Pirate stealth or inattentional blindness?:the effects of target relevance and sustained attention on security monitoring for experienced and naïve operators

Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) operators are responsible for maintaining security in various applied settings. However, research has largely ignored human factors that may contribute to CCTV operator error. One important source of error is inattentional blindness--the failure to detect unexpected but clearly visible stimuli when attending to a scene. We compared inattentional blindness rates for experienced (84 infantry personnel) and naïve (87 civilians) operators in a CCTV monitoring task. The task-relevance of the unexpected stimulus and the length of the monitoring period were manipulated between participants. Inattentional blindness rates were measured using typical post-event questionnaires, and participants' real-time descriptions of the monitored event. Based on the post-event measure, 66% of the participants failed to detect salient, ongoing stimuli appearing in the spatial field of their attentional focus. The unexpected task-irrelevant stimulus was significantly more likely to go undetected (79%) than the unexpected task-relevant stimulus (55%). Prior task experience did not inoculate operators against inattentional blindness effects. Participants' real-time descriptions revealed similar patterns, ruling out inattentional amnesia accounts

Culture and generalized inattentional blindness

A recent mathematical treatment of Baars' Global Workspace consciousness model, much in the spirit of Dretske's communication theory analysis of high level mental function, is used to study the effects of embedding cultural heritage on a generalized form of inattentional blindness. Culture should express itself quite distinctly in this basic psychophysical phenomenon, acting across a variety of sensory and other modalities, because the limited syntactic and grammatical 'bandpass' of the topological rate distortion manifold characterizing conscious attention is itself strongly sculpted by the constraints of cultural context

The Effects of Alcohol on Visual Attention

Alcohol has been shown to have a variety of effects on cognitive performance in humans; the present study tested the effects of alcohol on visual selective attention using three different paradigms. The effects of alcohol intoxication over a broad range of blood alcohol concentrations (average between 0.01 and 0.08) were evaluated for change blindness, inattentional blindness, and multiple object tracking. Alcohol was found to impair inattentional blindness performance, negatively affecting participants’ ability to notice the unexpected changes presented. This result is interpreted as support for the alcohol myopia theory. No significant effects of alcohol were found for change blindness or multiple object tracking

When Good Observers Go Bad: Change Blindness, Inattentional Blindness, and Visual Experience

Several studies (e.g., Becklen & Cervone, 1983; Mack & Rock, 1998; Neisser & Becklen, 1975) have found that observers attending to a particular object or event often fail to report the presence of unexpected items. This has been interpreted as inattentional blindness (IB), a failure to see unattended items (Mack & Rock, 1998). Meanwhile, other studies (e.g., Pashler, 1988; Phillips, 1974; Rensink et al., 1997; Simons, 1996) have found that observers often fail to report the presence of large changes in a display when these changes occur simultaneously with a transient such as an eye movement or flash of the display. This has been interpreted as change blindness (CB), a failure to see unattended changes (Rensink et al., 1997). In both cases there is a striking failure to report an object or event that would be quite visible under other circumstances. And in both cases there is a widespread (although not universal) belief that the underlying cause has to do with the absence of attention. The question then arises as to how these effects might be related. Is CB the same thing as IB? If not, what is the relation between them? And given that these phenomena deal with failures of subjective perception, what can they teach us about the nature of our visual experience? In particular, what can they teach us about the role played by visual attention

Institutional Cognition

We generalize a recent mathematical analysis of Bernard Baars' model of human consciousness to explore analogous, but far more complicated, phenomena of institutional cognition. Individual consciousness is limited to a single, tunable, giant component of interacting cogntivie modules, instantiating a Global Workspace. Human institutions, by contrast, seem able to multitask, supporting several such giant components simultaneously, although their behavior remains constrained to a topology generated by cultural context and by the path-dependence inherent to organizational history. Surprisingly, such multitasking, while clearly limiting the phenomenon of inattentional blindness, does not eliminate it. This suggests that organizations (or machines) explicitly designed along these principles, while highly efficient at certain sets of tasks, would still be subject to analogs of the subtle failure patterns explored in Wallace (2005b, 2006). We compare and contrast our results with recent work on collective efficacy and collective consciousness

