Multimedia Social Networks: Game Theoretic Modeling and Equilibrium Analysis

Multimedia content sharing and distribution over multimedia social networks is more popular now than ever before: we download music from Napster, share our images on Flickr, view user-created video on YouTube, and watch peer-to-peer television using Coolstreaming, PPLive and PPStream. Within these multimedia social networks, users share, exchange, and compete for scarce resources such as multimedia data and bandwidth, and thus influence each other's decision and performance. Therefore, to provide fundamental guidelines for the better system design, it is important to analyze the users' behaviors and interactions in a multimedia social network, i.e., how users interact with and respond to each other. Game theory is a mathematical tool that analyzes the strategic interactions among multiple decision makers. It is ideal and essential for studying, analyzing, and modeling the users' behaviors and interactions in social networking. In this thesis, game theory will be used to model users' behaviors in social networks and analyze the corresponding equilibria. Specifically, in this thesis, we first illustrate how to use game theory to analyze and model users' behaviors in multimedia social networks by discussing the following three different scenarios. In the first scenario, we consider a non-cooperative multimedia social network where users in the social network compete for the same resource. We use multiuser rate allocation social network as an example for this scenario. In the second scenario, we consider a cooperative multimedia social network where users in the social network cooperate with each other to obtain the content. We use cooperative peer-to-peer streaming social network as an example for this scenario. In the third scenario, we consider how to use the indirect reciprocity game to stimulate cooperation among users. We use the packet forwarding social network as an example. Moreover, the concept of ``multimedia social networks" can be applied into the field of signal and image processing. If each pixel/sample is treated as a user, then the whole image/signal can be regarded as a multimedia social network. From such a perspective, we introduce a new paradigm for signal and image processing, and develop generalized and unified frameworks for classical signal and image problems. In this thesis, we use image denoising and image interpolation as examples to illustrate how to use game theory to re-formulate the classical signal and image processing problems

