A Symposium on Restitution

The editors of the Vanderbilt Law Review deserve praise for arranging this symposium on the neglected subject of Restitution, a great and growing area of our private law whose literature is extra-ordinarily meager. Partly because of this neglect by legal scholars,the practicing profession as a whole remains unaware of the range and variety of restitutionary remedies and the possibilities they offer for solving problems that are otherwise intractable. The volume of restitution cases reported in current advance sheets shows that courts and lawyers are learning to make use of restitution remedies, but the subject still inspires hesitation and diffidence, for knowledge is diffused in fragments and an overview is difficult to acquire

The problem of moral luck: An argument against its epistemic reduction

Whom I call 'epistemic reductionists' in this article are critics of the notion of 'moral luck' that maintain that all supposed cases of moral luck are illusory; they are in fact cases of what I describe as a special form of epistemic luck, the only difference lying in what we get to know about someone, rather than in what (s)he deserves in terms of praise or blame. I argue that epistemic reductionists are mistaken. They implausibly separate judgements of character from judgements concerning acts, and they assume a conception of character that is untenable both from a common sense perspective and with a view to findings from social psychology. I use especially the example of Scobie, the protagonist of Graham Greene's novel The Heart of the Matter, to show that moral luck is real-that there are cases of moral luck that cannot be reduced to epistemic luck. The reality of moral luck, in this example at least, lies in its impact on character and personal and moral identity. © 2009 Springer Science Media B.V

A principles-based ethics assurance argument pattern for AI and autonomous systems

An assurance case is a structured argument, typically produced by safety engineers, to communicate confidence that a critical or complex system, such as an aircraft, will be acceptably safe within its intended context. Assurance cases often inform third party approval of a system. One emerging proposition within the trustworthy AI and autonomous systems (AI/AS) research community is to use assurance cases to instil justified confidence that specific AI/AS will be ethically acceptable when operational in well-defined contexts. This paper substantially develops the proposition and makes it concrete. It brings together the assurance case methodology with a set of ethical principles to structure a principles-based ethics assurance argument pattern. The principles are justice, beneficence, non-maleficence, and respect for human autonomy, with the principle of transparency playing a supporting role. The argument pattern—shortened to the acronym PRAISE—is described. The objective of the proposed PRAISE argument pattern is to provide a reusable template for individual ethics assurance cases, by which engineers, developers, operators, or regulators could justify, communicate, or challenge a claim about the overall ethical acceptability of the use of a specific AI/AS in a given socio-technical context. We apply the pattern to the hypothetical use case of an autonomous ‘robo-taxi’ service in a city centre

Implikatur Politik Ujaran Kebencian Terhadap Presiden Joko Widodo Pada Akun Sosial Twitter

Hate speech has become a tranding topic in various mass media. Hate speech cases in Indonesia can be said in a state of alert, because many cases have been found. One example of hate speech cases is Muhammad Arsyad who is accused of uploading pictures with words insulting President Joko Widodo in 2014. The purpose of this study is to analyze the style of language used in expressions of hatred towards Jokowi on Twitter social accounts, describing the forms of political implicature utterance of hatred on social media twitter, analyzing political implicature strategies for hate speech towards Jokowi on Twitter social accounts, and describing the implementation of research results with Indonesian language learning. Based on this, the method used in this research is the method of padan and the method of agih. This research attempts to examine the meaning contained in an utterance, ie hatred of Joko 2 Widodo on social accounts Twitter. The result of this research is the use of cynicism, sarcasm and irony; implicit forms of asking for a new president, asking to be silent, collecting appointments and listening to the people; the strategy used is directly and indirectly; and the implementation of this research, which is in accordance with KD 4.8, expresses criticism, refutation, or praise in the form of response texts verbally and / or written with regard to structure and language

Intentional Action in Folk Psychology: An Experimental Investigation

Four experiments examined people’s folk-psychological concept of intentional action. The chief question was whether or not evaluative considerations — considerations of good and bad, right and wrong, praise and blame — played any role in that concept. The results indicated that the moral qualities of a behavior strongly influence people’s judgements as to whether or not that behavior should be considered ‘intentional.’ After eliminating a number of alternative explanations, the author concludes that this effect is best explained by the hypothesis that evaluative considerations do play some role in people’s concept of intentional action

Equal Rights for Zombies?: Phenomenal Consciousness and Responsible Agency

Intuitively, moral responsibility requires conscious awareness of what one is doing, and why one is doing it, but what kind of awareness is at issue? Neil Levy argues that phenomenal consciousness—the qualitative feel of conscious sensations—is entirely unnecessary for moral responsibility. He claims that only access consciousness—the state in which information (e.g., from perception or memory) is available to an array of mental systems (e.g., such that an agent can deliberate and act upon that information)—is relevant to moral responsibility. I argue that numerous ethical, epistemic, and neuroscientific considerations entail that the capacity for phenomenal consciousness is necessary for moral responsibility. I focus in particular on considerations inspired by P. F. Strawson, who puts a range of qualitative moral emotions—the reactive attitudes—front and center in the analysis of moral responsibility

Accidental rightness

In this paper I argue that the disagreement between modern moral philosophers and (some) virtue ethicists about whether motive affects rightness is a result of conceptual disagreement, and that when they develop a theory of ‘right action,’ the two parties respond to two very different questions. Whereas virtue ethicists tend to use ‘right’ as interchangeable with ‘good’ or ‘virtuous’ and as implying moral praise, modern moral philosophers use it as roughly equivalent to ‘in accordance with moral obligation.’ One implication of this is that the possibility of an act being right by accident does not pose a problem for consequentialism or deontology. A further implication is that it reveals a shortcoming in virtue ethics, namely that it does not—yet needs to—present an account of moral obligation

Criminals or Patients? Towards a Tragic Conception of Moral and Legal Responsibility \ud

There is a gap between, on the one hand, the tragic character of human action and, on the other hand, our moral and legal conceptions of responsibility that focus on individual agency and absolute guilt. Drawing on Kierkegaard’s understanding of tragic action and engaging with contemporary discourse on moral luck, poetic justice, and relational responsibility, this paper argues for a reform of our legal practices based on a less ‘harsh’ (Kierkegaard) conception of moral and legal responsibility and directed more at empathic understanding based on the emotional and imaginative appreciation of personal narratives. This may help our societies and communities to better cope with unacceptable deeds by individuals who are neither criminals nor patients, to make room for praise as well as blame and punishment, and to set up practices and institutions that do not rely on a conception of responsibility that is hard to bear for all of us. \u