Optimal Sharing Strategies in Dynamic Games of Research and Development

This paper analyses the dynamic aspects of knowledge sharing in R&D rivalry. In a model where research projects consist of N sequential stages, our goal is to explore how the innovators' incentives to share intermediate research outcomes change with progress and with their relative positions in an R&D race. We consider an uncertain research process, where progress implies a decrease in the level of uncertainty that a firm faces. We assume that firms are informed about the progress of their rivals and make joint sharing decisions either before or after each success. Changes in the firms' absolute and relative positions affect their incentives to stay in the race and the expected duration of monopoly profits if they finish the race first. We show that firms always prefer to have sharing between their independent research units if they are allowed to collude in the product market. However, competing firms may have either decreasing or increasing incentives to share intermediate research outcomes throughout the race. If the lagging firm never drops out, the incentives to share always decrease over time as the research project nears completion. The incentives to share are higher earlier on because sharing has a smaller impact on each firm's chance of being a monopolist at the end of the race. If the lagging firm is expected to drop out, the incentives to share may increase over time. We also use our framework to analyze the impact of patent policy on the sharing incentives of firms and show that as patent policy gets stronger, sharing incentives may decrease or increase depending on whether or not the lagging firm has increased incentives to drop out.

Optimal Sharing Strategies in Dynamic Games of Research and Development

This paper builds a theoretical foundation for the dynamics of knowledge sharing in private industry. In practice, research and development projects can take years or even decades to complete. We model an uncertain research process, where research projects consist of multiple sequential steps. We ask how the incentives to license intermediate steps to rivals change over time as the research project approaches maturity and the uncertainty that the firms face decreases. Such a dynamic approach allows us to analyze the interaction between how close the firms are to product market competition and how intense that competition is. If product market competition is relatively moderate, the lagging firm is expected never to drop out and the incentives to share intermediate research outcomes decreases monotonically with progress. However, if product market competition is relatively intense, the incentives to share may increase with progress. These results illustrate under what circumstances it is necessary to have policies aimed at encouraging cooperation in R&D and when such policies should be directed towards early vs. later stage research.Multi-stage R&D, Innovation, Knowledge Sharing, Licensing, Dynamic Games

Patent Races with Dynamic Complementarity

Recent models of multi-stage R&D have shown that a system of weak intellectual property rights may lead to faster innovation by inducing firms to share intermediate technological knowledge. In this article I introduce a distinction between plain and sophisticated technological knowledge, which has not been noticed so far but plays a crucial role in determining how different appropriability rules affect the incentives to innovate. I argue that the positive effect of weak intellectual property regimes on the sharing of intermediate technological knowledge vanishes when technological knowledge is sophisticated, as is likely to be the case in many high tech industries.

A LOGIT ANALYSIS OF PARTICIPATION IN TENNESSEE'S FOREST STEWARDSHIP PROGRAM

This study determines the likely effect of cost-share incentives on participation in the Tennessee Forest Stewardship Program and identifies other factors that may contribute to participation. A random utility model is used to determine the probability that a landowner will choose to participate in the program. A binary choice model is specified to represent the dichotomous decision and a logit procedure is used to fit the model. Data are obtained from mail surveys of 4,000 randomly selected landowners. Results indicate that attitudes and knowledge of forestry programs may be more influential in a landowner's decision to participate than monetary incentives.Cost-share incentive, Stewardship Incentive Program, Logit, Nonindustrial private forest, NIPF, Participation, Forestry, Trees, Resource /Energy Economics and Policy,

Confidence Interval Estimation Tasks and the Economics of Overconfidence

Experiments in psychology, where subjects estimate confidence intervals to a series of factual questions, have shown that individuals report far too narrow intervals. This has been interpreted as evidence of overconfidence in the preciseness of knowledge, a potentially serious violation of the rationality assumption in economics. Following these results a growing literature in economics has incorporated overconfidence in models of, for instance, financial markets. In this paper we investigate the robustness of results from confidence interval estimation tasks with respect to a number of manipulations: frequency assessments, peer frequency assessments, iteration, and monetary incentives. Our results suggest that a large share of the overconfidence in interval estimation tasks is an artifact of the response format. Using frequencies and monetary incentives reduces the measured overconfidence in the confidence interval method by about 65%. The results are consistent with the notion that subjects have a deep aversion to setting broad confidence intervals, a reluctance that we attribute to a socially rational trade-off between informativeness and accuracy.overconfidence; uncertainty; monetary incentives; experiments

Why are technological spillovers spatially bounded ? A market orientated approach.

According to empirical evidence, technological spillovers are spatially bounded. This is one of the main reasons why firms are induced to locate in close prox-imity despite tough competition. This paper is an attempt to endogenize such spillovers. For that purpose, we try to explain why spatial proximity gives more incentives to competing firms to share knowledge. We show that spatial proxim-ity is the best way for firms to prevent free-riding in case of knowledge sharing. Indeed, Þercer competition impedes free riding provided that such a behavior dampens firms efficiency and have a dramatic effect on profits. Moreover, our results have important implications for regional policy. We point out that a slight decrease in transport costs triggers spatial polarization which implies knowledge sharing and thereby enhances innovation. A more dramatic decrease in transport costs attains both the objectives of increasing innovation and regional equity.

Information sharing in credit markets: incentives for incorrect information reporting

The introduction of institutions of credit information sharing - private credit bureaus and public credit registries - in the market for bank loans represent one of the possible solutions of information asymmetry problem, - the problem which the creditors tend to face. However the possibility of information sharing influences the bank's incentives in two different ways. While it disciplines the borrowers and, therefore, reduces the share of bad loans, a bank loses the competitive advantage, namely the monopolistic knowledge about the data in its clients' credit histories. Does the bank have an opportunity at its disposal to use the benefits of information sharing without losing its competitive advantage and its clientele? One way to do so is to report false data on borrowers. This paper analyses the bank's incentives for such opportunistic behavior and describes the impact of false information reporting on the characteristics of market equilibrium. The opportunity to get extra profit and to offer less expensive credit to new clients explains why banks prefer the strategy of dishonest behavior. This paper outlines the role of the informational intermediary in quality control for the data, contained in credit reports. Also, it describes the conditions under which verification of a certain share of reports provides that the parameters characterizing the equilibrium are equal to those in no information asymmetry situation.