8,690 research outputs found
Economic incentive patterns and their application to ad hoc networks
While research about cooperation incentives for mobile ad hoc
networks (MANETs) is done only for a relative short period,
there exists tremendous knowledge in the economic and social
areas. Based on a new categorization of incentive patterns, we
examine the relevant properties of each pattern and
demonstrate their respective design alternatives and occurring
challenges for the application to ad hoc networks. With a focus
on trade based patterns, we found that negotiation about actions
proves to be very complex or inefficient in MANETs. Another
approach, the introduction of an artificial currency,
also implies several problems like how to equip the entities
with means of payment and how to secure liquidity. As a novelty,
we introduce a new kind of incentive pattern following the
concept of company shares.
It suits well for MANETs because it can be shown that through
the creation of individual currencies the above mentioned
problems disappear
Transaction Propagation on Permissionless Blockchains: Incentive and Routing Mechanisms
Existing permissionless blockchain solutions rely on peer-to-peer propagation
mechanisms, where nodes in a network transfer transaction they received to
their neighbors. Unfortunately, there is no explicit incentive for such
transaction propagation. Therefore, existing propagation mechanisms will not be
sustainable in a fully decentralized blockchain with rational nodes. In this
work, we formally define the problem of incentivizing nodes for transaction
propagation. We propose an incentive mechanism where each node involved in the
propagation of a transaction receives a share of the transaction fee. We also
show that our proposal is Sybil-proof. Furthermore, we combine the incentive
mechanism with smart routing to reduce the communication and storage costs at
the same time. The proposed routing mechanism reduces the redundant transaction
propagation from the size of the network to a factor of average shortest path
length. The routing mechanism is built upon a specific type of consensus
protocol where the round leader who creates the transaction block is known in
advance. Note that our routing mechanism is a generic one and can be adopted
independently from the incentive mechanism.Comment: 2018 Crypto Valley Conference on Blockchain Technolog
Socially Optimal Mining Pools
Mining for Bitcoins is a high-risk high-reward activity. Miners, seeking to
reduce their variance and earn steadier rewards, collaborate in pooling
strategies where they jointly mine for Bitcoins. Whenever some pool participant
is successful, the earned rewards are appropriately split among all pool
participants. Currently a dozen of different pooling strategies (i.e., methods
for distributing the rewards) are in use for Bitcoin mining.
We here propose a formal model of utility and social welfare for Bitcoin
mining (and analogous mining systems) based on the theory of discounted
expected utility, and next study pooling strategies that maximize the social
welfare of miners. Our main result shows that one of the pooling strategies
actually employed in practice--the so-called geometric pay pool--achieves the
optimal steady-state utility for miners when its parameters are set
appropriately.
Our results apply not only to Bitcoin mining pools, but any other form of
pooled mining or crowdsourcing computations where the participants engage in
repeated random trials towards a common goal, and where "partial" solutions can
be efficiently verified
Social Welfare Maximization Auction in Edge Computing Resource Allocation for Mobile Blockchain
Blockchain, an emerging decentralized security system, has been applied in
many applications, such as bitcoin, smart grid, and Internet-of-Things.
However, running the mining process may cost too much energy consumption and
computing resource usage on handheld devices, which restricts the use of
blockchain in mobile environments. In this paper, we consider deploying edge
computing service to support the mobile blockchain. We propose an auction-based
edge computing resource market of the edge computing service provider. Since
there is competition among miners, the allocative externalities (positive and
negative) are taken into account in the model. In our auction mechanism, we
maximize the social welfare while guaranteeing the truthfulness, individual
rationality and computational efficiency. Based on blockchain mining experiment
results, we define a hash power function that characterizes the probability of
successfully mining a block. Through extensive simulations, we evaluate the
performance of our auction mechanism which shows that our edge computing
resources market model can efficiently solve the social welfare maximization
problem for the edge computing service provider
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