Logics of Imprecise Comparative Probability

This paper studies connections between two alternatives to the standard probability calculus for representing and reasoning about uncertainty: imprecise probability andcomparative probability. The goal is to identify complete logics for reasoning about uncertainty in a comparative probabilistic language whose semantics is given in terms of imprecise probability. Comparative probability operators are interpreted as quantifying over a set of probability measures. Modal and dynamic operators are added for reasoning about epistemic possibility and updating sets of probability measures

ISIPTA'07: Proceedings of the Fifth International Symposium on Imprecise Probability: Theories and Applications

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Probabilistic Logic Programming with Beta-Distributed Random Variables

We enable aProbLog---a probabilistic logical programming approach---to reason in presence of uncertain probabilities represented as Beta-distributed random variables. We achieve the same performance of state-of-the-art algorithms for highly specified and engineered domains, while simultaneously we maintain the flexibility offered by aProbLog in handling complex relational domains. Our motivation is that faithfully capturing the distribution of probabilities is necessary to compute an expected utility for effective decision making under uncertainty: unfortunately, these probability distributions can be highly uncertain due to sparse data. To understand and accurately manipulate such probability distributions we need a well-defined theoretical framework that is provided by the Beta distribution, which specifies a distribution of probabilities representing all the possible values of a probability when the exact value is unknown.Comment: Accepted for presentation at AAAI 201

Modelling default and likelihood reasoning as probabilistic

A probabilistic analysis of plausible reasoning about defaults and about likelihood is presented. 'Likely' and 'by default' are in fact treated as duals in the same sense as 'possibility' and 'necessity'. To model these four forms probabilistically, a logic QDP and its quantitative counterpart DP are derived that allow qualitative and corresponding quantitative reasoning. Consistency and consequence results for subsets of the logics are given that require at most a quadratic number of satisfiability tests in the underlying propositional logic. The quantitative logic shows how to track the propagation error inherent in these reasoning forms. The methodology and sound framework of the system highlights their approximate nature, the dualities, and the need for complementary reasoning about relevance

A Labelling Framework for Probabilistic Argumentation

The combination of argumentation and probability paves the way to new accounts of qualitative and quantitative uncertainty, thereby offering new theoretical and applicative opportunities. Due to a variety of interests, probabilistic argumentation is approached in the literature with different frameworks, pertaining to structured and abstract argumentation, and with respect to diverse types of uncertainty, in particular the uncertainty on the credibility of the premises, the uncertainty about which arguments to consider, and the uncertainty on the acceptance status of arguments or statements. Towards a general framework for probabilistic argumentation, we investigate a labelling-oriented framework encompassing a basic setting for rule-based argumentation and its (semi-) abstract account, along with diverse types of uncertainty. Our framework provides a systematic treatment of various kinds of uncertainty and of their relationships and allows us to back or question assertions from the literature

Credence: A Belief-First Approach

This paper explains and defends a belief-first view of the relationship between belief and credence. On this view, credences are a species of beliefs, and the degree of credence is determined by the content of what is believed. We begin by developing what we take to be the most plausible belief-first view. Then, we offer several arguments for it. Finally, we show how it can resist objections that have been raised to belief-first views. We conclude that the belief-first view is more plausible than many have previously supposed