Why Share in Peer-to-Peer Networks?

Prior theory and empirical work emphasize the enormous free-riding problem facing peer-to-peer (P2P) sharing networks. Nonetheless, many P2P networks thrive. We explore two possible explanations that do not rely on altruism or explicit mechanisms imposed on the network: direct and indirect private incentives for the provision of public goods. The direct incentive is a traffic redistribution effect that advantages the sharing peer. We din this incentive is likely insufficient to motivate equilibrium content sharing in large networks. We then approach P2P networks as a graph-theoretic problem and present sufficient conditions for sharing and free-riding to co-exist due to indirect incentives we call generalized reciprocity.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/60443/1/p2p_icec08.pd

Economic issues in distributed computing

textOn the Internet, one of the essential characteristics of electronic commerce is the integration of large-scale computer networks and business practices. Commercial servers are connected through open and complex communication technologies, and online consumers access the services with virtually unpredictable behavior. Both of them as well as the e-Commerce infrastructure are vulnerable to cyber attacks. Among the various network security problems, the Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attack is a unique example to illustrate the risk of commercial network applications. Using a massive junk traffic, literally anyone on the Internet can launch a DDoS attack to flood and shutdown an eCommerce website. Cooperative technological solutions for Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks are already available, yet organizations in the best position to implement them lack incentive to do so, and the victims of DDoS attacks cannot find effective methods to motivate the organizations. Chapter 1 discusses two components of the technological solutions to DDoS attacks: cooperative filtering and cooperative traffic smoothing by caching, and then analyzes the broken incentive chain in each of these technological solutions. As a remedy, I propose usage-based pricing and Capacity Provision Networks, which enable victims to disseminate enough incentive along attack paths to stimulate cooperation against DDoS attacks. Chapter 2 addresses possible Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks toward the wireless Internet including the Wireless Extended Internet, the Wireless Portal Network, and the Wireless Ad Hoc network. I propose a conceptual model for defending against DDoS attacks on the wireless Internet, which incorporates both cooperative technological solutions and economic incentive mechanisms built on usage-based fees. Cost-effectiveness is also addressed through an illustrative implementation scheme using Policy Based Networking (PBN). By investigating both technological and economic difficulties in defense of DDoS attacks which have plagued the wired Internet, our aim here is to foster further development of wireless Internet infrastructure as a more secure and efficient platform for mobile commerce. To avoid centralized resources and performance bottlenecks, online peer-to-peer communities and online social network have become increasingly popular. In particular, the recent boost of online peer-to-peer communities has led to exponential growth in sharing of user-contributed content which has brought profound changes to business and economic practices. Understanding the dynamics and sustainability of such peer-to-peer communities has important implications for business managers. In Chapter 3, I explore the structure of online sharing communities from a dynamic process perspective. I build an evolutionary game model to capture the dynamics of online peer-to-peer communities. Using online music sharing data collected from one of the IRC Channels for over five years, I empirically investigate the model which underlies the dynamics of the music sharing community. Our empirical results show strong support for the evolutionary process of the community. I find that the two major parties in the community, namely sharers and downloaders, are influencing each other in their dynamics of evolvement in the community. These dynamics reveal the mechanism through which peer-to-peer communities sustain and thrive in a constant changing environment.Information, Risk, and Operations Management (IROM

Incentives in peer-to-peer and grid networking

Today, most peer-to-peer networks are based on the assumptionthat the participating nodes are cooperative. Thisworks if the nodes are indifferent or ignorant about the resourcesthey offer, but limits the usability of peer-to-peernetworks to very few scenarios. It specifically excludes theirusage in any non-cooperative peer-to-peer environment, beit Grid networks or mobile ad-hoc networks. By introducingsoft incentives to offer resources to other nodes, we seean overall performance gain in traditional file-sharing networks.We also see soft incentives promoting the convergenceof peer-to-peer and Grid networks, as they increasethe predictability of the participating nodes, and thereforethe reliability of the services provided by the system as awhole. Reliability is what is required by Grid networks, butmissing in peer-to-peer networks

Transaction Propagation on Permissionless Blockchains: Incentive and Routing Mechanisms

Existing permissionless blockchain solutions rely on peer-to-peer propagation mechanisms, where nodes in a network transfer transaction they received to their neighbors. Unfortunately, there is no explicit incentive for such transaction propagation. Therefore, existing propagation mechanisms will not be sustainable in a fully decentralized blockchain with rational nodes. In this work, we formally define the problem of incentivizing nodes for transaction propagation. We propose an incentive mechanism where each node involved in the propagation of a transaction receives a share of the transaction fee. We also show that our proposal is Sybil-proof. Furthermore, we combine the incentive mechanism with smart routing to reduce the communication and storage costs at the same time. The proposed routing mechanism reduces the redundant transaction propagation from the size of the network to a factor of average shortest path length. The routing mechanism is built upon a specific type of consensus protocol where the round leader who creates the transaction block is known in advance. Note that our routing mechanism is a generic one and can be adopted independently from the incentive mechanism.Comment: 2018 Crypto Valley Conference on Blockchain Technolog

Robustness of a Distributed Knowledge Management Model

In globalizing competitive markets knowledge exchange between business organizations requires incentive mechanisms to ensure tactical purposes while strategic purposes are subject to joint organization and other forms of contractual obligations. Where property of knowledge (e.g. patents and copyrights) and contractbased knowledge exchange do not obtain network effectiveness because of prohibitive transaction costs in reducing uncertainty, we suggest a robust model for peer produced knowledge within a distributed setting. The peer produced knowledge exchange model relies upon a double loop knowledge conversion with symmetric incentives in a network since the production of actor specific knowledge makes any knowledge appropriation by use of property rights by the actors irrelevant. Without property rights in knowledge the actor network generates opportunity for incentive symmetry over a period of time. The model merges specific knowledge with knowledge from other actors into a decision support system specific for each actor in the network in recognition of actor role differences. The article suggests a set of 9 static and 5 dynamic propositions for the model to maintain symmetric incentives between different actor networks. The model is proposed for business networks