Exploring the resource recovery potentials of municipal solid waste: a review of solid wastes composting in developing countries

Population explosion, high urbanization and improved living standards have induced rapid changes in quantities and materiacompositions of solid waste generation globally. Until recently solid waste disposal in landfills and open dump sites waconsidered more economical and it is the most widely used methods in developing countries. Hence the potentials in the othealternative methods such as the resource recovery and recycling and their integration into waste management have been scarcelassessed. However, the ever growing challenges posed by the rapidly increasing quantities and compositions of solid wastes ideveloping countries led to the searching for alternative waste disposal methods. In this regard the paper presented an assessmenof the resource potentials of municipal solid waste materials arising from cities in developing countries as a strategy fosustainable solid waste management. Using published data on solid waste composition the paper has identified that there is higpotentials of composting in the solid waste stream from cities in developing countries. In conclusion, it recommended the recoverof organic waste material and papers for composting and the recycling of plastic, metals, textiles and others to explore their resource recovery potentials. This will largely reduce the ultimate quantities of solid waste for disposal and lower the operatincosts. This strategy will achieve sustainable waste management in developing countries. It is hoped that the paper has provided useful guide for wastes management policy decisions in developing countries

A Review of Norms and Normative Multiagent Systems

Norms and normative multiagent systems have become the subjects of interest for many researchers. Such interest is caused by the need for agents to exploit the norms in enhancing their performance in a community. The term norm is used to characterize the behaviours of community members. The concept of normative multiagent systems is used to facilitate collaboration and coordination among social groups of agents. Many researches have been conducted on norms that investigate the fundamental concepts, definitions, classification, and types of norms and normative multiagent systems including normative architectures and normative processes. However, very few researches have been found to comprehensively study and analyze the literature in advancing the current state of norms and normative multiagent systems. Consequently, this paper attempts to present the current state of research on norms and normative multiagent systems and propose a norm’s life cycle model based on the review of the literature. Subsequently, this paper highlights the significant areas for future work

The Imperial Sovereign: Sovereign Immunity & the ADA

Professors Brown and Parmet examine the impact of the Supreme Court\u27s resurrection of state sovereign immunity on the rights of individuals protected by the Americans with Disabilities Act in light of the recent decision, Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett. Placing Garrett within the context of the Rehnquist Court\u27s evolving reallocation of state and federal authority, they argue that the Court has relied upon a mythic and dangerous notion of sovereignty that is foreign to the Framers\u27 understanding. Brown and Parmet go on to show that, by determining that federalism compels constraining congressional power to abrogate sovereign immunity, the Court limits the ability of individuals with disabilities to obtain federal recourse. They also contend that the Court\u27s restriction of fora for individuals with disabilities raises significant separation of powers problems

The Statutory Interpretation Muddle

Debates about statutory interpretation typically proceed on the assumption that statutes have linguistic meanings that we can identify in the same way that we identify the meaning of utterances in ordinary conversation. But that premise is false. We identify the meaning of conversational utterances largely based on inferences about what the speaker intended to communicate. With legislatures, as now is widely recognized, there is no unitary speaker with the sort of communicative intentions that speakers in ordinary conversation possess. One might expect this recognition to trigger abandonment of the model of conversational interpretation as a framework for interpreting statutes. Instead, interpreters invent legislative intentions—purportedly “objective” ones for textualists—or purposes. With those inventions in place, judges and theorists then carry on talking about what statutes mean, or would mean to a reasonable person, as if there were a linguistic fact of the matter even in intelligibly disputed cases. But this is a deep and systematic error. Mainstream thinking about statutory interpretation needs a major reorientation. Contrary to widespread impressions, debates about statutory interpretation are not about what statutes mean as a matter of linguistic fact, but about which grounds for the attribution of an invented meaning would best promote judicial and governmental legitimacy. Having recognized that the model of conversational interpretation cannot ground claims about statutes’ meanings in disputed cases, we also need to rethink the role of legislatures and courts in a political democracy. There are limits to what legislatures can reasonably be expected to accomplish. Courts need to play the role of helpmates to the legislature, not just faithful agents. In the interpretation of statutes, linguistic intuitions should matter, but primarily for normative reasons, involving justice and fairness in the coercive application of law, and not because they reveal the legislature’s linguistically clear dictates

Outcome Sensitivity and the Constitutional Law of Criminal Procedure

Iconic criminal procedure doctrines that perform the same function go by different names. When constitutionally disfavored conduct taints a criminal proceeding, courts must determine how much the taint affected an outcome—and whether the damage requires judicial relief. These doctrinal constructs calibrate judicial responses to, among other things, deficient defense lawyering (prejudice), wrongful State suppression (materiality), unlawful policing (attenuation), and an assortment of trial-court mistakes (harmless error). I refer to these constructs, which tightly orbit the constitutional law of criminal procedure, as rules of “outcome sensitivity.” Formal differences in sensitivity rules remain enduring puzzles subject to only the most superficial inspection. In this Article, I surface the parallel functions that these rules perform, explain why they should be banished from substantive constitutional law, and advance my preferred view of their legal status: as subconstitutional limits on judicial remedies. At stake are basic behavioral incentives for defense lawyers, police, prosecutors, and judges. I proceed in three parts. In Part I, I map the universe of sensitivity rules. They can be internal pieces of substantive constitutional law (like materiality and prejudice elements), or they can be external limits on remedies for completed constitutional wrongs (like harmless error rules). They can also define downstream constitutional errors distinct from upstream constitutional violations (like certain rules against in-court identification). In Part II, I reject internal sensitivity rules, which unwisely transmit mixed signals to criminal justice actors engaged in disfavored conduct. Such rules undermine crucial professional norms, and they degrade constitutional enforcement that takes place outside the criminal process. In Part III, I argue that external sensitivity rules should be conceptualized as subconstitutonal limits on judicial remedies. That status neatly explains why sensitivity rules apply in state court, it avoids standard criticism of federal common law, and it is less doctrinally disruptive than the external alternatives

The Authority of International Refugee Law

As COVID-19 has spread around the world, many states have suspended their compliance with a core requirement of international refugee law: the duty to refrain from returning refugees to territories where they face a serious risk of persecution (the duty of non-refoulement). These measures have prompted some observers to question whether non-refoulement will survive the pandemic as a nonderogable legal duty. This Article explains why the international community should embrace non-refoulement as a peremptory norm of general international law (jus cogens) that applies even during public emergencies, such as the coronavirus pandemic. Viewed from a global justice perspective, the authority that international law entrusts to states—including the sovereign power to regulate migration across national borders—can be legitimate only if states refrain from refoulement. For the international legal order to claim to possess legitimate authority over exiled outsiders, it must treat non-refoulement as a jus cogens norm. A failure to regard non-refoulement as a peremptory norm would thus strip the international legal system of its claim to legality vis-à-vis asylum seekers, supplanting the rule of international law in this context with mere coercive force. To test this account of the authority of international refugee law, the Article surveys closed-border policies that states have adopted in response to COVID-19 and explains why the associated restrictions on non-refoulement are unjustifiable and incompatible with the rule of law. Even during a genuine national emergency, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, receiving states cannot return refugees to persecution without subverting their own claims to legal authority