The Complexity of Rationalizing Network Formation

We study the complexity of rationalizing network formation. In this problem we fix an underlying model describing how selfish parties (the vertices) produce a graph by making individual decisions to form or not form incident edges. The model is equipped with a notion of stability (or equilibrium), and we observe a set of "snapshots" of graphs that are assumed to be stable. From this we would like to infer some unobserved data about the system: edge prices, or how much each vertex values short paths to each other vertex. We study two rationalization problems arising from the network formation model of Jackson and Wolinsky [14]. When the goal is to infer edge prices, we observe that the rationalization problem is easy. The problem remains easy even when rationalizing prices do not exist and we instead wish to find prices that maximize the stability of the system. In contrast, when the edge prices are given and the goal is instead to infer valuations of each vertex by each other vertex, we prove that the rationalization problem becomes NP-hard. Our proof exposes a close connection between rationalization problems and the Inequality-SAT (I-SAT) problem. Finally and most significantly, we prove that an approximation version of this NP-complete rationalization problem is NP-hard to approximate to within better than a 1/2 ratio. This shows that the trivial algorithm of setting everyone's valuations to infinity (which rationalizes all the edges present in the input graphs) or to zero (which rationalizes all the non-edges present in the input graphs) is the best possible assuming P ≠ NP To do this we prove a tight (1/2 + δ) -approximation hardness for a variant of I-SAT in which all coefficients are non-negative. This in turn follows from a tight hardness result for MAX-LlN_(R_+) (linear equations over the reals, with non-negative coefficients), which we prove by a (non-trivial) modification of the recent result of Guruswami and Raghavendra [10] which achieved tight hardness for this problem without the non-negativity constraint. Our technical contributions regarding the hardness of I-SAT and MAX-LIN_(R_+) may be of independent interest, given the generality of these problem

On Existence and Properties of Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Bandwidth Allocation Games

In \emph{bandwidth allocation games} (BAGs), the strategy of a player consists of various demands on different resources. The player's utility is at most the sum of these demands, provided they are fully satisfied. Every resource has a limited capacity and if it is exceeded by the total demand, it has to be split between the players. Since these games generally do not have pure Nash equilibria, we consider approximate pure Nash equilibria, in which no player can improve her utility by more than some fixed factor $\alpha$ through unilateral strategy changes. There is a threshold $\alpha_\delta$ (where $\delta$ is a parameter that limits the demand of each player on a specific resource) such that $\alpha$-approximate pure Nash equilibria always exist for $\alpha \geq \alpha_\delta$, but not for $\alpha < \alpha_\delta$. We give both upper and lower bounds on this threshold $\alpha_\delta$ and show that the corresponding decision problem is ${\sf NP}$-hard. We also show that the $\alpha$-approximate price of anarchy for BAGs is $\alpha+1$. For a restricted version of the game, where demands of players only differ slightly from each other (e.g. symmetric games), we show that approximate Nash equilibria can be reached (and thus also be computed) in polynomial time using the best-response dynamic. Finally, we show that a broader class of utility-maximization games (which includes BAGs) converges quickly towards states whose social welfare is close to the optimum

The Strongish Planted Clique Hypothesis and Its Consequences

We formulate a new hardness assumption, the Strongish Planted Clique Hypothesis (SPCH), which postulates that any algorithm for planted clique must run in time n^?(log n) (so that the state-of-the-art running time of n^O(log n) is optimal up to a constant in the exponent). We provide two sets of applications of the new hypothesis. First, we show that SPCH implies (nearly) tight inapproximability results for the following well-studied problems in terms of the parameter k: Densest k-Subgraph, Smallest k-Edge Subgraph, Densest k-Subhypergraph, Steiner k-Forest, and Directed Steiner Network with k terminal pairs. For example, we show, under SPCH, that no polynomial time algorithm achieves o(k)-approximation for Densest k-Subgraph. This inapproximability ratio improves upon the previous best k^o(1) factor from (Chalermsook et al., FOCS 2017). Furthermore, our lower bounds hold even against fixed-parameter tractable algorithms with parameter k. Our second application focuses on the complexity of graph pattern detection. For both induced and non-induced graph pattern detection, we prove hardness results under SPCH, improving the running time lower bounds obtained by (Dalirrooyfard et al., STOC 2019) under the Exponential Time Hypothesis

10171 Abstracts Collection -- Equilibrium Computation

From April 25 to April 30, 2010, the Dagstuhl Seminar 10171 ``Equilibrium Computation\u27\u27 was held in Schloss Dagstuhl~--~Leibniz Center for Informatics. During the seminar, several participants presented their current research, and ongoing work and open problems were discussed. Abstracts of the presentations given during the seminar as well as abstracts of seminar results and ideas are put together in this paper. The first section describes the seminar topics and goals in general. Links to extended abstracts or full papers are provided, if available

The Complexity of Welfare Maximization in Congestion Games

We investigate issues of complexity related to welfare maximization in congestion games. In particular, we provide a full classification of complexity results for the problem of finding a minimum cost solution to a congestion game, under the model of Rosenthal. We consider both network and general congestion games, and we examine several variants of the problem concerning the structure of the game and the properties of its associated cost functions. Many of these problem variants turn out to be NP-hard, and some are hard to approximate to within any finite factor, unless P = NP. We also identify several versions of the problem that are solvable in polynomial time.United States. Dept. of Energy (Grant Number: DE-AC52-07NA27344)Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (Grant Number: LLNL-JRNL-410585)United States. Office of Naval Research (Grant Number: N000141110056