The significance of bidding, accepting and opponent modeling in automated negotiation

Given the growing interest in automated negotiation, the search for effective strategies has produced a variety of different negotiation agents. Despite their diversity, there is a common structure to their design. A negotiation agent comprises three key components: the bidding strategy, the opponent model and the acceptance criteria. We show that this three-component view of a negotiating architecture not only provides a useful basis for developing such agents but also provides a useful analytical tool. By combining these components in varying ways, we are able to demonstrate the contribution of each component to the overall negotiation result, and thus determine the key contributing components. Moreover, we are able to study the interaction between components and present detailed interaction effects. Furthermore, we find that the bidding strategy in particular is of critical importance to the negotiator's success and far exceeds the importance of opponent preference modeling techniques. Our results contribute to the shaping of a research agenda for negotiating agent design by providing guidelines on how agent developers can spend their time most effectively

Ontology acquisition and exchange of evolutionary product-brokering agents

Agent-based electronic commerce (e-commerce) has been booming with the development of the Internet and agent technologies. However, little effort has been devoted to exploring the learning and evolving capabilities of software agents. This paper addresses issues of evolving software agents in e-commerce applications. An agent structure with evolution features is proposed with a focus on internal hierarchical knowledge. We argue that knowledge base of agents should be the cornerstone for their evolution capabilities, and agents can enhance their knowledge bases by exchanging knowledge with other agents. In this paper, product ontology is chosen as an instance of knowledge base. We propose a new approach to facilitate ontology exchange among e-commerce agents. The ontology exchange model and its formalities are elaborated. Product-brokering agents have been designed and implemented, which accomplish the ontology exchange process from request to integration

An Evolutionary Approach for Learning Opponent's Deadline and Reserve Points in Multi-Issue Negotiation

The efficiency of automated multi-issue negotiation depends on the available information about the opponent. In a competitive negotiation environment, agents do not reveal their parameters to their opponents in order to avoid exploitation. Several researchers have argued that an agent's optimal strategy can be determined using the opponent's deadline and reserve points. In this paper, we propose a new learning agent, so-called Evolutionary Learning Agent (ELA), able to estimate its opponent's deadline and reserve points in bilateral multi-issue negotiation based on opponent's counter-offers (without any additional extra information). ELA reduces the learning problem to a system of non-linear equations and uses an evolutionary algorithm based on the elitism aspect to solve it. Experimental study shows that our learning agent outperforms others agents by improving its outcome in term of average and joint utility

Preliminary specification and design documentation for software components to achieve catallaxy in computational systems

This Report is about the preliminary specifications and design documentation for software components to achieve Catallaxy in computational systems. -- Die Arbeit beschreibt die Spezifikation und das Design von Softwarekomponenten, um das Konzept der Katallaxie in Grid Systemen umzusetzen. Eine Einführung ordnet das Konzept der Katallaxie in bestehende Grid Taxonomien ein und stellt grundlegende Komponenten vor. Anschließend werden diese Komponenten auf ihre Anwendbarkeit in bestehenden Application Layer Netzwerken untersucht.Grid Computing

The evolution of trade treaties and trade creation : lessons for Latin America

The author examines the main distinction between trade liberalization under the General Agreement on Tariffs andTrade (GATT) and under regional trading agreements. Under the GATT, trade liberalization is based on the most-favored-nation principle. Under regional trade agreements, it is based on preferential trade. Establishing regional trade agreements does not necessarily lead to greater regional integration. The European Economic Community has been an exception, and with greater integration, regional trade has grown steadily. The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) has been a weak association, but trade among ASEAN members has increased rapidly because member countries have undertaken multilateral trade liberalization. The efforts of Latin American countries to create regional trade associations in the 1960s, based on protectionist policies, reduced trade not only regionally, but with the rest of the world. In contrast, the Latin American regional trading agreements of the 1980s and 1990s have liberalized trade among the groups. Proper regional trading agreements must conform to Article XXIV of the GATT, but nearly all the countries that have created regional integration schemes have not followed it. These regional trading agreements have not increased protection, but neither has there been across-the-board trade liberalization. Regional trading agreements carry with them the danger of trade diversion (when imports that used to come from third countries at lower prices become costlier because of preferential access granted to a higher-cost regional source). How can Latin American countries reduce trade diversion in their regional trading agreements? : 1) keep protection low in the first place; 2) have open regional trade associations (so that it is easy for new partners to join); 3) continue liberalizing trade with the rest of the world, following the most-favored-nation principle; 4) establish common markets rather than free trade areas (because rules of origin create new barriers, including bureaucracies); 5) coordinate regulatory and competition policies (eliminate laws that limit competition and adopt common external tariffs); and 6) improve roads, ports, and means of communications.TF054105-DONOR FUNDED OPERATION ADMINISTRATION FEE INCOME AND EXPENSE ACCOUNT,Trade and Regional Integration,Trade Policy,Economic Theory&Research,Environmental Economics&Policies