ADDRESSING SELFISHNESS IN THE DESIGN OF COOPERATIVE SYSTEMS

I sistemi distribuiti cooperativi, tra cui in particolare i sistemi peer-to-peer, sono oggi alla base di applicazioni Internet di larga diffusione come file-sharing e media streaming, nonch\ue9 di tecnologie emergenti quali Blockchain e l'Internet of Things. Uno dei fattori chiave per il successo di un sistema cooperativo \ue8 che i nodi che vi partecipano mettano a disposizione della comunit\ue0 una parte delle proprie risorse (es. capacit\ue0 di calcolo, banda, spazio disco). Alcuni nodi, poich\ue9 controllati da agenti autonomi e indipendenti, potrebbero tuttavia agire egoisticamente e scegliere di non condividere alcuna risorsa, spinti dall'obiettivo di massimizzare la propria utilit\ue0 anche se a danno delle prestazioni dell'intero sistema. Affrontare l'egoismo dei nodi rappresenta dunque un'attivit\ue0 imprescindibile per lo sviluppo di un sistema cooperativo affidabile e performante. Nonostante il grande numero di tecniche ed approcci presenti in letteratura, tale attivit\ue0 richiede elaborazioni complesse, manuali e laboriose, nonch\ue9 conoscenze approfondite in vari domini di applicazione. Obiettivo di questa tesi \ue8 di fornire strumenti sia pratici che teorici per semplificare lo studio e il contrasto dei comportamenti egoistici nei sistemi cooperativi. Il primo contributo, basato su un'analisi esaustiva dello stato dell'arte sull'egoismo in sistemi distribuiti, presenta un framework di classificazione finalizzato all'identificazione e comprensione dei comportamenti egoistici pi\uf9 importanti su cui concentrarsi durante la progettazione di un sistema cooperativo. Come secondo contributo, presentiamo RACOON, un framework per la progettazione e configurazione di sistemi cooperativi resilienti all'egoismo dei nodi. L'obiettivo di RACOON \ue8 di semplificare tali attivit\ue0 fornendo una metodologia generale e semi-automatica, capace di integrare in un dato sistema pratici meccanismi di incentivo alla cooperazione, attentamente calibrati in modo da raggiungere gli obiettivi di resilienza e performance desiderati. A tal fine, RACOON impiega sia strumenti analitici appartenenti alla teoria dei giochi che metodi simulativi, che vengono utilizzati per fare previsioni sul comportamento del sistema in presenza di nodi egoisti. In questa tesi presentiamo inoltre una versione estesa del framework, chiamata RACOON++, sviluppata per migliorare l'accuratezza, flessibilit\ue0 e usabilit\ue0 del framework originale. Infine, come ultimo contributo del lavoro di tesi, presentiamo SEINE, un framework per la rapida modellazione e analisi sperimentale di vari tipi di comportamenti egoistici in un dato sistema cooperativo. Il framework \ue8 basato su un nuovo linguaggio specifico di dominio (SEINE-L) sviluppato per la descrizione degli scenari di egoismo da analizzare. SEINE fornisce inoltre supporto semi-automatico per l'implementazione e lo studio di tali scenari in un simulatore di sistemi distribuiti selezionato dallo stato dell'arte.Cooperative distributed systems, particularly peer-to-peer systems, are the basis of several mainstream Internet applications (e.g., file-sharing, media streaming) and the key enablers of new and emerging technologies, including blockchain and the Internet of Things. Essential to the success of cooperative systems is that nodes are willing to cooperate with each other by sharing part of their resources, e.g., network bandwidth, CPU capability, storage space. However, as nodes are autonomous entities, they may be tempted to behave in a selfish manner by not contributing their fair share, potentially causing system performance degradation and instability. Addressing selfish nodes is, therefore, key to building efficient and reliable cooperative systems. Yet, it is a challenging task, as current techniques for analysing selfishness and designing effective countermeasures remain manual and time-consuming, requiring multi-domain expertise. In this thesis, we aim to provide practical and conceptual tools to help system designers in dealing with selfish nodes. First, based on a comprehensive survey of existing work on selfishness, we develop a classification framework to identify and understand the most important selfish behaviours to focus on when designing a cooperative system. Second, we propose RACOON, a unifying framework for the selfishness-aware design and configuration of cooperative systems. RACOON provides a semi-automatic methodology to integrate a given system with practical and finely tuned mechanisms to meet specified resilience and performance objectives, using game theory and simulations to predict the behaviour of the system when subjected to selfish nodes. An extension of the framework (RACOON++) is also proposed to improve the accuracy, flexibility, and usability of RACOON. Finally, we propose SEINE, a framework for fast modelling and evaluation of various types of selfish behaviour in a given cooperative system. SEINE relies on a domain-specific language for describing the selfishness scenario to evaluate and provides semi-automatic support for its implementation and study in a state-of-the-art simulator.Les syst\ue8mes distribu\ue9s collaboratifs, en particulier les syst\ue8mes pair-\ue0-pair, forment l\u2019infrastructure sous-jacente de nombreuses applications Internet, certaines parmi les plus populaires (ex\ua0: partage de fichiers, streaming multim\ue9dia). Ils se situent \ue9galement \ue0 la base d\u2019un ensemble de technologies \ue9mergentes telles que la blockchain et l\u2019Internet des Objets. Le succ\ue8s de ces syst\ue8mes repose sur la contribution volontaire, de la part des n\u153uds participants, aux ressources partag\ue9es (ex : bande passante r\ue9seau, puissance de calcul, stockage de donn\ue9es). Or ces n\u153uds sont des entit\ue9s autonomes qui peuvent consid\ue9rer comme plus avantageux de se comporter de mani\ue8re \ue9go\uefste, c\u2019est-\ue0- dire de refuser de collaborer. De tels comportements peuvent fortement impacter les performances et la stabilit\ue9 op\ue9rationnelles du syst\ue8me cible. Prendre en compte et pr\ue9venir les comportements \ue9go\uefstes des n\u153uds est donc essentiel pour garantir l\u2019efficacit\ue9 et la fiabilit\ue9 des syst\ue8mes coop\ue9ratifs. Cependant, cela exige du d\ue9veloppeur, en d\ue9pit de la grande quantit\ue9 de techniques et d\u2019approches propos\ue9es dans la litt\ue9rature, des connaissances multisectorielles approfondies. L'objectif de cette th\ue8se est de concevoir et \ue9tudier de nouveaux outils th\ue9oriques et pratiques pour aider les concepteurs de syst\ue8mes distribu\ue9s collaboratifs \ue0 faire face \ue0 des n\u153uds \ue9go\uefstes. La premi\ue8re contribution, bas\ue9e sur une analyse exhaustive de la litt\ue9rature sur les comportements \ue9go\uefstes dans les syst\ue8mes distribu\ue9s, propose un mod\ue8le de classification pour identifier et analyser les comportements \ue9go\uefstes les plus importants sur lesquels il est important de se concentrer lors de la conception d'un syst\ue8me coop\ue9ratif. Dans la deuxi\ue8me contribution, nous proposons RACOON, un framework pour la conception et la configuration de syst\ue8mes coop\ue9ratifs r\ue9silients aux comportements \ue9go\uefstes. Outre un ensemble de m\ue9canismes d'incitation \ue0 la coop\ue9ration, RACOON fournit une m\ue9thodologie semi-automatique d\u2019int\ue9gration et de calibration de ces m\ue9canismes de mani\ue8re \ue0 garantir le niveau de performance souhait\ue9. RACOON s\u2019appuie sur une analyse du syst\ue8me cible fond\ue9e sur la th\ue9orie des jeux et sur des simulations pour pr\ue9dire l\u2019existence de n\u153uds \ue9go\uefstes dans le syst\ue8me. RACOON a \ue9t\ue9 \ue9tendu en un deuxi\ue8me framework, RACOON++. Plus pr\ue9cis, plus flexible, RACOON++ offre \ue9galement une plus grande facilit\ue9 d'utilisation. Une derni\ue8re contribution, SEINE, propose un framework pour la mod\ue9lisation et l'analyse des diff\ue9rents types de comportements \ue9go\uefstes dans un syst\ue8me coop\ue9ratif. Bas\ue9 sur un langage d\ue9di\ue9, d\ue9velopp\ue9 pour d\ue9crire les sc\ue9narios de comportement \ue9go\uefstes, SEINE fournit un support semi-automatique pour la mise en \u153uvre et l'\ue9tude de ces sc\ue9narios dans un simulateur choisi sur la base de l\u2019\ue9tat de l\u2019art (PeerSim)

