657 research outputs found
TOWARDS SUSTAINABLE QUALITY OF SERVICE IN INTERCONNECTION
This paper analyses the structure of the Internet marketplace and the business relationships of key players involved in network services provision. A brief overview of existing pricing policies and research work in this area is presented and some new issues are introduced. We believe that the role of information asymmetry is critical when considering agreements for Internet access and interconnection. In negotiation and contract preparation, information asymmetry gives rise to adverse selection. The current structure of connectivity agreements does not address information asymmetries thus allowing the possibility of opportunistic behaviour in the form of moral hazard. Inasmuch as interconnection agreements involve sharing and/or exchanging network resources, either party will tend to exploit the agreement to its own advantage (i.e. conserving its own resources) and, possibly, to the detriment of the other (i.e. overutilising the otherâs resources). The discussion focuses on interconnection agreements between Internet Service Providers, namely peering and transit. The paper concludes with an outline of an incentive compatible mechanism that can sustain quality of service requirements in interconnection agreements.interconnection information asymmetry
Spectrum Trading: An Abstracted Bibliography
This document contains a bibliographic list of major papers on spectrum
trading and their abstracts. The aim of the list is to offer researchers
entering this field a fast panorama of the current literature. The list is
continually updated on the webpage
\url{http://www.disp.uniroma2.it/users/naldi/Ricspt.html}. Omissions and papers
suggested for inclusion may be pointed out to the authors through e-mail
(\textit{[email protected]})
Trade & Cap: A Customer-Managed, Market-Based System for Trading Bandwidth Allowances at a Shared Link
We propose Trade & Cap (T&C), an economics-inspired mechanism that incentivizes users to voluntarily coordinate their consumption of the bandwidth of a shared resource (e.g., a DSLAM link) so as to converge on what they perceive to be an equitable allocation, while ensuring efficient resource utilization. Under T&C, rather than acting as an arbiter, an Internet Service Provider (ISP) acts as an enforcer of what the community of rational users sharing the resource decides is a fair allocation of that resource. Our T&C mechanism proceeds in two phases. In the first, software agents acting on behalf of users engage in a strategic trading game in which each user agent selfishly chooses bandwidth slots to reserve in support of primary, interactive network usage activities. In the second phase, each user is allowed to acquire additional bandwidth slots in support of presumed open-ended need for fluid bandwidth, catering to secondary applications. The acquisition of this fluid bandwidth is subject to the remaining "buying power" of each user and by prevalent "market prices" â both of which are determined by the results of the trading phase and a desirable aggregate cap on link utilization. We present analytical results that establish the underpinnings of our T&C mechanism, including game-theoretic results pertaining to the trading phase, and pricing of fluid bandwidth allocation pertaining to the capping phase. Using real network traces, we present extensive experimental results that demonstrate the benefits of our scheme, which we also show to be practical by highlighting the salient features of an efficient implementation architecture.National Science Foundation (CCF-0820138, CSR-0720604, EFRI-0735974, CNS-0524477, and CNS-0520166); Universidad Pontificia Bolivariana and COLCIENCIASâInstituto Colombiano para el Desarrollo de la Ciencia y la TecnologĂa âFrancisco Jose Ì de Caldasâ
Coordinating service composition
The fundamental paradigm shift from traditional value chains to agile service value networks implies new economic and organizational challenges. As coordination mechanisms, auctions have proven to perform quite well in situations where intangible and heterogeneous goods are traded. Nevertheless traditional approaches in the area of multiattribute combinatorial auctions are not quite suitable to enable the trade of composite services. A flawless service execution and therefore the requester\u27s valuation highly depends on the accurate sequence of the functional parts of the composition, meaning that in contrary to service bundles, composite services only generate value through a valid order of their components. We present an abstract model as a formalization of a service value network. The model comprehends a graph-based mechanism design to allocate multiattribute service offers within the network, to impose penalties for non-performance and to determine prices for complex services. The mechanism and the bidding language support various types of QoS attributes and their (semantic) aggregation. We analytically show that this variant is incentive compatible with respect to all dimensions of the service offer (quality and price)
The State of Network Neutrality Regulation
The Network Neutrality (NN) debate refers to the battle over the design of a regulatory framework for preserving the Internet as a public network and open innovation platform. Fueled by concerns that broadband access service providers might abuse network management to discriminate against third party providers (e.g., content or application providers), policymakers have struggled with designing rules that would protect the Internet from unreasonable network management practices. In this article, we provide an overview of the history of the debate in the U.S. and the EU and highlight the challenges that will confront network engineers designing and operating networks as the debate continues to evolve.BMBF, 16DII111, Verbundprojekt: Weizenbaum-Institut fĂŒr die vernetzte Gesellschaft - Das Deutsche Internet-Institut; Teilvorhaben: Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin fĂŒr Sozialforschung (WZB)EC/H2020/679158/EU/Resolving the Tussle in the Internet: Mapping, Architecture, and Policy Making/ResolutioNe
Auction-based Bandwidth Allocation Mechanisms for Wireless Future Internet
An important aspect of the Future Internet is the efficient utilization of
(wireless) network resources. In order for the - demanding in terms of QoS -
Future Internet services to be provided, the current trend is evolving towards
an "integrated" wireless network access model that enables users to enjoy
mobility, seamless access and high quality of service in an all-IP network on
an "Anytime, Anywhere" basis. The term "integrated" is used to denote that the
Future Internet wireless "last mile" is expected to comprise multiple
heterogeneous geographically coexisting wireless networks, each having
different capacity and coverage radius. The efficient management of the
wireless access network resources is crucial due to their scarcity that renders
wireless access a potential bottleneck for the provision of high quality
services. In this paper we propose an auction mechanism for allocating the
bandwidth of such a network so that efficiency is attained, i.e. social welfare
is maximized. In particular, we propose an incentive-compatible, efficient
auction-based mechanism of low computational complexity. We define a repeated
game to address user utilities and incentives issues. Subsequently, we extend
this mechanism so that it can also accommodate multicast sessions. We also
analyze the computational complexity and message overhead of the proposed
mechanism. We then show how user bids can be replaced from weights generated by
the network and transform the auction to a cooperative mechanism capable of
prioritizing certain classes of services and emulating DiffServ and time-of-day
pricing schemes. The theoretical analysis is complemented by simulations that
assess the proposed mechanisms properties and performance. We finally provide
some concluding remarks and directions for future research
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