Decentralized Greedy-Based Algorithm for Smart Energy Management in Plug-in Electric Vehicle Energy Distribution Systems

Variations in electricity tariffs arising due to stochastic demand loads on the power grids have stimulated research in finding optimal charging/discharging scheduling solutions for electric vehicles (EVs). Most of the current EV scheduling solutions are either centralized, which suffer from low reliability and high complexity, while existing decentralized solutions do not facilitate the efficient scheduling of on-move EVs in large-scale networks considering a smart energy distribution system. Motivated by smart cities applications, we consider in this paper the optimal scheduling of EVs in a geographically large-scale smart energy distribution system where EVs have the flexibility of charging/discharging at spatially-deployed smart charging stations (CSs) operated by individual aggregators. In such a scenario, we define the social welfare maximization problem as the total profit of both supply and demand sides in the form of a mixed integer non-linear programming (MINLP) model. Due to the intractability, we then propose an online decentralized algorithm with low complexity which utilizes effective heuristics to forward each EV to the most profitable CS in a smart manner. Results of simulations on the IEEE 37 bus distribution network verify that the proposed algorithm improves the social welfare by about 30% on average with respect to an alternative scheduling strategy under the equal participation of EVs in charging and discharging operations. Considering the best-case performance where only EV profit maximization is concerned, our solution also achieves upto 20% improvement in flatting the final electricity load. Furthermore, the results reveal the existence of an optimal number of CSs and an optimal vehicle-to-grid penetration threshold for which the overall profit can be maximized. Our findings serve as guidelines for V2G system designers in smart city scenarios to plan a cost-effective strategy for large-scale EVs distributed energy management

(WP 2016-05) Hodgson, Cumulative Causation, and Reflexive Economic Agents

This paper examines Geoff Hodgson’s interpretation of Veblen in agency-structure terms, and argues it produces a conception of reflexive economic agents. It then sets out an account of cumulative causation processes using this reflexive agent conception, modeling them as a two-part causal process, one part involving a linear causal relation and one part involving a circular causal relation. The paper compares the reflexive agent conception to the standard expected utility conception of economic agents, and argues that on a cumulative causation view of the world the completeness assumption essential to the standard view of rationality cannot be applied. The final discussion addresses the nature of the choice behavior of reflexive economic agents, using the thinking of Amartya Sen and Herbert Simon to frame how agents might approach choice in regard to each of the two different parts of cumulative causal processes, and closing with brief comments on behavioral economics’ understanding of reference dependence and position adjustment

A Game Theoretic Analysis of Incentives in Content Production and Sharing over Peer-to-Peer Networks

User-generated content can be distributed at a low cost using peer-to-peer (P2P) networks, but the free-rider problem hinders the utilization of P2P networks. In order to achieve an efficient use of P2P networks, we investigate fundamental issues on incentives in content production and sharing using game theory. We build a basic model to analyze non-cooperative outcomes without an incentive scheme and then use different game formulations derived from the basic model to examine five incentive schemes: cooperative, payment, repeated interaction, intervention, and enforced full sharing. The results of this paper show that 1) cooperative peers share all produced content while non-cooperative peers do not share at all without an incentive scheme; 2) a cooperative scheme allows peers to consume more content than non-cooperative outcomes do; 3) a cooperative outcome can be achieved among non-cooperative peers by introducing an incentive scheme based on payment, repeated interaction, or intervention; and 4) enforced full sharing has ambiguous welfare effects on peers. In addition to describing the solutions of different formulations, we discuss enforcement and informational requirements to implement each solution, aiming to offer a guideline for protocol designers when designing incentive schemes for P2P networks.Comment: 31 pages, 3 figures, 1 tabl

Height, Relationship Satisfaction, Jealousy, and Mate Retention

Male height is associated with high mate value. In particular, tall men are perceived as more attractive, dominant and of a higher status than shorter rivals, resulting in a greater lifetime reproductive success. Female infidelity and relationship dissolution may therefore present a greater risk to short men. It was predicted that tall men would report greater relationship satisfaction and lower jealousy and mate retention behavior than short men. Ninety eight heterosexual men in a current romantic relationship completed a questionnaire. Both linear and quadratic relationships were found between male height and relationship satisfaction, cognitive and behavioral jealousy. Tall men reported greater relationship satisfaction and lower levels of cognitive or behavioral jealousy than short men. In addition, linear and quadratic relationships were found between male height and a number of mate retention behaviors. Tall and short men engaged in different mate retention behaviors. These findings are consistent with previous research conducted in this area detailing the greater attractiveness of tall men

Are male orangutans a threat to infants? Evidence of mother-offspring counter strategies to infanticide in Bornean orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus wurmbii)

Sexually selected infanticide by males is widespread in primates. Female primates employ a variety of strategies to reduce infanticide risk. While infanticide has never been directly observed in wild orangutans (Pongo spp.), their slow life history makes infants vulnerable to infanticide. The mating strategies of female orangutans include polyandrous and postconceptive mating that may serve to increase paternity confusion, an infanticide avoidance strategy. Here, we investigate whether female orangutans alter their social interactions with males as another infanticide avoidance strategy. We hypothesize that females with younger offspring avoid males and that the distance between mother and offspring decreases in the presence of males. We use long-term behavioral data collected between 1994 and 2016 from Bornean orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus wurmbii) in Gunung Palung National Park, Indonesia, to test whether the sexual selection hypothesis for infanticide helps explain aspects of orangutan social behavior. We found that mothers with offspring 6 yr. old and females without offspring. In addition, the distance between a mother–offspring dyad showed a statistically significant decrease in the presence of males, but not females. Our results are consistent with the hypothesis that female orangutans employ strategies to reduce infanticide risk in their social interactions. Because orangutans have a high fission–fusion dynamic, they have flexibility in manipulating social interactions as a counter-infanticide strategy. Our results suggest that infanticide by males is a selective pressure shaping female orangutan social behavior.Accepted manuscrip