Incentive-driven QoS in peer-to-peer overlays

A well known problem in peer-to-peer overlays is that no single entity has control over the software, hardware and configuration of peers. Thus, each peer can selfishly adapt its behaviour to maximise its benefit from the overlay. This thesis is concerned with the modelling and design of incentive mechanisms for QoS-overlays: resource allocation protocols that provide strategic peers with participation incentives, while at the same time optimising the performance of the peer-to-peer distribution overlay. The contributions of this thesis are as follows. First, we present PledgeRoute, a novel contribution accounting system that can be used, along with a set of reciprocity policies, as an incentive mechanism to encourage peers to contribute resources even when users are not actively consuming overlay services. This mechanism uses a decentralised credit network, is resilient to sybil attacks, and allows peers to achieve time and space deferred contribution reciprocity. Then, we present a novel, QoS-aware resource allocation model based on Vickrey auctions that uses PledgeRoute as a substrate. It acts as an incentive mechanism by providing efficient overlay construction, while at the same time allocating increasing service quality to those peers that contribute more to the network. The model is then applied to lagsensitive chunk swarming, and some of its properties are explored for different peer delay distributions. When considering QoS overlays deployed over the best-effort Internet, the quality received by a client cannot be adjudicated completely to either its serving peer or the intervening network between them. By drawing parallels between this situation and well-known hidden action situations in microeconomics, we propose a novel scheme to ensure adherence to advertised QoS levels. We then apply it to delay-sensitive chunk distribution overlays and present the optimal contract payments required, along with a method for QoS contract enforcement through reciprocative strategies. We also present a probabilistic model for application-layer delay as a function of the prevailing network conditions. Finally, we address the incentives of managed overlays, and the prediction of their behaviour. We propose two novel models of multihoming managed overlay incentives in which overlays can freely allocate their traffic flows between different ISPs. One is obtained by optimising an overlay utility function with desired properties, while the other is designed for data-driven least-squares fitting of the cross elasticity of demand. This last model is then used to solve for ISP profit maximisation

