Epistemic irrelevance in credal networks : the case of imprecise Markov trees

We replace strong independence in credal networks with the weaker notion of epistemic irrelevance. Focusing on directed trees, we show how to combine local credal sets into a global model, and we use this to construct and justify an exact message-passing algorithm that computes updated beliefs for a variable in the tree. The algorithm, which is essentially linear in the number of nodes, is formulated entirely in terms of coherent lower previsions. We supply examples of the algorithm's operation, and report an application to on-line character recognition that illustrates the advantages of our model for prediction

A Geometric Interpretation of the Neutrosophic Set - A Generalization of the Intuitionistic Fuzzy Set

In this paper we generalize the intuitionistic fuzzy set (IFS), paraconsistent set, and intuitionistic set to the neutrosophic set (NS). Several examples are presented. Also, a geometric interpretation of the Neutrosophic Set is given using a Neutrosophic Cube. Many distinctions between NS and IFS are underlined.Comment: 9 pages. Presented at the 2003 BISC FLINT-CIBI International Workshop on Soft Computing for Internet and Bioinformatics, University of Berkeley, California, December 15-19, 2003, under the title "Generalization of the Intuitionistic Fuzzy Set to the Neutrosophic Set

Dilating and contracting arbitrarily

Standard accuracy-based approaches to imprecise credences have the consequence that it is rational to move between precise and imprecise credences arbitrarily, without gaining any new evidence. Building on the Educated Guessing Framework of Horowitz (2019), we develop an alternative accuracy-based approach to imprecise credences that does not have this shortcoming. We argue that it is always irrational to move from a precise state to an imprecise state arbitrarily, however it can be rational to move from an imprecise state to a precise state arbitrarily

Epistemic irrelevance in credal nets: the case of imprecise Markov trees

We focus on credal nets, which are graphical models that generalise Bayesian nets to imprecise probability. We replace the notion of strong independence commonly used in credal nets with the weaker notion of epistemic irrelevance, which is arguably more suited for a behavioural theory of probability. Focusing on directed trees, we show how to combine the given local uncertainty models in the nodes of the graph into a global model, and we use this to construct and justify an exact message-passing algorithm that computes updated beliefs for a variable in the tree. The algorithm, which is linear in the number of nodes, is formulated entirely in terms of coherent lower previsions, and is shown to satisfy a number of rationality requirements. We supply examples of the algorithm's operation, and report an application to on-line character recognition that illustrates the advantages of our approach for prediction. We comment on the perspectives, opened by the availability, for the first time, of a truly efficient algorithm based on epistemic irrelevance.Comment: 29 pages, 5 figures, 1 tabl

Cluelessness

Decisions, whether moral or prudential, should be guided at least in part by considerations of the consequences that would result from the various available actions. For any given action, however, the majority of its consequences are unpredictable at the time of decision. Many have worried that this leaves us, in some important sense, clueless. In this paper, I distinguish between ‘simple’ and ‘complex’ possible sources of cluelessness. In terms of this taxonomy, the majority of the existing literature on cluelessness focusses on the simple sources. I argue, contra James Lenman in particular, that these would-be sources of cluelessness are unproblematic, on the grounds that indifference-based reasoning is far less problematic than Lenman (along with many others) supposes. However, there does seem to be a genuine phenomenon of cluelessness associated with the ‘complex’ sources; here, indifference-based reasoning is inapplicable by anyone’s lights. This ‘complex problem of cluelessness’ is vivid and pressing, in particular, in the context of Effective Altruism. This motivates a more thorough examination of the precise nature of cluelessness, and the precise source of the associated phenomenology of discomfort in forced-choice situations. The latter parts of the paper make some initial explorations in those directions