258,822 research outputs found
The Efficacy of Group Selection is Increased by Coexistence Dynamics within Groups
Selection on the level of loosely associated groups has been suggested as a route towards the evolution of cooperation between individuals and the subsequent formation of higher-level biological entities. Such group selection explanations remain problematic, however, due to the narrow range of parameters under which they can overturn within-group selection that favours selfish behaviour. In principle, individual selection could act on such parameters so as to strengthen the force of between-group selection and hence increase cooperation and individual fitness, as illustrated in our previous work. However, such a process cannot operate in parameter regions where group selection effects are totally absent, since there would be no selective gradient to follow. One key parameter, which when increased often rapidly causes group selection effects to tend to zero, is initial group size, for when groups are formed randomly then even moderately sized groups lack significant variance in their composition. However, the consequent restriction of any group selection effect to small sized groups is derived from models that assume selfish types will competitively exclude their more cooperative counterparts at within-group equilibrium. In such cases, diversity in the migrant pool can tend to zero and accordingly variance in group composition cannot be generated. In contrast, we show that if within-group dynamics lead to a stable coexistence of selfish and cooperative types, then the range of group sizes showing some effect of group selection is much larger
Growth dynamics and the evolution of cooperation in microbial populations
Microbes providing public goods are widespread in nature despite running the
risk of being exploited by free-riders. However, the precise ecological factors
supporting cooperation are still puzzling. Following recent experiments, we
consider the role of population growth and the repetitive fragmentation of
populations into new colonies mimicking simple microbial life-cycles.
Individual-based modeling reveals that demographic fluctuations, which lead to
a large variance in the composition of colonies, promote cooperation. Biased by
population dynamics these fluctuations result in two qualitatively distinct
regimes of robust cooperation under repetitive fragmentation into groups.
First, if the level of cooperation exceeds a threshold, cooperators will take
over the whole population. Second, cooperators can also emerge from a single
mutant leading to a robust coexistence between cooperators and free-riders. We
find frequency and size of population bottlenecks, and growth dynamics to be
the major ecological factors determining the regimes and thereby the
evolutionary pathway towards cooperation.Comment: 26 pages, 6 figure
Cooperation, Norms, and Revolutions: A Unified Game-Theoretical Approach
Cooperation is of utmost importance to society as a whole, but is often
challenged by individual self-interests. While game theory has studied this
problem extensively, there is little work on interactions within and across
groups with different preferences or beliefs. Yet, people from different social
or cultural backgrounds often meet and interact. This can yield conflict, since
behavior that is considered cooperative by one population might be perceived as
non-cooperative from the viewpoint of another.
To understand the dynamics and outcome of the competitive interactions within
and between groups, we study game-dynamical replicator equations for multiple
populations with incompatible interests and different power (be this due to
different population sizes, material resources, social capital, or other
factors). These equations allow us to address various important questions: For
example, can cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma be promoted, when two
interacting groups have different preferences? Under what conditions can costly
punishment, or other mechanisms, foster the evolution of norms? When does
cooperation fail, leading to antagonistic behavior, conflict, or even
revolutions? And what incentives are needed to reach peaceful agreements
between groups with conflicting interests?
Our detailed quantitative analysis reveals a large variety of interesting
results, which are relevant for society, law and economics, and have
implications for the evolution of language and culture as well
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Cooperative Or Controlling? The Effects Of Ceo-Board Relations And The Content Of Interlocks On The Formation Of Joint Ventures
This study examines the influence of the social network of board interlocks on strategic alliance formation. Our theoretical framework suggests how board interlock ties to other firms can increase or decrease the likelihood of alliance formation, depending on the content of relationships between CEOs (chief executive officers) and outside directors. Results suggest that CEO-board relationships characterized by independent board control reduce the likelihood of alliance formation by prompting distrust between corporate leaders, while CEO-board cooperation in strategic decision making appears to promote alliance formation by enhancing trust. The findings also show how the effects of direct interlock ties are amplified further by third-party network ties.Business Administratio
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