Incentive Problem in Gas Transport Infrastructure Development on the Norwegian Continental Shelf

AbstractThe objective of this paper is to propose an analytical structure to investigate the interaction between the tariff regulation and investment behavior in the Norwegian gas transport sector. A game theoretic approach is used to analyze the current tariff system, and consider its implications on the development of the transport network in the long run. A special position of the independent system operator as a common agent is discussed

Government involvement in liberalised gas markets; a welfare-economic analysis of Dutch gas-depletion policy

This report analyses the welfare effects of two major components of the Dutch gas-depletion policy: the offtake guarantee for small-fields gas and the cap on production from the Groningen field. We conclude that the benefits of offtake guarantee currently may outweigh the costs, but a further development of the gas market would reverse this picture. The cost of the offtake guarantee is that it gives operators reduced incentives to respond optimally to short-term changes in market conditions compared to a competitive market. Regarding the cap on Groningen (42.5 bcm per year), we find that this measure is inefficient when the cap is binding, i.e. restricting the production from the Groningen field. The costs of capping Groningen production follow from shifting returns to the future. The benefits of this measures consist of slightly positive effects on small-fields production and positive benefits for security of supply. Read the�background documents: CPB Memorandum 143: "Market failures and government policies in gas markets" CPB Memorandum 144: "NATGAS: a model of the European natural gas market" �

Faster Drilling with Expercience?

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Oil Service Contracts - New Incentive Schemes to Promote Drilling Efficiency

,Oil

An optimised illustrative investment model of the economics of integrated returns from CCS deployment in the UK/UKCS

Preprin

Building infrastructures for Fossil- and Bio-energy with Carbon Capture and Storage: insights from a cooperative game-theoretic perspective

This paper examines the deployment of a shared CO2 transportation infrastructure needed to support the combined emergence of Bio-energy with Carbon Capture and Storage (BECCS) and Fossil energy with Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS). We develop a cooperative game-theoretic approach to: (i) examine the conditions needed for its construction to be decided, and (ii) determine the break-even CO2 value needed to build such a shared infrastructure. In particular, we highlight that, as biogenic emissions are overlooked in currently-implemented carbon accounting frameworks, BECCS and CCS emitters face asymmetric conditions for joining a shared infrastructure. We thus further examine the influence of these carbon accounting considerations by assessing and comparing the break-even CO2 values obtained under alternative accounting rules. We apply this modeling framework to a large contemporary BECCS/CCS case-study in Sweden. Our results indicate that sustainable and incentive-compatible cooperation schemes can be implemented if the value of CO2 is high enough and show how that value varies depending on the carbon accounting framework retained for negative emissions and the nature of the infrastructure operators. In the most advantageous scenario, the CO2 value needs to reach 112€/tCO2, while the current Swedish carbon tax amounts to 110€/tCO2. Overall, these findings position pragmatic policy recommendations for local BECCS deployment

Offshore transportation of Norwegian gas to Europe: the case of the Barents Sea gas infrastructure

This study is concerned with Norway’s role in supplying gas to Europe through offshore pipelines. One reason for choosing this topic is the difference in available research between the number one supplier of gas to Europe, Russia, and the number two, Norway, where there is much less published research. This study aims to bridge the gap by considering, for the Norwegian gas Sector, issues of gas supply, a competitive gas market, a sustainable effective, efficient offshore infrastructure and access for all where and when it is required. It further explores whether the regulation of the Norwegian Gas Sector, through national regulations, the Gas Target Model and three EU gas directives is meeting its goals or actually hinders development. Another reason to choose this subject is the low volume of investments in the Norwegian gas offshore infrastructure, which consequently will lead to reduced volumes of supply. In relation to the abovementioned, the third reason is to investigate whether current and anticipated prices justify further investment in Norwegian natural resources and offshore infrastructure. The fourth reason is to explore the possibilities and preferences for Europe to support investment in Norway’s most promising sector, the Barents Sea, or if competition and pricing do not warrant further investment