2,208 research outputs found

    Sensing as a service: A cloud computing system for mobile phone sensing

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    Sensors on (or attached to) mobile phones can enable attractive sensing applications in different domains such as environmental monitoring, social networking, healthcare, etc. We introduce a new concept, Sensing-as-a-Service (S2aaS), i.e., providing sensing services using mobile phones via a cloud computing system. An S2aaS cloud should meet the following requirements: 1) It must be able to support various mobile phone sensing applications on different smartphone platforms. 2) It must be energy-efficient. 3) It must have effective incentive mechanisms that can be used to attract mobile users to participate in sensing activities. In this paper, we identify unique challenges of designing and implementing an S2aaS cloud, review existing systems and methods, present viable solutions, and point out future research directions

    Enabling the Internet of Mobile Crowdsourcing Health Things: A Mobile Fog Computing, Blockchain and IoT Based Continuous Glucose Monitoring System for Diabetes Mellitus Research and Care

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    [Abstract] Diabetes patients suffer from abnormal blood glucose levels, which can cause diverse health disorders that affect their kidneys, heart and vision. Due to these conditions, diabetes patients have traditionally checked blood glucose levels through Self-Monitoring of Blood Glucose (SMBG) techniques, like pricking their fingers multiple times per day. Such techniques involve a number of drawbacks that can be solved by using a device called Continuous Glucose Monitor (CGM), which can measure blood glucose levels continuously throughout the day without having to prick the patient when carrying out every measurement. This article details the design and implementation of a system that enhances commercial CGMs by adding Internet of Things (IoT) capabilities to them that allow for monitoring patients remotely and, thus, warning them about potentially dangerous situations. The proposed system makes use of smartphones to collect blood glucose values from CGMs and then sends them either to a remote cloud or to distributed fog computing nodes. Moreover, in order to exchange reliable, trustworthy and cybersecure data with medical scientists, doctors and caretakers, the system includes the deployment of a decentralized storage system that receives, processes and stores the collected data. Furthermore, in order to motivate users to add new data to the system, an incentive system based on a digital cryptocurrency named GlucoCoin was devised. Such a system makes use of a blockchain that is able to execute smart contracts in order to automate CGM sensor purchases or to reward the users that contribute to the system by providing their own data. Thanks to all the previously mentioned technologies, the proposed system enables patient data crowdsourcing and the development of novel mobile health (mHealth) applications for diagnosing, monitoring, studying and taking public health actions that can help to advance in the control of the disease and raise global awareness on the increasing prevalence of diabetes.Xunta de Galicia; ED431G/01Xunta de Galicia; ED431C 2016-045Agencia Estatal de Investigación de España; TEC2016-75067-C4-1-

    Privacy Management and Optimal Pricing in People-Centric Sensing

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    With the emerging sensing technologies such as mobile crowdsensing and Internet of Things (IoT), people-centric data can be efficiently collected and used for analytics and optimization purposes. This data is typically required to develop and render people-centric services. In this paper, we address the privacy implication, optimal pricing, and bundling of people-centric services. We first define the inverse correlation between the service quality and privacy level from data analytics perspectives. We then present the profit maximization models of selling standalone, complementary, and substitute services. Specifically, the closed-form solutions of the optimal privacy level and subscription fee are derived to maximize the gross profit of service providers. For interrelated people-centric services, we show that cooperation by service bundling of complementary services is profitable compared to the separate sales but detrimental for substitutes. We also show that the market value of a service bundle is correlated with the degree of contingency between the interrelated services. Finally, we incorporate the profit sharing models from game theory for dividing the bundling profit among the cooperative service providers.Comment: 16 page

    Incentive Mechanism Design in Mobile Crowdsensing Systems

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    In the past few years, the popularity of Mobile Crowdsensing Systems (MCSs) has been greatly prompted, in which sensory data can be ubiquitously collected and shared by mobile devices in a distributed fashion. Typically, a MCS consists of a cloud platform, sensing tasks, and mobile users equipped with mobile devices, in which the mobile users carry out sensing tasks and receive monetary rewards as compensation for resource consumption ( e.g., energy, bandwidth, and computation) and risk of privacy leakage ( e.g., location exposure). Compared with traditional mote-class sensor networks, MCSs can reduce the cost of deploying specialized sensing infrastructures and enable many applications that require resources and sensing modalities beyond the current mote-class sensor processes as today’s mobile devices (smartphones (iPhones, Sumsung Galaxy), tablets (iPad) and vehicle-embedded sensing devices (GPS)) integrate more computing, communication, and storage resources than traditional mote-class sensors. The current applications of MCSs include traffic congestion detection, wireless indoor localization, pollution monitoring, etc . There is no doubt that one of the most significant characteristics of MCSs is the active involvement of mobile users to collect and share sensory data. In this dissertation, we study the incentive mechanism design in mobile crowdsensing system with consideration of economic properties. Firstly, we investigate the problem of joining sensing task assignment and scheduling in MCSs with the following three considerations: i) partial fulfillment, ii) attribute diversity, and iii) price diversity. Then, we design a distributed auction framework to allow each task owner to independently process its local auction without collecting global information in a MCS, reducing communication cost. Next, we propose a cost-preferred auction scheme (CPAS) to assign each winning mobile user one or more sub- working time durations and a time schedule-preferred auction scheme (TPAS) to allocate each winning mobile user a continuous working time duration. Secondly, we focus on the design of an incentive mechanism for an MCS to minimize the social cost. The social cost represents the total cost of mobile devices when all tasks published by the MCS are finished. We first present the working process of a MCS, and then build an auction market for the MCS where the MCS platform acts as an auctioneer and users with mobile devices act as bidders. Depending on the different requirements of the MCS platform, we design a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG)-based auction mechanism for the continuous working pattern and a suboptimal auction mechanism for the discontinuous working pattern. Both of them can ensure that the bidding of users are processed in a truthful way and the utilities of users are maximized. Through rigorous theoretical analysis and comprehensive simulations, we can prove that these incentive mechanisms satisfy economic properties and can be implemented in reasonable time complexcity. Next, we discuss the importance of fairness and unconsciousness of MCS surveillance applications. Then, we propose offline and online incentive mechanisms with fair task scheduling based on the proportional share allocation rules. Furthermore, to have more sensing tasks done over time dimension, we relax the truthfulness and unconsciousness property requirements and design a (ε, μ)-unconsciousness online incentive mechanism. Real map data are used to validate these proposed incentive mechanisms through extensive simulations. Finally, future research topics are proposed to complete the dissertation
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