3,153 research outputs found

    An Optimal Game Theoretical Framework for Mobility Aware Routing in Mobile Ad hoc Networks

    Full text link
    Selfish behaviors are common in self-organized Mobile Ad hoc Networks (MANETs) where nodes belong to different authorities. Since cooperation of nodes is essential for routing protocols, various methods have been proposed to stimulate cooperation among selfish nodes. In order to provide sufficient incentives, most of these methods pay nodes a premium over their actual costs of participation. However, they lead to considerably large overpayments. Moreover, existing methods ignore mobility of nodes, for simplicity. However, owing to the mobile nature of MANETs, this assumption seems unrealistic. In this paper, we propose an optimal game theoretical framework to ensure the proper cooperation in mobility aware routing for MANETs. The proposed method is based on the multi-dimensional optimal auctions which allows us to consider path durations, in addition to the route costs. Path duration is a metric that best reflects changes in topology caused by mobility of nodes and, it is widely used in mobility aware routing protocols. Furthermore, the proposed mechanism is optimal in that it minimizes the total expected payments. We provide theoretical analysis to support our claims. In addition, simulation results show significant improvements in terms of payments compared to the most popular existing methods

    A Coalition-Formation Game Model for Energy-Efficient Routing in Mobile Ad-hoc Network

    Get PDF
    One of the most routing problems in Mobile Ad-hoc Network is the node’s selfishness. Nodes are generally selfish and try to maximize their own benefit; hence these nodes refuse to forward packet on behalf of others to preserve their limited energy resources. This selfishness may lead to a low efficiency of routing. Therefore, it is important to study mechanisms which can be used encourage cooperation among nodes, to maintain the network efficiency. In this paper, we propose a cooperative game theoretic model to support more energy-aware and available bandwidth routing in MANET. We introduce a novel framework from coalitional-formation game theory, called hedonic coalition-formation game. We integrate this model to OLSR protocol that is an optimization over the classical link state protocol for the MANETs. Within each coalition, a coalition coordinator acts as a special MPR node to improve the energy efficient and the packet success rate of the transmission. Simulation results show how the proposed algorithm improve the performance in terms of the percentage of selected MPR nodes in the network, the percentage of alive nodes by time, and the Packet Delivery Ratio. Which prove that our proposed model leads, to better results compared to the classical OLSR

    A mechanism design-based secure architecture for mobile ad hoc networks

    Get PDF
    International audienceTo avoid the single point of failure for the certificate authority (CA) in MANET, a decentralized solution is proposed where nodes are grouped into different clusters. Each cluster should contain at least two confident nodes. One is known as CA and the another as register authority RA. The Dynamic Demilitarized Zone (DDMZ) is proposed as a solution for protecting the CA node against potential attacks. It is formed from one or more RA node. The problems of such a model are: (1) Clusters with one confident node, CA, cannot be created and thus clusters' sizes are increased which negatively affect clusters' services and stability. (2) Clusters with high density of RA can cause channel collision at the CA. (3) Clusters' lifetime are reduced since RA monitors are always launched (i.e., resource consumption). In this paper, we propose a model based on mechanism design that will allow clusters with single trusted node (CA) to be created. Our mechanism will motivate nodes that does not belong to the confident community to participate by giving them incentives in the form of trust, which can be used for cluster's services. To achieve this goal, a RA selection algorithm is proposed that selects nodes based on a predefined selection criteria function. Finally, empirical results are provided to support our solutions

    Incentive based Routing Protocol for Mobile Peer to Peer Networks

    Get PDF
    Incentive models are becoming increasingly popular in Mobile Peer to Peer Networks (M-P2P) as these models entice node participation in return for a virtual currency to combat free riding and to effectively manage constraint resources in the network. Many routing protocols proposed are based on best effort data traffic policy, such as the shortest route selection (hop minimization). Using virtual currency to find a cost effective optimal route from the source to the destination, while considering Quality of Service (QoS) aspects such as bandwidth and service capacity constraints for data delivery, remains a challenging task due to the presence of multiple paths and service providers. Modeling the network as a directed weighted graph and using the cost acquired from the price function as an incentive to pay the intermediate nodes in M-P2P networks to forward data, we develop a Game theoretic approach based on stochastic games to find an optimal route considering QoS aspect. The performance of our routing protocol is evaluated and compared with some existing routing protocols and the result shows that our protocol proves to be efficient compared to shortest-path DSR and multiple paths SMR in terms of average response time, energy and bandwidth utilization in the network

    Spectrum Trading: An Abstracted Bibliography

    Full text link
    This document contains a bibliographic list of major papers on spectrum trading and their abstracts. The aim of the list is to offer researchers entering this field a fast panorama of the current literature. The list is continually updated on the webpage \url{http://www.disp.uniroma2.it/users/naldi/Ricspt.html}. Omissions and papers suggested for inclusion may be pointed out to the authors through e-mail (\textit{[email protected]})
    • …
    corecore