880 research outputs found
Energy Saving Techniques for Phase Change Memory (PCM)
In recent years, the energy consumption of computing systems has increased
and a large fraction of this energy is consumed in main memory. Towards this,
researchers have proposed use of non-volatile memory, such as phase change
memory (PCM), which has low read latency and power; and nearly zero leakage
power. However, the write latency and power of PCM are very high and this,
along with limited write endurance of PCM present significant challenges in
enabling wide-spread adoption of PCM. To address this, several
architecture-level techniques have been proposed. In this report, we review
several techniques to manage power consumption of PCM. We also classify these
techniques based on their characteristics to provide insights into them. The
aim of this work is encourage researchers to propose even better techniques for
improving energy efficiency of PCM based main memory.Comment: Survey, phase change RAM (PCRAM
Egalitarian ORAM: Wear-Leveling for ORAM
While non-volatile memories (NVMs) provide several desirable characteristics
like better density and comparable energy efficiency than DRAM, DRAM-like
performance, and disk-like durability, the limited endurance NVMs manifest
remains a challenge with these memories. Indeed, the endurance constraints of
NVMs can prevent solutions that are commonly employed for other mainstream
memories like DRAM from being carried over as-is to NVMs. Specifically, in this
work we observe that, Oblivious RAM (ORAM) primitive, the state-ofart solution
to tackle memory bus side channel vulnerability, while widely studied for
DRAMs, is particularly challenging to implement as-is for NVMs as it severely
affects endurance of NVMs. This is so, as the inherent nature of ORAM primitive
causes an order of magnitude increase in write traffic and furthermore, causes
some regions of memory to be written far more often than others. This
non-uniform write traffic as manifested by ORAM primitive stands to severely
affect the lifetime of non-volatile memories (1% of baseline without ORAM) to
even make it impractical to address this security vulnerabilit
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NoiseSPY: a real-time mobile phone platform for urban noise monitoring and mapping
In this paper we present the design, implementation, evaluation, and user experiences of the NoiseSpy application, our sound sensing system that turns the mobile phone into a low-cost data logger for monitoring environmental noise. It allows users to explore a city area while collaboratively visualizing noise levels in real-time. The software combines the sound levels with GPS data in order to generate a map of sound levels that were encountered during a journey. We report early findings from the trials which have been carried out by cycling couriers who were given Nokia mobile phones equipped with the NoiseSpy software to collect noise data around Cambridge city. Indications are that, not only is the functionality of this personal environmental sensing tool engaging for users, but aspects such as personalization of data, contextual information, and reflection upon both the data and its collection, are important factors in obtaining and retaining their interest
Enabling Recovery of Secure Non-Volatile Memories
Emerging non-volatile memories (NVMs), such as phase change memory (PCM), spin-transfer torque RAM (STT-RAM) and resistive RAM (ReRAM), have dual memory-storage characteristics and, therefore, are strong candidates to replace or augment current DRAM and secondary storage devices. The newly released Intel 3D XPoint persistent memory and Optane SSD series have shown promising features. However, when these new devices are exposed to events such as power loss, many issues arise when data recovery is expected. In this dissertation, I devised multiple schemes to enable secure data recovery for emerging NVM technologies when memory encryption is used. With the data-remanence feature of NVMs, physical attacks become easier; hence, emerging NVMs are typically paired with encryption. In particular, counter-mode encryption is commonly used due to its performance and security advantages over other schemes (e.g., electronic codebook encryption). However, enabling data recovery in power failure events requires the recovery of security metadata associated with data blocks. Naively writing security metadata updates along with data for each operation can further exacerbate the write endurance problem of NVMs as they have limited write endurance and very slow write operations. Therefore, it is necessary to enable the recovery of data and security metadata (encryption counters) but without incurring a significant number of writes. The first work of this dissertation presents an explanation of Osiris, a novel mechanism that repurposes error correcting code (ECC) co-located with data to enable recovery of encryption counters by additionally serving as a sanity-check for encryption counters used. Thus, by using a stop-loss mechanism with a limited number of trials, ECC can be used to identify which encryption counter that was used most recently to encrypt the data and, hence, allow correct decryption and recovery. The first work of this dissertation explores how different stop-loss parameters along with optimizations of Osiris can potentially reduce the number of writes. Overall, Osiris enables the recovery of encryption counters while achieving better performance and fewer writes than a conventional write-back caching scheme of encryption counters, which lacks the ability to recover encryption counters. Later, in the second work, Osiris implementation is expanded to work with different counter-mode memory encryption schemes, where we use an epoch-based approach to periodically persist updated counters. Later, when a crash occurs, we can recover counters through test-and-verification to identify the correct counter within the size of an epoch for counter recovery. Our proposed scheme, Osiris-Global, incurs minimal performance overheads and write overheads in enabling the recovery of encryption counters. In summary, the findings of the present PhD work enable the recovery of secure NVM systems and, hence, allows persistent applications to leverage the persistency features of NVMs. Meanwhile, it also minimizes the number of writes required in meeting this crash consistency requirement of secure NVM systems
InternalBlue - Bluetooth Binary Patching and Experimentation Framework
Bluetooth is one of the most established technologies for short range digital
wireless data transmission. With the advent of wearables and the Internet of
Things (IoT), Bluetooth has again gained importance, which makes security
research and protocol optimizations imperative. Surprisingly, there is a lack
of openly available tools and experimental platforms to scrutinize Bluetooth.
