Counting Incompossibles

We often speak as if there are merely possible people—for example, when we make such claims as that most possible people are never going to be born. Yet most metaphysicians deny that anything is both possibly a person and never born. Since our unreflective talk of merely possible people serves to draw non-trivial distinctions, these metaphysicians owe us some paraphrase by which we can draw those distinctions without committing ourselves to there being merely possible people. We show that such paraphrases are unavailable if we limit ourselves to the expressive resources of even highly infinitary first-order modal languages. We then argue that such paraphrases are available in higher-order modal languages only given certain strong assumptions concerning the metaphysics of properties. We then consider alternative paraphrase strategies, and argue that none of them are tenable. If talk of merely possible people cannot be paraphrased, then it must be taken at face value, in which case it is necessary what individuals there are. Therefore, if it is contingent what individuals there are, then the demands of paraphrase place tight constraints on the metaphysics of properties: either (i) it is necessary what properties there are, or (ii) necessarily equivalent properties are identical, and having properties does not entail even possibly being anything at all

On Formalism Freeness : Implementing Gödel's 1946 Princeton Bicentennial Lecture

Peer reviewe

Global supervenience without reducibility

Does the global supervenience of one class on another entail reductionism, in the sense that any property in the former class is definable from properties in the latter class? This question appears to be at the same time formally tractable and philosophically significant. It seems formally tractable because the concepts involved are susceptible to rigorous definition. It is philosophically significant because in a number of debates about inter-level relationships, there are prima facie plausible positions that presuppose that there is no such entailment: standard versions of non-reductive physicalism and of normative non-naturalism accept global supervenience while rejecting reductionism. I identify a gap in an influential argument for the entailment, due to Frank Jackson and Robert Stalnaker, and draw on the model theory of infinitary languages to argue that some globally supervening properties are not reducible

On the Scope of the Universal-Algebraic Approach to Constraint Satisfaction

The universal-algebraic approach has proved a powerful tool in the study of the complexity of CSPs. This approach has previously been applied to the study of CSPs with finite or (infinite) omega-categorical templates, and relies on two facts. The first is that in finite or omega-categorical structures A, a relation is primitive positive definable if and only if it is preserved by the polymorphisms of A. The second is that every finite or omega-categorical structure is homomorphically equivalent to a core structure. In this paper, we present generalizations of these facts to infinite structures that are not necessarily omega-categorical. (This abstract has been severely curtailed by the space constraints of arXiv -- please read the full abstract in the article.) Finally, we present applications of our general results to the description and analysis of the complexity of CSPs. In particular, we give general hardness criteria based on the absence of polymorphisms that depend on more than one argument, and we present a polymorphism-based description of those CSPs that are first-order definable (and therefore can be solved in polynomial time).Comment: Extended abstract appeared at 25th Symposium on Logic in Computer Science (LICS 2010). This version will appear in the LMCS special issue associated with LICS 201