3,857 research outputs found
Incentive-Based Control of Asynchronous Best-Response Dynamics on Binary Decision Networks
Various populations of interacting decision-making agents can be modeled by asynchronous best-response dynamics, or equivalently, linear threshold dynamics. Building upon recent convergence results in the absence of control, we now consider how such a network can be efficiently driven to a desired equilibrium state by offering payoff incentives or rewards for using a particular strategy, either uniformly or targeted to individuals. We begin by showing that strategy changes are monotone following an increase in payoffs in coordination games, and that the resulting equilibrium is unique. Based on these results, for the case when a uniform incentive is offered to all agents, we show how to compute the optimal incentive using a binary search algorithm. When different incentives can be offered to each agent, we propose a new algorithm to select which agents should be targeted based on maximizing a ratio between the cascading effect of a strategy switch by each agent and the incentive required to cause the agent to switch. Simulations show that this algorithm computes near-optimal targeted incentives for a wide range of networks and payoff distributions in coordination games and can also be effective for anti-coordination games
Distributed Computing with Adaptive Heuristics
We use ideas from distributed computing to study dynamic environments in
which computational nodes, or decision makers, follow adaptive heuristics (Hart
2005), i.e., simple and unsophisticated rules of behavior, e.g., repeatedly
"best replying" to others' actions, and minimizing "regret", that have been
extensively studied in game theory and economics. We explore when convergence
of such simple dynamics to an equilibrium is guaranteed in asynchronous
computational environments, where nodes can act at any time. Our research
agenda, distributed computing with adaptive heuristics, lies on the borderline
of computer science (including distributed computing and learning) and game
theory (including game dynamics and adaptive heuristics). We exhibit a general
non-termination result for a broad class of heuristics with bounded
recall---that is, simple rules of behavior that depend only on recent history
of interaction between nodes. We consider implications of our result across a
wide variety of interesting and timely applications: game theory, circuit
design, social networks, routing and congestion control. We also study the
computational and communication complexity of asynchronous dynamics and present
some basic observations regarding the effects of asynchrony on no-regret
dynamics. We believe that our work opens a new avenue for research in both
distributed computing and game theory.Comment: 36 pages, four figures. Expands both technical results and discussion
of v1. Revised version will appear in the proceedings of Innovations in
Computer Science 201
Multi-agent network games with applications in smart electric mobility
The growing complexity and globalization of modern society brought to light novel problems and challenges for researchers that aim to model real-life phenomena. Nowadays communities and even single individuals cannot be considered as a closed system, since one's actions create a ripple effect that ends up influencing the action of others. Therefore, the study of decision-making processes over networks became a pivotal topic in the research community. The possible applications are virtually endless and span into many different fields. Two of the most relevant examples are smart mobility and energy management in highly populated cities, where a collection of (partially) noncooperative individuals interact over a network trying to reach an efficient equilibrium point, in the sense of Nash, and share limited resources due to the environment in which they operate. In this work, we approach these problems through the lens of game theory. We use different declinations of this powerful mathematical tool to study several aspects of these themes. We design decentralized iterative algorithms solving generalized network games that generate behavioral rules for the players that, if followed, ensure global convergence. Then, we question the classical assumption of perfect playersâ rationality by introducing novel dynamics to model partial rationality and analyzing their properties. We conclude by focusing on the design of optimal policies to regulate smart mobility and energy management. In this case, we create a detailed and more realistic description of the problem and use a nudging mechanism, implemented by means of a semi-decentralized algorithm, to align the users' behavior with the one desired by the policymaker
A Distributed Demand-Side Management Framework for the Smart Grid
This paper proposes a fully distributed Demand-Side Management system for
Smart Grid infrastructures, especially tailored to reduce the peak demand of
residential users. In particular, we use a dynamic pricing strategy, where
energy tariffs are function of the overall power demand of customers. We
consider two practical cases: (1) a fully distributed approach, where each
appliance decides autonomously its own scheduling, and (2) a hybrid approach,
where each user must schedule all his appliances. We analyze numerically these
two approaches, showing that they are characterized practically by the same
performance level in all the considered grid scenarios. We model the proposed
system using a non-cooperative game theoretical approach, and demonstrate that
our game is a generalized ordinal potential one under general conditions.
Furthermore, we propose a simple yet effective best response strategy that is
proved to converge in a few steps to a pure Nash Equilibrium, thus
demonstrating the robustness of the power scheduling plan obtained without any
central coordination of the operator or the customers. Numerical results,
obtained using real load profiles and appliance models, show that the
system-wide peak absorption achieved in a completely distributed fashion can be
reduced up to 55%, thus decreasing the capital expenditure (CAPEX) necessary to
meet the growing energy demand
A survey on the analysis and control of evolutionary matrix games
In support of the growing interest in how to efficiently influence complex systems of interacting self interested agents, we present this review of fundamental concepts, emerging research, and open problems related to the analysis and control of evolutionary matrix games, with particular emphasis on applications in social, economic, and biological networks. (C) 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved
A Parameterisation of Algorithms for Distributed Constraint Optimisation via Potential Games
This paper introduces a parameterisation of learning algorithms for distributed constraint optimisation problems (DCOPs). This parameterisation encompasses many algorithms developed in both the computer science and game theory literatures. It is built on our insight that when formulated as noncooperative games, DCOPs form a subset of the class of potential games. This result allows us to prove convergence properties of algorithms developed in the computer science literature using game theoretic methods. Furthermore, our parameterisation can assist system designers by making the pros and cons of, and the synergies between, the various DCOP algorithm components clear
A Comprehensive Survey of Potential Game Approaches to Wireless Networks
Potential games form a class of non-cooperative games where unilateral
improvement dynamics are guaranteed to converge in many practical cases. The
potential game approach has been applied to a wide range of wireless network
problems, particularly to a variety of channel assignment problems. In this
paper, the properties of potential games are introduced, and games in wireless
networks that have been proven to be potential games are comprehensively
discussed.Comment: 44 pages, 6 figures, to appear in IEICE Transactions on
Communications, vol. E98-B, no. 9, Sept. 201
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