A NOVEL FRAMEWORK FOR SOCIAL INTERNET OF THINGS: LEVERAGING THE FRIENDSHIPS AND THE SERVICES EXCHANGED BETWEEN SMART DEVICES

As humans, we tackle many problems in complex societies and manage the complexities of networked social systems. Cognition and sociability are two vital human capabilities that improve social life and complex social interactions. Adding these features to smart devices makes them capable of managing complex and networked Internet of Things (IoT) settings. Cognitive and social devices can improve their relationships and connections with other devices and people to better serve human needs. Nowadays, researchers are investigating two future generations of IoT: social IoT (SIoT) and cognitive IoT (CIoT). This study develops a new framework for IoT, called CSIoT, by using complexity science concepts and by integrating social and cognitive IoT concepts. This framework uses a new mechanism to leverage the friendships between devices to address service management, privacy, and security. The framework addresses network navigability, resilience, and heterogeneity between devices in IoT settings. This study uses a new simulation tool for evaluating the new CSIoT framework and evaluates the privacy-preserving ability of CSIoT using the new simulation tool. To address different CSIoT security and privacy issues, this study also proposes a blockchain-based CSIoT. The evaluation results show that CSIoT can effectively preserve the privacy and the blockchain-based CSIoT performs effectively in addressing different privacy and security issues

Supporting cooperation and coordination in open multi-agent systems

Cooperation and coordination between agents are fundamental processes for increasing aggregate and individual benefit in open Multi-Agent Systems (MAS). The increased ubiquity, size, and complexity of open MAS in the modern world has prompted significant research interest in the mechanisms that underlie cooperative and coordinated behaviour. In open MAS, in which agents join and leave freely, we can assume the following properties: (i) there are no centralised authorities, (ii) agent authority is uniform, (iii) agents may be heterogeneously owned and designed, and may consequently have con icting intentions and inconsistent capabilities, and (iv) agents are constrained in interactions by a complex connecting network topology. Developing mechanisms to support cooperative and coordinated behaviour that remain effective under these assumptions remains an open research problem. Two of the major mechanisms by which cooperative and coordinated behaviour can be achieved are (i) trust and reputation, and (ii) norms and conventions. Trust and reputation, which support cooperative and coordinated behaviour through notions of reciprocity, are effective in protecting agents from malicious or selfish individuals, but their capabilities can be affected by a lack of information about potential partners and the impact of the underlying network structure. Regarding conventions and norms, there are still a wide variety of open research problems, including: (i) manipulating which convention or norm a population adopts, (ii) how to exploit knowledge of the underlying network structure to improve mechanism efficacy, and (iii) how conventions might be manipulated in the middle and latter stages of their lifecycle, when they have become established and stable. In this thesis, we address these issues and propose a number of techniques and theoretical advancements that help ensure the robustness and efficiency of these mechanisms in the context of open MAS, and demonstrate new techniques for manipulating convention emergence in large, distributed populations. Specfically, we (i) show that gossiping of reputation information can mitigate the detrimental effects of incomplete information on trust and reputation and reduce the impact of network structure, (ii) propose a new model of conventions that accounts for limitations in existing theories, (iii) show how to manipulate convention emergence using small groups of agents inserted by interested parties, (iv) demonstrate how to learn which locations in a network have the greatest capacity to in uence which convention a population adopts, and (v) show how conventions can be manipulated in the middle and latter stages of the convention lifecycle

