Quantized VCG Mechanisms for Polymatroid Environments

Many network resource allocation problems can be viewed as allocating a divisible resource, where the allocations are constrained to lie in a polymatroid. We consider market-based mechanisms for such problems. Though the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism can provide the efficient allocation with strong incentive properties (namely dominant strategy incentive compatibility), its well-known high communication requirements can prevent it from being used. There have been a number of approaches for reducing the communication costs of VCG by weakening its incentive properties. Here, instead we take a different approach of reducing communication costs via quantization while maintaining VCG's dominant strategy incentive properties. The cost for this approach is a loss in efficiency which we characterize. We first consider quantizing the resource allocations so that agents need only submit a finite number of bids instead of full utility function. We subsequently consider quantizing the agent's bids

A Study of Truck Platooning Incentives Using a Congestion Game

We introduce an atomic congestion game with two types of agents, cars and trucks, to model the traffic flow on a road over various time intervals of the day. Cars maximize their utility by finding a trade-off between the time they choose to use the road, the average velocity of the flow at that time, and the dynamic congestion tax that they pay for using the road. In addition to these terms, the trucks have an incentive for using the road at the same time as their peers because they have platooning capabilities, which allow them to save fuel. The dynamics and equilibria of this game-theoretic model for the interaction between car traffic and truck platooning incentives are investigated. We use traffic data from Stockholm to validate parts of the modeling assumptions and extract reasonable parameters for the simulations. We use joint strategy fictitious play and average strategy fictitious play to learn a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of this game. We perform a comprehensive simulation study to understand the influence of various factors, such as the drivers' value of time and the percentage of the trucks that are equipped with platooning devices, on the properties of the Nash equilibrium.Comment: Updated Introduction; Improved Literature Revie

Modelling mixed autonomy traffic networks with pricing and routing control

Connected and automated vehicles (CAVs) are expected to change the way people travel in cities. Before human-driven vehicles (HVs) are completely phased out, the urban traffic flow will be heterogeneous of HVs, CAVs, and public transport vehicles commonly known as mixed autonomy. Mixed autonomy networks are likely to be made up of different route choice behaviours compared with conventional networks with HVs only. While HVs are expected to continue taking individually and selfishly selected shortest paths following user equilibrium (UE), a set of centrally controlled AVs could potentially follow the system optimal (SO) routing behaviour to reduce the selfish and inefficient behaviour of UE-seeking HVs. In this dissertation, a mixed equilibrium simulation-based dynamic traffic assignment (SBDTA) model is developed in which two classes of vehicles with different routing behaviours (UE-seeking HVs and SO-seeking AVs) are present in the network. The dissertation proposes a joint routing and incentive-based congestion pricing scheme in which SO-seeking CAVs are exempt from the toll while UE-seeking HVs have their usual shortest-path routing decisions are subject to a spatially differentiated congestion charge. This control strategy could potentially boost market penetration rate of CAVs while encouraging them to adopt SO routing behaviour and discouraging UE-seeking users from entering congested areas. The dissertation also proposes a distance-based time-dependent optimal ratio control scheme (TORCS) in which an optimal ratio of CAVs is identified and selected to seek SO routing. The objective of the control scheme is to achieve a reasonable compromise between the system efficiency (i.e., total travel time savings) and the control cost that is proportional to the total distance travelled by SO-seeking AVs. The proposed modelling frameworks are then extended to bi-modal networks considering three competing modes (bus, SO-seeking CAVs, and UE-seeking HVs). A nested logit-based mode choice model is applied to capture travellers’ preferences toward three available modes and elasticity in travel demand. A dynamic transit assignment model is also deployed and integrated into the mixed equilibrium SBDTA model to generate equilibrium traffic flow under different scenarios. The applicability and performance of the proposed models are demonstrated on a real large-scale network of Melbourne, Australia. The research outcomes are expected to improve the performance of mixed autonomy traffic networks with optimal pricing and routing control

Rewarding instead of charging road users: a model case study investigating effects on traffic conditions

Instead of giving a negative incentive such as transport pricing, a positive incentive by rewarding travelers for ‘good behavior’ may yield different responses. In a Dutch pilot project called Peak Avoidance (in Dutch: “SpitsMijden”), a few hundred travelers participated in an experiment in which they received 3 to 7 euros per day when they avoided traveling by car during the morning rush hours (7h30–9h30). Mainly departure time shifts were observed, together with moderate mode shifts. Due to the low number of participants in the experiment, no impact on traffic conditions could be expected. In order to assess the potential of such a rewarding scheme on traffic conditions, a dynamic traffic assignment model has been developed to forecast network wide effects in the long term by assuming higher participation levels. This paper describes the mathematical model. Furthermore, the Peak Avoidance project is taken as a case study and different rewarding strategies with varying participation levels and reward levels are analyzed. First results show that indeed overall traffic conditions can be improved by giving a reward, where low to moderate reward levels and participation levels of 50% or lower are sufficient for a significant improvement. Higher participation and reward levels seem to become increasingly counter-effective

An Agent-based Route Choice Model

Travel demand emerges from individual decisions. These decisions, depending on individual objectives, preferences, experiences and spatial knowledge about travel, are both heterogeneous and evolutionary. Research emerging from fields such as road pricing and ATIS requires travel demand models that are able to consider travelers with distinct attributes (value of time (VOT), willingness to pay, travel budgets, etc.) and behavioral preferences (e.g. willingness to switch routes with potential savings) in a differentiated market (by tolls and the level of service). Traditional trip-based models have difficulty in dealing with the aforementioned heterogeneity and issues such as equity. Moreover, the role of spatial information, which has significant influence on decision-making and travel behavior, has not been fully addressed in existing models. To bridge the gap, this paper proposes to explicitly model the formation and spread- ing of spatial knowledge among travelers. An Agent-based Route Choice (ARC) model was developed to track choices of each decision-maker on a road network over time and map individual choices into macroscopic flow pattern. ARC has been applied on both SiouxFalls network and Chicago sketch network. Comparison between ARC and existing models (UE and SUE) on both networks shows ARC is valid and computationally tractable. To be brief, this paper specifically focuses on the route choice behavior, while the proposed model can be extended to other modules of travel demand under an integrated framework.Agent-based model, route choice, traffic assignment, travel demand modeling

Credit securitization and credit derivatives : financial instruments and the credit risk management of middle market commercial loan portfolios

Banks increasingly recognize the need to measure and manage the credit risk of their loans on a portfolio basis. We address the subportfolio "middle market". Due to their specific lending policy for this market segment it is an important task for banks to systematically identify regional and industrial credit concentrations and reduce the detected concentrations through diversification. In recent years, the development of markets for credit securitization and credit derivatives has provided new credit risk management tools. However, in the addressed market segment adverse selection and moral hazard problems are quite severe. A potential successful application of credit securitization and credit derivatives for managing credit risk of middle market commercial loan portfolios depends on the development of incentive-compatible structures which solve or at least mitigate the adverse selection and moral hazard problems. In this paper we identify a number of general requirements and describe two possible solution concepts