535 research outputs found

    Coordinated pluralism as a means to facilitate integrative taxonomies of cognition

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    © 2017 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. The past decade has witnessed a growing awareness of conceptual and methodological hurdles within psychology and neuroscience that must be addressed for taxonomic and explanatory progress in understanding psychological functions to be possible. In this paper, I evaluate several recent knowledge-building initiatives aimed at overcoming these obstacles. I argue that while each initiative offers important insights about how to facilitate taxonomic and explanatory progress in psychology and neuroscience, only a “coordinated pluralism” that incorporates positive aspects of each initiative will have the potential for success

    Safe Hands:Institutional Dynamics of Work Environment Management

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    The Usefulness of Truth : An Enquiry Concerning Economic Modelling

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    This thesis attempts to justify a normative role for methodology by sketching a pragmatic way out of the dichotomy between two major strands in economic methodology: empiricism and postmodernism. I discuss several methodological approaches and assess their aptness for theory appraisal in economics. I begin with the most common views on methodology (i.e. empiricism and postmodernism) and argue why they are each ill-suited for giving methodological prescriptions to economics. Then, I consider positions that avoid the errors of empiricism and postmodernism. I specifically examine why the two major strands of methodological criticism fail to give helpful methodological advice to economists and sketch out a pragmatic approach that can do this

    Higher-Order Expressivism: The Dyadic Nature of Moral Judgement

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    Moral judgements have a dyadic nature. Normally we experience some pressure to act in line with our moral judgements, even if it’s regularly overcome by fear, selfishness, laziness, or other forces. This is evidence that moral judgements are desire-like, as expressivists contend. On the other hand, moral judgements also have the features of beliefs. They can be true or false, as cognitivists maintain, and justified and reasoned about in the way other beliefs are. Rather than deny one of these two aspects, this thesis is ultimately a defence of higher-order expressivism according to which moral judgements are hybrid mental states composed of beliefs and desires. However, only two of the chapters (2 and 3) contain arguments in favour of this specific kind of expressivism. The first chapter – What is Expressivism? – argues for a general characterisation that will be useful for friends and foes alike, and the final two chapters address problems that are common to all expressivists. After we find out what expressivism is, I turn to the problems with pure versions according to which moral judgements are only desire-like states. I argue in chapter 2, The Problem with Purity, that pure expressivists are unlikely to be able to solve the Frege-Geach problem but higher-order (and other hybrid) expressivists can. In chapter 3, Metaphysics for Expressivists, I make a case for the inescapability of metaphysics even on the expressivist picture, which puts more pressure on pure versions of expressivism. I then show why higher-order expressivists must think moral properties are reducible to bog-standard descriptive ones. I end by arguing that this expressivist take on moral naturalism is better than cognitivist versions of naturalism. Chapter 4 is about how to understand moral disagreement. If moral judgements are desire-like, why does it make sense to say that two people morally disagree? I propose An Assertoric Theory of Disagreement whereby people express disagreement by asserting inconsistent things (and the problem of inconsistency is addressed in chapter 2). Finally, chapter 5, Error and the Limits of Quasi-Realism, is about how to understand the thought that our moral beliefs might be mistaken. I defend the standard expressivist construal of it being a case of thinking we might change our minds after we’ve gathered more evidence, cohered our beliefs and generally improved our epistemic situation. I then argue this yields a transcendental argument against scepticism: it tells us that it is incoherent to believe we might be utterly unable to access the moral truth. The upshot is that expressivists cannot “mimic” realism completely, but if this simply means that our door is closed to radical scepticism whereas theirs is open, this is all the better for expressivism

    Front-Line Physicians' Satisfaction with Information Systems in Hospitals

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    Day-to-day operations management in hospital units is difficult due to continuously varying situations, several actors involved and a vast number of information systems in use. The aim of this study was to describe front-line physicians' satisfaction with existing information systems needed to support the day-to-day operations management in hospitals. A cross-sectional survey was used and data chosen with stratified random sampling were collected in nine hospitals. Data were analyzed with descriptive and inferential statistical methods. The response rate was 65 % (n = 111). The physicians reported that information systems support their decision making to some extent, but they do not improve access to information nor are they tailored for physicians. The respondents also reported that they need to use several information systems to support decision making and that they would prefer one information system to access important information. Improved information access would better support physicians' decision making and has the potential to improve the quality of decisions and speed up the decision making process.Peer reviewe

    Preface

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    Realism and the epistemic accessibility of correspondence truth.