Synoptic analysis techniques for intrusion detection in wireless networks

Current system administrators are missing intrusion alerts hidden by large numbers of false positives. Rather than accumulation more data to identify true alerts, we propose an intrusion detection tool that e?ectively uses select data to provide a picture of ?network health?. Our hypothesis is that by utilizing the data available at both the node and cooperative network levels we can create a synoptic picture of the network providing indications of many intrusions or other network issues. Our major contribution is to provide a revolutionary way to analyze node and network data for patterns, dependence, and e?ects that indicate network issues. We collect node and network data, combine and manipulate it, and tease out information about the state of the network. We present a method based on utilizing the number of packets sent, number of packets received, node reliability, route reliability, and entropy to develop a synoptic picture of the network health in the presence of a sinkhole and a HELLO Flood attacker. This method conserves network throughput and node energy by requiring no additional control messages to be sent between the nodes unless an attacker is suspected. We intend to show that, although the concept of an intrusion detection system is not revolutionary, the method in which we analyze the data for clues about network intrusion and performance is highly innovative

Signaling and Reciprocity:Robust Decentralized Information Flows in Social, Communication, and Computer Networks

Complex networks exist for a number of purposes. The neural, metabolic and food networks ensure our survival, while the social, economic, transportation and communication networks allow us to prosper. Independently of the purposes and particularities of the physical embodiment of the networks, one of their fundamental functions is the delivery of information from one part of the network to another. Gossip and diseases diffuse in the social networks, electrochemical signals propagate in the neural networks and data packets travel in the Internet. Engineering networks for robust information flows is a challenging task. First, the mechanism through which the network forms and changes its topology needs to be defined. Second, within a given topology, the information must be routed to the appropriate recipients. Third, both the network formation and the routing mechanisms need to be robust against a wide spectrum of failures and adversaries. Fourth, the network formation, routing and failure recovery must operate under the resource constraints, either intrinsic or extrinsic to the network. Finally, the autonomously operating parts of the network must be incentivized to contribute their resources to facilitate the information flows. This thesis tackles the above challenges within the context of several types of networks: 1) peer-to-peer overlays – computers interconnected over the Internet to form an overlay in which participants provide various services to one another, 2) mobile ad-hoc networks – mobile nodes distributed in physical space communicating wirelessly with the goal of delivering data from one part of the network to another, 3) file-sharing networks – networks whose participants interconnect over the Internet to exchange files, 4) social networks – humans disseminating and consuming information through the network of social relationships. The thesis makes several contributions. Firstly, we propose a general algorithm, which given a set of nodes embedded in an arbitrary metric space, interconnects them into a network that efficiently routes information. We apply the algorithm to the peer-to-peer overlays and experimentally demonstrate its high performance, scalability as well as resilience to continuous peer arrivals and departures. We then shift our focus to the problem of the reliability of routing in the peer-to-peer overlays. Each overlay peer has limited resources and when they are exhausted this ultimately leads to delayed or lost overlay messages. All the solutions addressing this problem rely on message redundancy, which significantly increases the resource costs of fault-tolerance. We propose a bandwidth-efficient single-path Forward Feedback Protocol (FFP) for overlay message routing in which successfully delivered messages are followed by a feedback signal to reinforce the routing paths. Internet testbed evaluation shows that FFP uses 2-5 times less network bandwidth than the existing protocols relying on message redundancy, while achieving comparable fault-tolerance levels under a variety of failure scenarios. While the Forward Feedback Protocol is robust to message loss and delays, it is vulnerable to malicious message injection. We address this and other security problems by proposing Castor, a variant of FFP for mobile ad-hoc networks (MANETs). In Castor, we use the same general mechanism as in FFP; each time a message is routed, the routing path is either enforced or weakened by the feedback signal depending on whether the routing succeeded or not. However, unlike FFP, Castor employs cryptographic mechanisms for ensuring the integrity and authenticity of the messages. We compare Castor to four other MANET routing protocols. Despite Castor's simplicity, it achieves up to 40% higher packet delivery rates than the other protocols and recovers at least twice as fast as the other protocols in a wide range of attacks and failure scenarios. Both of our protocols, FFP and Castor, rely on simple signaling to improve the routing robustness in peer-to-peer and mobile ad-hoc networks. Given the success of the signaling mechanism in shaping the information flows in these two types of networks, we examine if signaling plays a similar crucial role in the on-line social networks. We characterize the propagation of URLs in the social network of Twitter. The data analysis uncovers several statistical regularities in the user activity, the social graph, the structure of the URL cascades as well as the communication and signaling dynamics. Based on these results, we propose a propagation model that accurately predicts which users are likely to mention which URLs. We outline a number of applications where the social network information flow modelling would be crucial: content ranking and filtering, viral marketing and spam detection. Finally, we consider the problem of freeriding in peer-to-peer file-sharing applications, when users can download data from others, but never reciprocate by uploading. To address the problem, we propose a variant of the BitTorrent system in which two peers are only allowed to connect if their owners know one another in the real world. When the users know which other users their BitTorrent client connects to, they are more likely to cooperate. The social network becomes the content distribution network and the freeriding problem is solved by leveraging the social norms and reciprocity to stabilize cooperation rather than relying on technological means. Our extensive simulation shows that the social network topology is an efficient and scalable content distribution medium, while at the same time provides robustness to freeriding