Competing Ways Towards International Antitrust: the WTO versus the ICN

In times of globalization, trade liberalization and deregulation of specific industries, competition authorities face new challenges in order to protect national as well as international competition. With companies operating in various countries, fading market frontiers and increasing crossborder trade, new strategies must be developed in order to overcome threats to domestic markets resulting of anticompetitive behavior abroad. Even though solutions such as the “Effects Doctrine” or bilateral agreements allow – albeit imperfectly – countries to protect their domestic market, there are no laws safeguarding the global economy and international competition. Thus, the request arises to establish an international competition policy regime in order to harmonize countries’ competition laws, to reduce conflicts due to cross-border anti-competitive behavior and to support developing countries in reaching Western standards. Among several approaches, two are of significant interest: On the one hand, the World Trade Organization (WTO) could be enhanced by a board of supervision for international competition issues including a harmonized competition code for all, while on the other hand the International Competition Network (ICN) has been established to take care of global competition concerns through policy coordination [Graham 2003; Janow 2003; Budzinski 2004b]. This paper discusses whether the institutional WTO or the voluntary ICN approach represents the better path to an international competition policy regime to control private anticompetitive activities. The second part will explain the importance of an international competition policy. Subsequently, unilateral, bilateral and multilateral approaches to the prevention and solution of problems in global competition are introduced. Section 3.1 gives a short overview of the WTO’s characteristics, its structural organization and its plans to integrate an international competition policy. The organization and the framework of the ICN as well as its attempts to prevent international anticompetitive behavior is explored in section 3.2. Based on the statements made in section 2 and the facts presented in section 3, the fourth section compares the WTO approach with the ICN qualities. The discussion will be divided into the following six criteria: (i) feasibility, (ii) acceptability, (iii) efficiency, (iv) negotiation and implementation of international competition rules, (v) conflict resolution and (vi) adaptability. Conclusions follow in section 5.

Learning to Like What You Have - Explaining the Endowment Effect

The endowment effect describes the fact that people demand much more to give up an object than they are willing to spend to acquire it. The existence of this effect has been documented in numerous experiments. We attempt to explain this effect by showing that evolution favors individuals whose preferences embody an endowment effect. The reason is that an endowment effect improves one's bargaining position in bilateral trades. We show that for a general class of evolutionary processes strictly positive endowment effects will survive in the long run.endowment effect, evolution, bargaining

A theoretical and computational basis for CATNETS

The main content of this report is the identification and definition of market mechanisms for Application Layer Networks (ALNs). On basis of the structured Market Engineering process, the work comprises the identification of requirements which adequate market mechanisms for ALNs have to fulfill. Subsequently, two mechanisms for each, the centralized and the decentralized case are described in this document. These build the theoretical foundation for the work within the following two years of the CATNETS project. --Grid Computing

Learning in Strategic Alliances

{Excerpt} Strategic alliances that bring organizations together promise unique opportunities for partners. The reality is often otherwise. Successful strategic alliances manage the partnership, not just the agreement,for collaborative advantage. Above all, they also pay attentionto learning priorities in alliance evolution. The resource-based view of the firm that gained currency in the mid-1980s considered that the competitive advantage of an organization rests on the application of the strategic resources at its disposal. These days, orthodoxy recognizes the merits of the dynamic, knowledge-based capabilities underpinning the positions organizations occupy in a sector or market. Strategic alliances—meaning cooperative agreements between two or more organizations—are a means to enhance strategic resources: self-sufficiency is becoming increasingly difficult in a complex, uncertain, and discontinuous external environment that calls for focus and flexibility in equal measure. Everywhere, organizations are discovering that they cannot “go” it alone and must now often turn to others to survive