In particular, system aspects and close to hardware protocol layers are mostly
uncovered.
We reverse engineer multiple Broadcom Bluetooth chipsets that are widespread
in off-the-shelf devices. Thus, we offer deep insights into the internal
architecture of a popular commercial family of Bluetooth controllers used in
smartphones, wearables, and IoT platforms. Reverse engineered functions can
then be altered with our InternalBlue Python framework---outperforming
evaluation kits, which are limited to documented and vendor-defined functions.
The modified Bluetooth stack remains fully functional and high-performance.
Hence, it provides a portable low-cost research platform.
InternalBlue is a versatile framework and we demonstrate its abilities by
implementing tests and demos for known Bluetooth vulnerabilities. Moreover, we
discover a novel critical security issue affecting a large selection of
Broadcom chipsets that allows executing code within the attacked Bluetooth
firmware. We further show how to use our framework to fix bugs in chipsets out
of vendor support and how to add new security features to Bluetooth firmware
An Improved Method on Static Binary Analysis to Enhance the Context-Sensitive CFI
Control Flow Integrity (CFI) is one of the most
promising technique to defend Code-Reuse Attacks (CRAs).
Traditional CFI Systems and recent Context-Sensitive CFI use coarse
control flow graphs (CFGs) to analyze whether the control flow
hijack occurs, left vast space for attackers at indirect call-sites. Coarse
CFGs make it difficult to decide which target to execute at indirect
control-flow transfers, and weaken the existing CFI systems actually.
It is an unsolved problem to extract CFGs precisely and perfectly
from binaries now. In this paper, we present an algorithm to get a
more precise CFG from binaries. Parameters are analyzed at indirect
call-sites and functions firstly. By comparing counts of parameters
prepared before call-sites and consumed by functions, targets of
indirect calls are reduced. Then the control flow would be more
constrained at indirect call-sites in runtime. Combined with CCFI,
we implement our policy. Experimental results on some popular
programs show that our approach is efficient. Further analysis show
that it can mitigate COOP and other advanced attacks
Threat Models and Security of Phase-Change Memory
Emerging non-volatile memories (NVMs) have been considered promising alternatives to DRAM for future main memory design. Among the NVMs, Phase-Change Memory (PCM) can serve as a good substitute due to its low standby power, high density, and good scalability. However, PCM material also induces security design challenges mainly due to its interior non-volatility. Designing the memory system necessitates considering the challenges which may open the backdoor for attackers. A threat model can help to identify security vulnerabilities in design processes. It is all about finding the security problems, and therefore it should be done early in the design and adoption of manufacture. To our knowledge, this paper is the first attempt to thoroughly discuss the potential threat models for the PCM memory, which can provide a good reference for designing the new generation of PCM. Meanwhile, this paper gives security advice and potential security solutions to design a secure PCM to protect against these potential threats
Anchor: Architecture for Secure Non-Volatile Memories
The rapid growth of memory-intensive applications like cloud computing, deep learning, bioinformatics, etc., have propelled memory industry to develop scalable, high density, low power non-volatile memory (NVM) technologies; however, computing systems that integrate these advanced NVMs are vulnerable to several security attacks that threaten (i) data confidentiality, (ii) data availability, and (iii) data integrity. This dissertation presents ANCHOR, which integrates 4 low overhead, high performance security solutions SECRET, COVERT, ACME, and STASH to thwart these attacks on NVM systems.
SECRET is a low cost security solution for data confidentiality in multi-/triple-level cell (i.e., MLC/TLC) NVMs. SECRET synergistically combines (i) smart encryption, which prevents re-encryption of unmodified or zero-words during a write-back with (ii) XOR-based energy masking, which further optimizes NVM writes by transforming a high-energy ciphertext into a low-energy ciphertext. SECRET outperforms state-of-the-art encryption solutions, with the lowest write energy and latency, as well as the highest lifetime.
COVERT and ACME complement SECRET to improve system availability of counter mode encryption (CME). COVERT repurposes unused error correction resources to dynamically extend time to counter overflow of fast growing counters, thereby delaying frequent full memory re-encryption (system freeze). ACME performs counter write leveling (CWL) to further increase time to counter overflow, and thereby delays the time to full memory re-encryption. COVERT+ACME achieves system availability of 99.999% during normal operation and 99.9% under a denial of memory service (DoMS) attack. In contrast, conventional CME achieves system availability of only 85.71% during normal operation and is rendered non-operational under a DoMS attack. Finally, STASH is a comprehensive end-to-end security architecture for state-of-the-art smart hybrid memories (SHMs) that employ a smart DRAM cache with smart NVM-based main memory. STASH integrates (i) CME for data confidentiality, (ii) page-level Merkle Tree authentication for data integrity, (iii) recovery-compatible MT updates to withstand power/system failures, and (iv) page-migration friendly security meta-data management. For security guarantees equivalent to state-of-the-art, STASH reduces memory overhead by 12.7x, improves system performance by 65%, and increases NVM lifetime by 5x.
This dissertation thus addresses the core security challenges of next-generation NVM-based memory systems. Directions for future research include (i) exploration of holistic architectures that ensure both security and reliability of smart memory systems, (ii) investigating applications of ANCHOR to reduce security overhead of Internet-of-Things, and (iii) extending ANCHOR to safeguard emerging non-volatile processors, especially in the light of advanced attacks like Spectre and Meltdown
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