On the Design and Analysis of Incentive Mechanisms in Network Science

With the rapid development of communication, computing and signal processing technologies, the last decade has witnessed a proliferation of emerging networks and systems, examples of which can be found in a wide range of domains from online social networks like Facebook or Twitter to crowdsourcing sites like Amazon Mechanical Turk or Topcoder; to online question and answering (Q&A) sites like Quora or Stack Overflow; all the way to new paradigms of traditional systems like cooperative communication networks and smart grid. Different from tradition networks and systems where uses are mandated by fixed and predetermined rules, users in these emerging networks have the ability to make intelligent decisions and their interactions are self-enforcing. Therefore, to achieve better system-wide performance, it is important to design effective incentive mechanisms to stimulate desired user behaviors. This dissertation contributes to the study of incentive mechanisms by developing game-theoretic frameworks to formally analyze strategic user behaviors in a network and systematically design incentive mechanisms to achieve a wide range of system objectives. In this dissertation, we first consider cooperative communication networks and propose a reputation based incentive mechanism to enforce cooperation among self-interested users. We analyze the proposed mechanism using indirect reciprocity game and theoretically demonstrate the effectiveness of reputation in cooperation stimulation. Second, we propose a contract-based mechanism to incentivize a large group of self-interested electric vehicles that have various preferences to act coordinately to provide ancillary services to the power grid. We derive the optimal contract that maximizes the system designer's profits and propose an online learning algorithm to effectively learn the optimal contract. Third, we study the quality control problem for microtask crowdsourcing from the perspective of incentives. After analyzing two widely adopted incentive mechanisms and showing their limitations, we propose a cost-effective incentive mechanism that can be employed to obtain high quality solutions from self-interested workers and ensure the budget constraint of requesters at the same time. Finally, we consider social computing systems where the value is created by voluntary user contributions and understanding how user participate is of key importance. We develop a game-theoretic framework to formally analyze the sequential decision makings of strategic users under the presence of complex externality. It is shown that our analysis is consistent with observations made from real-word user behavior data and can be applied to guide the design of incentive mechanisms in practice