the state/event based logic UCTL* along with two example applications to demonstrate this approach, and then look at a distributed, rich Internet application, proving properties about the information it stores and disseminates. Our approach enables us to justify proofs about abstract properties that are preserved in the face of concurrent, networked inputs by proofs about concrete properties in an Internet setting. We conclude that our approach makes it possible to reason about the programs and protocols that comprise the Internet's application layer with reliability and generality.Comment: In Proceedings WWV 2013, arXiv:1308.026

Simple Public Key Infrastructure Analysis Protocol Analysis and Design

Secure electronic communication is based on secrecy, authentication and authorization. One means of assuring a communication has these properties is to use Public Key Cryptography (PKC). The framework consisting of standards, protocols and instructions that make PKC usable in communication applications is called a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). This thesis aims at proving the applicability of the Simple Public Key Infrastructure (SPKI) as a means of PKC. The strand space approach of Guttman and Thayer is used to provide an appropriate model for analysis. A Diffie-Hellman strand space model is combined with mixed strand space proof methods for proving the correctness of multiple protocols operating in the same context. The result is the public key mixed strand space model. This model is ideal for the analysis of SPKI applications operating as sub-protocols of an implementing application. This thesis then models the popular Internet Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol as a public key mixed strand space model. The model includes the integration of SPKI certificates. To accommodate the functionality of SPKI, a new protocol is designed for certificate validation, the Certificate Chain Validation Protocol (CCV). The CCV protocol operates as a sub-protocol to TLS and provides online certificate validation. The security of the TLS protocol integrated with SPKI certificates and subprotocols is then analyzed to prove its security properties

Formal Verification of Security Protocol Implementations: A Survey

Automated formal verification of security protocols has been mostly focused on analyzing high-level abstract models which, however, are significantly different from real protocol implementations written in programming languages. Recently, some researchers have started investigating techniques that bring automated formal proofs closer to real implementations. This paper surveys these attempts, focusing on approaches that target the application code that implements protocol logic, rather than the libraries that implement cryptography. According to these approaches, libraries are assumed to correctly implement some models. The aim is to derive formal proofs that, under this assumption, give assurance about the application code that implements the protocol logic. The two main approaches of model extraction and code generation are presented, along with the main techniques adopted for each approac