The ISCIP Analyst, Volume VIII, Issue 4

This repository item contains a single issue of The ISCIP Analyst, an analytical review journal published from 1996 to 2010 by the Boston University Institute for the Study of Conflict, Ideology, and Policy

RONCO\u27s Response to Explosive Remnants of War in Post-conflict Environments

RONCO’s technical experts are dedicated to eliminating threats created by landmines and explosive remnants of war. Part of RONCO’s disposal process is creating local demining capacities in their host countries. As part of a quick response, RONCO has most recently added mine-action programs in Iraq and Afghanistan, creating a specialized explosive ordnance- disposal capacity in Afghanistan and establishing a bomb-disposal training school in Iraq

FM 30-16, Technical Intelligence, 28 February 1969.

This manual defines technical intelligence and explains the technical intelligence process. It briefly discusses the top level Army technical intelligence production organizations, which at that time were Foreign Science and Technology Center, the Missile Intelligence Directorate of the US Army Missile Command, and the Medical Intelligence Office of the Office of the Surgeon General of the Army. It explains the technical intelligence activities and planning in US Forces in the field. Considerable attention is given to explaining the proper procedures for recovery and evacuation of foreign equipment and documents. The appendices contain an extensive list of references, the categories of technical intelligence, and an example of a technical intelligence plan

FM 30-16, Technical Intelligence, 28 February 1969.

This manual defines technical intelligence and explains the technical intelligence process. It briefly discusses the top level Army technical intelligence production organizations, which at that time were Foreign Science and Technology Center, the Missile Intelligence Directorate of the US Army Missile Command, and the Medical Intelligence Office of the Office of the Surgeon General of the Army. It explains the technical intelligence activities and planning in US Forces in the field. Considerable attention is given to explaining the proper procedures for recovery and evacuation of foreign equipment and documents. The appendices contain an extensive list of references, the categories of technical intelligence, and an example of a technical intelligence plan

A Strategic Response to Terrorism A Framework for U.S. Policy; Strategic Insight: v.2, issue 2 (February 2003)

This article appeared in Strategic Insights (February 2003), v.2 no.2Deterrence by denial is the ultimate objective of the terrorism response framework. Although most counter-terror strategies begin with deterrence, their aim is to prevent an attack, not to deter the terrorist strategy. Some also describe deterrence of terrorism in terms of deterrence by punishment. While it is possible to deter a specific attack by threatening punishment, it is unlikely to succeed in terms of deterring a terrorist campaign in the first place. This framework depicts deterrence as the net result of operational, tactical, and strategic programs that range from pre-attack policies through the long-term response to a terrorist incident. This is ultimately deterrence by denial. Delegitimized and marginalized, the terrorists' message falls on deaf ears, and recruits no longer rush to their cause. They are denied sanctuary, funding, and logistics support. Their organization, communication, and movement is disrupted. Their planning, training, and access to weapons is curtailed. They are denied victims. They are denied the ability to generate fear and as a result are unable to influence targeted government. With this across-the-board denial, the terrorists and the terrorists' message are marginalized, and their strategy is rendered impotent. At that point terrorism is deterred