Towards eradication of SPAM: A study on intelligent adaptive SPAM filters

As the massive increase of electronic mail (email) usage continues, SPAM (unsolicited bulk email), has continued to grow because it is a very inexpensive method of advertising. These unwanted emails can cause a serious problem by filling up the email inbox and thereby leaving no space for legitimate emails to pass through. Currently the only defense against SPAM is the use of SPAM filters. A novel SPAM filter GetEmail5 along with the design rationale, is described in this thesis. To test the efficacy of GetEmail5 SPAM filter, an experimental setup was created and a commercial bulk email program was used to send SPAM and non-SPAM emails to test the new SPAM filter. GetEmail5's efficiency and ability to detect SPAM was compared against two highly ranked commercial SPAM filters on different sets of emails, these included all SPAM, non-SPAM, and mixed emails, also text and HTML emails. The results showed the superiority of GetEmail5 compared to the two commercial SPAM filters in detecting SPAM emails and reducing the user's involvement in categorizing the incoming emails. This thesis demonstrates the design rationale for GetEmail5 and also its greater effectiveness in comparison with the commercial SPAM filters tested

Exploiting Machine Learning to Subvert Your Spam Filter

Using statistical machine learning for making security decisions introduces new vulnerabilities in large scale systems. This paper shows how an adversary can exploit statistical machine learning, as used in the SpamBayes spam filter, to render it useless—even if the adversary’s access is limited to only 1 % of the training messages. We further demonstrate a new class of focused attacks that successfully prevent victims from receiving specific email messages. Finally, we introduce two new types of defenses against these attacks.

Reverse Engineering Socialbot Infiltration Strategies in Twitter

Data extracted from social networks like Twitter are increasingly being used to build applications and services that mine and summarize public reactions to events, such as traffic monitoring platforms, identification of epidemic outbreaks, and public perception about people and brands. However, such services are vulnerable to attacks from socialbots $-$ automated accounts that mimic real users $-$ seeking to tamper statistics by posting messages generated automatically and interacting with legitimate users. Potentially, if created in large scale, socialbots could be used to bias or even invalidate many existing services, by infiltrating the social networks and acquiring trust of other users with time. This study aims at understanding infiltration strategies of socialbots in the Twitter microblogging platform. To this end, we create 120 socialbot accounts with different characteristics and strategies (e.g., gender specified in the profile, how active they are, the method used to generate their tweets, and the group of users they interact with), and investigate the extent to which these bots are able to infiltrate the Twitter social network. Our results show that even socialbots employing simple automated mechanisms are able to successfully infiltrate the network. Additionally, using a $2^k$ factorial design, we quantify infiltration effectiveness of different bot strategies. Our analysis unveils findings that are key for the design of detection and counter measurements approaches