134,749 research outputs found
Equal-Budget Choice Equivalent Solutions in Exchange Economies
Given a family of linear budget sets, an allocation is equal opportunity equivalent (Thomson, 1994) if there exists a common budget set such that each agent is indiĀ¤erent between the bundle that he gets and the best bundle he can obtain in the choice set. We first study therobustness properties of equal opportunity equivalent correspondences with respect to change in preferences. We impose independence to irrelevant preference changes and connect this property with the implementation of rules via some game-theoretic solution concept. We provide an equivalence result with the equal-income Walrasian rule. Next, we study robustness with respect to change in the number of agents and derive a haracterization of the equal-income Walrasian rule. Our results provide additional justifications for the equal-division of resources as a first step toward fairness.microeconomics ;
Equilibrium Rejection of a Mechanism
We study a mechanism design problem in which players can take part in a mechanism to coordinate their actions in a default game. By refusing to participate in the mechanism, a player can revert to playing the default game non-cooperatively. We show with an example that some allocation rules are implementable only with mechanisms which will be rejected on the equilibrium path. In our construction, a refusal to participate conveys information about the types of the players. This information causes the default game to be played under different beliefs, and more importantly under different higher order beliefs, than the interim ones. We find a lower bound on all the implementable payoffs. We use this bound to establish a condition on the default game under which all the implementable outcomes are truthfully implementable, without the need to induce rejection of the mechanism.Mechanism design; Default game; Cartel agreements
Triple implementation by sharing mechanisms in production economics with unequal labor skill
labor sovereignty, triple implementation, different labor skills
On the implementation of Markov-perfect interest rate and money supply rules: global and local uniqueness
Currently there is a growing literature exploring the features of optimal monetary policy in New Keynesian models under both commitment and discretion. This literature usually solves for the optimal allocations that are consistent with a rational expectations market equilibrium, but it does not study how the policy can be implemented given the available policy instruments. Recently, however, King and Wolman (2004) have shown that a time-consistent policy cannot be implemented through the control of nominal money balances. In particular, they find that equilibria are not unique under a money stock regime. The authors of this paper find that King and Wolman's conclusion of non-uniqueness of Markov-perfect equilibria is sensitive to the instrument of choice. Surprisingly, if, instead, the monetary authority chooses the nominal interest rate there exists a unique Markov-perfect equilibrium. The authors then investigate under what conditions a time-consistent planner can implement the optimal allocation by just announcing his policy rule in a decentralized setting.Markov processes
Feasible Implementation of Taxation Methods
This paper studies the problem of implementation of taxation methods in one-commodity environments in which the taxable incomes of the (at least two) agents are fixed and not known to the planner. In this problem (unlike most work in implementation theory), the feasible set is unknown to the designer. We first show that feasibility out of equilibrium imposes that the mechanism depend on the environment. Next we present two game forms. In the first one, which requires complete information among the tax payers, each agent reports the incomes of all players to a central agency, and implementation of every taxation method is obtained in Nash, strong and coalition-proof equilibrium. In the second, informational requirements may be somewhat relaxed. One of the agents makes a tax proposal, the others bargain with him, and the services of a central agency are used only to solve disputes between pairs of agents. This game form implements a large class of consistent and monotone taxation methods in subgame perfect equilibrium. Neither mechanism employs the off-equilibrium devices used by the general theory. Partial departures from complete information still allow for implementability. However, under fully private information implementation is not possible.Feasible Implementation; Taxation Methods; Consistency; Decentralization; Information; Flat Tax
The Obstacles of Implementation of Village Allocation Fund Program in the North Konawe Southeast Sulawesi
Provision of Village Allocation Fund is predicated on the realization of the right to hold the village of village
autonomy. This is done so that the village can grow and evolve to follow the growth coming from the village
itself based on diversity, participation, indigenous autonomy, democratization, and empowerment. Rural
Institutions have increased due to the ability of an optimal are not adequately involved in the planning process
using the Alokasi Dana Desa (ADD) village without there even through the planning process as the existing
guidelines, were never involved in the implementation of ADD and also have never been involved in the
evaluation of the implementation of the ADD, all plans activities and filing submitted to Badan Pemberdayaan
Masyarakat Desa (BPMD). This phenomenon shows that community involvement is still an obstacle. The main
barriers associated with the management of the village administration who have not gotten the right formula in
community involvement, especially in aspiration. That is because of the following: 1) The low level of public
education 2) Weak managerial ability of the village and other village institutions and 3) Failure mechanisms of
socialization and increased capacity building by BPMD to the village
Mechanism design with partially-specified participation games
This paper considers the implementation of an economic outcome under complete information when the strategic and informational details of the participation game are partially-specified. This means that full participation is required to be a subgame-perfect equilibrium for a large variety of extensive modifications of the simultaneous-move participation game in the same vein as Kalai [Large Robust Games, Econometrica 72 (2004) 1631-1665].mechanism design ; robust implementation ; strong Nash equilibrium ; partial subgame perfection ; collusion on participation
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