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    A long-standing objection to the correspondence theory of truth is that it is bound to make truth epistemically inaccessible and knowledge impossible. This sort of objection has led many philosophers to espouse anti-realism by subscribing to some kind of epistemic theory of truth. The aim of this thesis is to reject the standard objection against correspondence truth by arguing (i) that no reasonable version of the epistemic theory of truth is going to make truth epistemically more accessible than correspondence truth, and (ii) that in the framework of a naturalistic epistemology correspondence truth can prove sufficiently accessible to our cognitive efforts. Chapter 1 spells out the content of various claims which are usually described as 'realist' and investigates their connections with correspondence and epistemic truth. Chapter 2 introduces the 'inaccessibility' argument against correspondence truth, discusses Hilary Putnam's 'Brains in a vat' purported refutation of 'external' realism, and argues that ceteris paribus, every epistemic theory of truth falling short of strict verificationism will fail to make truth epistemically more accessible than a correspondence theory can. Chapter 3 provides a discussion of epistemological internalism. It gives an account of the appeal of epistemological internalism on philosophers in the Cartesian tradition and describes two major theoretical problems it has to face. Chapter 4 focuses on externalist accounts of knowing which make room (or can be modified so as to make room) for the possibility that human beings have, at least in certain circumstances, knowledge of their knowledge. Robert Nozick's 'tracking' analysis of factual knowledge and Fred Dretske's 'information-theoretic' analysis of (perceptual) knowledge are extensively discussed. Chapter 5 addresses the charge that purely externalist (i.e., naturalistic) accounts of knowing ought to be seen, in Laurence Bonjour's phrase, 'as simply abandoning the traditional idea of epistemic justification or rationality and along with it anything resembling the traditional conception of knowledge'. This leads to a wider discussion of the role and character of epistemic justification in our argumentative practices. Chapter 6 contains a discussion of various sorts of 'naturalized' epistemologies and identifies the 'naturalistic' claims one must be prepared to subscribe to in order to support the thesis that correspondence truth is something human beings can rationally pursue. Finally, a model-theoretic approach to the analysis of the comparative concept of verisimilitude is presented in the Appendix

    Exploring endocrinologists’ views and experiences of psychosocial and self-management support for patients with hypothyroidism

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    BackgroundHypothyroidism affects between 2% and 5% of the UK population. Reports suggest that up to 15% of patients report persistent symptoms despite treatment. Recommendations exist for psychosocial and self-management support for patients to address the demands of living with their condition and to develop the skills, knowledge, and experience to manage their health. In this study, Endocrinologists were asked about the provision of support for patients with hypothyroidism in secondary care. Their views, experiences, and perceptions of the barriers and facilitators to the implementation of psychosocial and self-management models of care were explored. MethodsEighteen Consultant Endocrinologists in the UK were recruited via a snowballing sampling technique and interviewed. Interviews were analysed using reflexive thematic analysis.FindingsFour overarching themes were identified. In the first theme (‘Walk with them’) participants identified that patients with hypothyroidism have diverse needs for psychosocial and self-management support from the point of diagnosis, but that participants report varied will, skill and confidence to meet these needs. The second theme (‘Embedded is best’) encapsulates participants’ attempts to explore psychosocial issues and embed components of self-management support into their own practice. Difficulties in shifting the focus of the consultation towards self-management and subsequent challenges to professional identity as biomedical expert are reported. These were perceived to be confounded by debates about non-standard (T3) treatments for hypothyroidism and a lack of available support services for referral. The third theme (‘Incorporate and collaborate’) presents participants’ views that collaboration is required to address gaps in provision in primary and secondary care. Valuable partners include: Patients, Endocrine Nurses, Health Psychologists, Pharmacists, Exercise Physiologists, embedded Researchers, and experts in the charitable sector. The fourth theme (‘We can’t do this alone’) includes participant-identified barriers to progress and highlights a need for change. This includes increases in funding and research, and supportive environment which empowers clinicians to place patients at the centre of their care.ConclusionThe findings from this research suggest that patients with hypothyroidism have unmet needs for psychosocial and self-management support from the point of diagnosis, and that Endocrinologists may to benefit from training, collaboration and support to incorporate non-medical models of care. Patients, professional collaborators, and experts in the charitable sector are valuable assets to Endocrinology and can contribute to psychosocial and self-management programmes for patients and clinician skills training, as well as acting as agents of change to address gaps in provision in primary and secondary care. A whole-systems approach is required to improve outcomes for patients with hypothyroidism and the clinicians who manage their care
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