Modeling Security and Resource Allocation for Mobile Multi-hop Wireless Neworks Using Game Theory

This dissertation presents novel approaches to modeling and analyzing security and resource allocation in mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs). The research involves the design, implementation and simulation of different models resulting in resource sharing and security’s strengthening of the network among mobile devices. Because of the mobility, the network topology may change quickly and unpredictably over time. Moreover, data-information sent from a source to a designated destination node, which is not nearby, has to route its information with the need of intermediary mobile nodes. However, not all intermediary nodes in the network are willing to participate in data-packet transfer of other nodes. The unwillingness to participate in data forwarding is because a node is built on limited resources such as energy-power and data. Due to their limited resource, nodes may not want to participate in the overall network objectives by forwarding data-packets of others in fear of depleting their energy power. To enforce cooperation among autonomous nodes, we design, implement and simulate new incentive mechanisms that used game theoretic concepts to analyze and model the strategic interactions among rationale nodes with conflicting interests. Since there is no central authority and the network is decentralized, to address the concerns of mobility of selfish nodes in MANETs, a model of security and trust relationship was designed and implemented to improve the impact of investment into trust mechanisms. A series of simulations was carried out that showed the strengthening of security in a network with selfish and malicious nodes. Our research involves bargaining for resources in a highly dynamic ad-hoc network. The design of a new arbitration mechanism for MANETs utilizes the Dirichlet distribution for fairness in allocating resources. Then, we investigated the problem of collusion nodes in mobile ad-hoc networks with an arbitrator. We model the collusion by having a group of nodes disrupting the bargaining process by not cooperating with the arbitrator. Finally, we investigated the resource allocation for a system between agility and recovery using the concept of Markov decision process. Simulation results showed that the proposed solutions may be helpful to decision-makers when allocating resources between separated teams

Telecommunication Economics

This book constitutes a collaborative and selected documentation of the scientific outcome of the European COST Action IS0605 Econ@Tel "A Telecommunications Economics COST Network" which run from October 2007 to October 2011. Involving experts from around 20 European countries, the goal of Econ@Tel was to develop a strategic research and training network among key people and organizations in order to enhance Europe's competence in the field of telecommunications economics. Reflecting the organization of the COST Action IS0605 Econ@Tel in working groups the following four major research areas are addressed: - evolution and regulation of communication ecosystems; - social and policy implications of communication technologies; - economics and governance of future networks; - future networks management architectures and mechanisms

Telecommunication Economics

This book constitutes a collaborative and selected documentation of the scientific outcome of the European COST Action IS0605 Econ@Tel "A Telecommunications Economics COST Network" which run from October 2007 to October 2011. Involving experts from around 20 European countries, the goal of Econ@Tel was to develop a strategic research and training network among key people and organizations in order to enhance Europe's competence in the field of telecommunications economics. Reflecting the organization of the COST Action IS0605 Econ@Tel in working groups the following four major research areas are addressed: - evolution and regulation of communication ecosystems; - social and policy implications of communication technologies; - economics and governance of future networks; - future networks management architectures and mechanisms

Incentivizing Efficient Load Repartition in Heterogeneous Wireless Networks with Selfish Delay-Sensitive Users

International audienceAlmost all modern mobile devices are equipped with a number of various wireless interfaces simultaneously, so that each user is free to select between several types of wireless networks. This opportunity raises a number of challenges, since in general selfish choices do not lead to a globally efficient repartition of users over networks. The most popular approach in this context is to charge an extra tax for connecting to overloaded networks, thus incentivizing users to choose less congested alternatives. In this paper we apply that idea to a system where several networks with a common coverage area coexist. Moreover we assume that users -or the applications they use- are heterogeneous in their sensitivity to the congestion-varying Quality-of-Service (QoS). We show the technical and computational feasibility of computing taxes leading to a globally optimal outcome for any number of networks and application types (QoS-sensitivities), hence generalizing the results from previous works

Free Access to Public Information - More Transparency, Less Corruption: The Case of Republic of Macedonia

The traditional model of not transparent administration today disappears step by step. Citizens are increasingly becoming an equal entity with state institutions which have responsibility to ensure protection of their rights, accountability, openness and transparency in its operations - as the basic principles upon which rests the principle of good governance. Therefore, adoption of a law of free access to public information in many countries in the world which seek to enhance democracy in their societies today is a trend (process) that can not stop. Nowadays, countries that don’t have such a law can not claim that they have full democracy. One of the reasons for passing this law is reducing corruption. Corruption is based on secrecy. Citizens and institutions become corrupted when the public has no insight into their work. If the work of public institutions is transparent and offered for public inspection, then the chance for them to be corrupt is smaller. Republic of Macedonia has adopted the Law of free access to public information in 2006. This paper analyzes the law and its application; the situation in Macedonia after the adoption of the law; concluding that despite some inconsistencies, the law has contributed to increasing transparency and reducing corruption. Keywords: Free access, information, transparency, corruption