As Time Goes By: Adding a Temporal Dimension Towards Resolving Delegations in Liquid Democracy

In recent years, the study of various models and questions related to Liquid Democracy has been of growing interest among the community of Computational Social Choice. A concern that has been raised, is that current academic literature focuses solely on static inputs, concealing a key characteristic of Liquid Democracy: the right for a voter to change her mind as time goes by, regarding her options of whether to vote herself or delegate her vote to other participants, till the final voting deadline. In real life, a period of extended deliberation preceding the election-day motivates voters to adapt their behaviour over time, either based on observations of the remaining electorate or on information acquired for the topic at hand. By adding a temporal dimension to Liquid Democracy, such adaptations can increase the number of possible delegation paths and reduce the loss of votes due to delegation cycles or delegating paths towards abstaining agents, ultimately enhancing participation. Our work takes a first step to integrate a time horizon into decision-making problems in Liquid Democracy systems. Our approach, via a computational complexity analysis, exploits concepts and tools from temporal graph theory which turn out to be convenient for our framework

Voting over a distributed ledger: an interdisciplinary perspective

This work discusses the potential of a blockchain based infrastructure for a decentralised online voting platform. When compared to monograph based voting, online voting can vastly increase the speed that votes can be counted, expand the overall accessibility of the election system and decrease the cost of turnout. Yet despite these advantages, online voting for political office is subject to fraud at various levels due to its centralised nature. In this monograph, we describe a general architecture of a centralised online voting system and detail which areas of such a system are vulnerable to electoral fraud. We then proceed to introduce the key ideas underlying blockchain technology as a decentralised mechanism that can address these problems. We discuss the advantages and weaknesses of the blockchain technology, the protocols the technology uses and what criteria a good blockchain protocol should satisfy (depending on the voting application). We argue that the decentralisation inherent in the blockchain technology could increase the public's trust in national elections, as well as eliminate voter impersonation and double voting. We conclude with a discussion regarding how economists and social scientists can collaborate with the blockchain community in a research agenda on the design of efficient blockchain protocols and new voting systems such as liquid democracy

Popular Branchings and Their Dual Certificates

Let G be a digraph where every node has preferences over its incoming edges. The preferences of a node extend naturally to preferences over branchings, i.e., directed forests; a branching B is popular if B does not lose a head-to-head election (where nodes cast votes) against any branching. Such popular branchings have a natural application in liquid democracy. The popular branching problem is to decide if G admits a popular branching or not. We give a characterization of popular branchings in terms of dual certificates and use this characterization to design an efficient combinatorial algorithm for the popular branching problem. When preferences are weak rankings, we use our characterization to formulate the popular branching polytope in the original space and also show that our algorithm can be modified to compute a branching with least unpopularity margin. When preferences are strict rankings, we show that “approximately popular” branchings always exist.TU Berlin, Open-Access-Mittel – 202

Pyramidal deliberative democracy

This dissertation has two main objectives. First, to outline an ICT-facilitated model of democracy called ‘pyramidal democracy’ that reconciles deliberative democracy with mass engagement. Second, to suggest how this model of democracy might engender the democratisation of the global economy and thus the provision of a basic level of economic security for all global citizens. At the core of the model is the pyramidal deliberative network, a means of organising citizens into small online deliberative groups and linking these groups together by means of an iterative process of delegate-selection and group-formation. The pyramidal network enables citizens to aggregate their preferences in a deliberative manner, and then project social power by authorizing the delegates at the top-tier of the pyramidal network to communicate their social demands to elected officials or to other points of authority. The envisioned outcome is the democratisation of the public sphere by means of the proliferation of deliberative networks in the government, market, and civil society spheres. Transnational pyramidal networks may make it feasible to instantiate a new citizen-based schema of global governance and, thereby, facilitate the reform of the United Nations and enable a transition towards global peace, sustainability, and distributive justice. Distributive justice might be achieved by means of implementing the six components of a democratised economy: participatory budgeting, fee-and-dividend taxes, a basic income, monetary reform, workplace democracy, and the sharing economy. Taken together, these components might enable the universal provision of a social minimum – a universal basic income sufficient for basic security and real freedom. Taken to its logical conclusion, a democratised economy may also enable a transition towards a post-scarcity economic order characterised by a maximal stock of humanmade and natural capital that would not exceed the sustainable carrying capacity of the earth

Open Problems in DAOs

Decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) are a new, rapidly-growing class of organizations governed by smart contracts. Here we describe how researchers can contribute to the emerging science of DAOs and other digitally-constituted organizations. From granular privacy primitives to mechanism designs to model laws, we identify high-impact problems in the DAO ecosystem where existing gaps might be tackled through a new data set or by applying tools and ideas from existing research fields such as political science, computer science, economics, law, and organizational science. Our recommendations encompass exciting research questions as well as promising business opportunities. We call on the wider research community to join the global effort to invent the next generation of organizations

Towards Sustainable Blockchains:Cryptocurrency Treasury and General Decision-making Systems with Provably Secure Delegable Blockchain-based Voting

The blockchain technology and cryptocurrencies, its most prevalent application, continue to gain acceptance and wide traction in research and practice within academia and the industry because of its promise in decentralised and distributed computing. Notably, the meteoric rise in the value and number of cryptocurrencies since the creation of Bitcoin in 2009 have ushered in newer innovations and interventions that addressed some of the prominent issues that affect these platforms. Despite the increased privacy, security, scalability, and energy-saving capabilities of new consensus protocols in newer systems, the development and management of blockchains, mostly, do not reflect the decentralisation principle despite blockchains being decentralised and distributed in their architecture. The concept of treasury has been identified as a tool to address this problem. We explore the idea of blockchain treasury systems within literature and practice, especially with relation to funding and decision-making power towards blockchain development and maintenance. Consequently, we propose a taxonomy for treasury models within cryptocurrencies. Thereafter, we propose an efficient community-controlled and decentralised collaborative decision-making mechanism to support the development and management of blockchains. Our proposed system incentivises participants and is proven secure under the universally composable (UC) framework while also addressing gaps identified from our investigation of prior systems e.g. non-private ballots and insecure voting. Furthermore, we adapt our system and propose a privacy-preserving general decision making system for blockchain governance that supports privacy-centric cryptocurrencies. Besides, using a set of metrics, we introduce a consensus analysis mechanism to enhance the utility of decision-making of the systems by evaluating individual choices against collective (system-wide) decisions. Finally, we provide pilot system implementations with benchmark results confirming the efficiency and practicality of our constructions