Generalized inattentional blindness from a Global Workspace perspective

We apply Baars' Global Workspace model of consciousness to inattentional blindness, using the groupoid network method of Stewart et al. to explore modular structures defined by information measures associated with cognitive process. Internal cross-talk breaks the fundamental groupoid symmetry, and, if sufficiently strong, creates, in a highly punctuated manner, a linked, shifting, giant component which instantiates the global workspace of consciousness. Embedding, exterior, information sources act as an external field which breaks the groupoid symmetry in a somewhat different manner, definng the slowly-acting contexts of Baars' theory and providing topological constraints on the manifestations of consciousness. This analysis significantly extends recent mathematical treatments of the global workspace, and identifies a shifting, topologically-determined syntactical and grammatical 'bottleneck' as a tunable rate distortion manifold which constrains what sensory or other signals can be brought to conscious attention, typically in a punctuated manner. Sensations outside the limits of that filter's syntactic 'bandpass' have lower probability of detection, regardless of their structure, accounting for generalized forms of inattentional blindness

Artificially created stimuli produced by a genetic algorithm using a saliency model as its fitness function show that Inattentional Blindness modulates performance in a pop-out visual search paradigm

Salient stimuli are more readily detected than less salient stimuli, and individual differences in such detection may be relevant to why some people fail to notice an unexpected stimulus that appears in their visual field whereas others do notice it. This failure to notice unexpected stimuli is termed 'Inattentional Blindness' and is more likely to occur when we are engaged in a resource-consuming task. A genetic algorithm is described in which artificial stimuli are created using a saliency model as its fitness function. These generated stimuli, which vary in their saliency level, are used in two studies that implement a pop-out visual search task to evaluate the power of the model to discriminate the performance of people who were and were not Inattentionally Blind (IB). In one study the number of orientational filters in the model was increased to check if discriminatory power and the saliency estimation for low-level images could be improved. Results show that the performance of the model does improve when additional filters are included, leading to the conclusion that low-level images may require a higher number of orientational filters for the model to better predict participants' performance. In both studies we found that given the same target patch image (i.e. same saliency value) IB individuals take longer to identify a target compared to non-IB individuals. This suggests that IB individuals require a higher level of saliency for low-level visual features in order to identify target patches

Institutional paraconsciousness and its pathologies

This analysis extends a recent mathematical treatment of the Baars consciousness model to analogous, but far more complicated, phenomena of institutional cognition. Individual consciousness is limited to a single, tunable, giant component of interacting cognitive modules, instantiating a Global Workspace. Human institutions, by contrast, support several, sometimes many, such giant components simultaneously, although their behavior remains constrained to a topology generated by cultural context and by the path-dependence inherent to organizational history. Such highly parallel multitasking - institutional paraconsciousness - while clearly limiting inattentional blindness and the consequences of failures within individual workspaces, does not eliminate them, and introduces new characteristic dysfunctions involving the distortion of information sent between global workspaces. Consequently, organizations (or machines designed along these principles), while highly efficient at certain kinds of tasks, remain subject to canonical and idiosyncratic failure patterns similar to, but more complicated than, those afflicting individuals. Remediation is complicated by the manner in which pathogenic externalities can write images of themselves on both institutional function and therapeutic intervention, in the context of relentless market selection pressures. The approach is broadly consonant with recent work on collective efficacy, collective consciousness, and distributed cognition

Machine Hyperconsciousness

Individual animal consciousness appears limited to a single giant component of interacting cognitive modules, instantiating a shifting, highly tunable, Global Workspace. Human institutions, by contrast, can support several, often many, such giant components simultaneously, although they generally function far more slowly than the minds of the individuals who compose them. Machines having multiple global workspaces -- hyperconscious machines -- should, however, be able to operate at the few hundred milliseconds characteistic of individual consciousness. Such multitasking -- machine or institutional -- while clearly limiting the phenomenon of inattentional blindness, does not eliminate it, and introduces characteristic failure modes involving the distortion of information sent between global workspaces. This suggests that machines explicitly designed along these principles, while highly efficient at certain sets of tasks, remain subject to canonical and idiosyncratic failure patterns analogous to, but more complicated than, those explored in Wallace (2006a). By contrast, institutions, facing similar challenges, are usually deeply embedded in a highly stabilizing cultural matrix of law, custom, and tradition which has evolved over many centuries. Parallel development of analogous engineering strategies, directed toward ensuring an 'ethical' device, would seem requisite to the sucessful application of any form of hyperconscious machine technology

Biologically inspired distributed machine cognition: a new formal approach to hyperparallel computation

The irresistable march toward multiple-core chip technology presents currently intractable pdrogramming challenges. High level mental processes in many animals, and their analogs for social structures, appear similarly massively parallel, and recent mathematical models addressing them may be adaptable to the multi-core programming problem