Contractualism and the Death Penalty

It is a truism that there are erroneous convictions in criminal trials. Recent legal findings show that 3.3% to 5%of all convictions in capital rape-murder cases in the U.S. in the 1980s were erroneous convictions. Given this fact, what normative conclusions can be drawn? First, the article argues that a moderately revised version of Scanlon’ s contractualism offers an attractive moral vision that is different from utilitarianism or other consequentialist theories, or from purely deontological theories. It then brings this version of Scanlonian contractualism to bear on the question of whether the death penalty, life imprisonment, long sentences, or shorter sentences can be justified, given that there is a non-negligible rate of erroneous conviction. Contractualism holds that a permissible act must be justifiable to everyone affected by it. Yet, given the non-negligible rate of erroneous conviction, it is unjustifiable to mete out the death penalty, because such a punishment is not justifiable to innocent murder convicts. It is further argued that life imprisonment will probably not be justified (unless lowering the sentence to a long sentence will drastically increase the murder rate). However, whether this line of argument could be further extended would depend on the impact of lowering sentences on communal security

HUMAN FACE IN EDUCATION: A PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE

A human face is one vital part that can be used to consciously or unconsciously express human emotions. The shape of the nose and the muscles of the face are significant when engaging in body language as a means of communication. The face therefore is not merely a set of frontage features, but it is more meaningful in its configuration, implying the reality of matter and form in our overall understanding of humanity. This is consistent with the view that an image is seen in its entirety, not by its individual parts. Thus, the human face of an individual is the cause of existential diversity in terms of variability whose inference is to enable recognition and identification of the uniqueness of individuality in order to discover the reality of being. In a similar vein, the human face analogy can elucidate meaning for education. In the academic spectrum, the subjects codified as humanities provide the analogy of face in education more so during   the   process   of   acquiring   knowledge.   As   such,   humanities   contribute   towards understanding perspectives, conceptualizing ideas, defining antiquities, isolating cultures and configuring creativity and by extension, fostering equity. In the contemporary society, science and technology is being overemphasized because it has contributed to human discoveries, inventions  and  innovations.  However,  it  is  palpable  that  science  and  technology  can  only interpret an idea using the component of a humanistic skill – dispositional knowledge which is devoid of propositional knowledge. It has no relevance in ideas, attitude, and values, which remain at the reserves of humanities. This article targets to shed more light on this discourse in order to inject newer insights in the unending controversy in science/humanities divide in education

Boundary Algebra: A Simpler Approach to Boolean Algebra and the Sentential Connectives

Boundary algebra [BA] is a algebra of type , and a simplified notation for Spencer-Brown’s (1969) primary algebra. The syntax of the primary arithmetic [PA] consists of two atoms, () and the blank page, concatenation, and enclosure between ‘(‘ and ‘)’, denoting the primitive notion of distinction. Inserting letters denoting, indifferently, the presence or absence of () into a PA formula yields a BA formula. The BA axioms are A1: ()()= (), and A2: “(()) [abbreviated ‘⊥’] may be written or erased at will,” implying (⊥)=(). The repeated application of A1 and A2 simplifies any PA formula to either () or ⊥. The basis for BA is B1: abc=bca (concatenation commutes & associates); B2, ⊥a=a (BA has a lower bound, ⊥); B3, (a)a=() (BA is a complemented lattice); and B4, (ba)a=(b)a (implies that BA is a distributive lattice). BA has two intended models: (1) the Boolean algebra 2 with base set B={(),⊥}, such that () ⇔ 1 [dually 0], (a) ⇔ a′, and ab ⇔ a∪b [a∩b]; and (2) sentential logic, such that () ⇔ true [false], (a) ⇔ ~a, and ab ⇔ a∨b [a∧b]. BA is a self-dual notation, facilitates a calculational style of proof, and simplifies clausal reasoning and Quine’s truth value analysis. BA resembles C.S. Peirce’s graphical logic, the symbolic logics of Leibniz and W.E. Johnson, the 2 notation of Byrne (1946), and the Boolean term schemata of Quine (1982).Boundary algebra; boundary logic; primary algebra; primary arithmetic; Boolean algebra; calculation proof; G. Spencer-Brown; C.S. Peirce; existential graphs

Rhetorical Holy War: Polygamy, Homosexuality, and the Paradox of Community and Autonomy

The article explores the rhetorical strategies deployed in both legal and cultural narratives of Mormon polygamy in nineteenth-century America. It demonstrates how an understanding of that unique communal experience, and the narratives by which it was represented, informs the classic paradox of community and autonomy – the tension between the collective and the individual. The article concludes by using the Mormon polygamy analysis to illuminate a contemporary social situation that underscores the paradox of community and autonomy – homosexuality and the so-called culture wars over family values and the meaning of marriage

Legal Epistemology

An annotated bibliography of legal epistemology

Rhetorical Holy War: Polygamy, Homosexuality, and the Paradox of Community and Autonomy

The article explores the rhetorical strategies deployed in both legal and cultural narratives of Mormon polygamy in nineteenth-century America. It demonstrates how an understanding of that unique communal experience, and the narratives by which it was represented, informs the classic paradox of community and autonomy – the tension between the collective and the individual. The article concludes by using the Mormon polygamy analysis to illuminate a contemporary social situation that underscores the paradox of community and autonomy – homosexuality and the so-called culture wars over family values and the meaning of marriage

Boundary Algebra: A Simple Notation for Boolean Algebra and the Truth Functors

Boundary algebra [BA] is a simpler notation for Spencer-Brown’s (1969) primary algebra [pa], the Boolean algebra 2, and the truth functors. The primary arithmetic [PA] consists of the atoms ‘()’ and the blank page, concatenation, and enclosure between ‘(‘ and ‘)’, denoting the primitive notion of distinction. Inserting letters denoting the presence or absence of () into a PA formula yields a BA formula. The BA axioms are "()()=()" (A1), and "(()) [=?] may be written or erased at will” (A2). Repeated application of these axioms to a PA formula yields a member of B= {(),?} called its simplification. (a) has two intended interpretations: (a) ? a? (Boolean algebra 2), and (a) ? ~a (sentential logic). BA is self-dual: () ? 1 [dually 0] so that B is the carrier for 2, ab ? a?b [a?b], and (a)b [(a(b))] ? a=b, so that ?=() [()=?] follows trivially and B is a poset. The BA basis abc= bca (Dilworth 1938), a(ab)= a(b), and a()=() (Bricken 2002) facilitates clausal reasoning and proof by calculation. BA also simplifies normal forms and Quine’s (1982) truth value analysis. () ? true [false] yields boundary logic.G. Spencer Brown; boundary algebra; boundary logic; primary algebra; primary arithmetic; Boolean algebra; calculation proof; C.S. Peirce; existential graphs.

Judicial Notice and the Law\u27s Scientific Search for Truth

Part I of this Article begins by introducing the concept of judicial notice followed by a short background defining the scope of scientific and technical principles. Part II addresses the problems created by the current judicial notice standard. The standard’s text is problematic, and courts’ diverse interpretations of the standard have also created problems. Part III analyzes whether scientific and technical principles merit a different judicial notice standard specifically for them. This Part concludes that the inherent inconsistency of science and technical knowledge with the current standard and the judicial shortcomings in scientific/technical competence justify different legal treatment. Finally, Part IV suggests a solution that would create a new standard for scientific and technical principles. In addition, it creates a new officer of the court, a neutral scientific adviser who would advise judges on scientific and technical judicial notice decisions