Institutional aspects of credit cooperatives

The most common form of government intervention in the rural sector has been massive lending at subsidized interest rates. Credit programs generally aim to reach small farmers. However, despite the expansion of credit over the last three decades, few farmers in low income countries seem to have received or benefited from such credit. It has thus been common for small-scale farmers to resort to the formation of organized credit groups or cooperatives. This paper is a normative analysis of cooperatives viewed as institutions to improve the plight of small-scale farmers. The purpose is to analyze which structures are most successful, then to promote credit cooperatives and to design an optimal incentive scheme in place of subsidized credit policies of the past. The paper concludes by stating that a policy of providing assistance to existing and potential credit groups on how to set incentives, implement monitoring schemes and develop centralized resources is more desirable and more cost effective than the old fashioned and largely regressive subsidized credit policies.Banks&Banking Reform,Strategic Debt Management,Economic Theory&Research,Environmental Economics&Policies,Insurance&Risk Mitigation

Low-powered incentives

We study low-powered incentives in a model that captures important features of workplaces in which incentive-pay approaches are minimally relevant. Our motivation is that incentive pay, while not rare, is clearly far less common than are agency problems: many firms with agency problems nonetheless pay fixed compensation and offer continued employment to all but those workers judged "unsatisfactory" according to largely subjective criteria. We find that low-powered incentives can achieve efficient outcomes in simple workplaces and function surprisingly well even when the environment is characterized by unobservable performance heterogeneity and a high degree of complementarity among workers.Wages

Contracting with Repeated Moral Hazard and Private Evaluations

A repeated moral hazard setting in which the Principal privately observes the Agentfs output is studied. It is shown that there is no loss from restricting the analysis to contracts in which the Agent is supposed to exert effort every period, receives a constant efficiency wage and no feedback until he is fired. The optimal contract for a finite horizon is characterized, and shown to require burning of resources. These are only burnt after the worst possible realization sequence and the amount is independent of both the length of the horizon and the discount factor (ƒÂ). For the infinite horizon case a family of fixed interval review contracts is characterized and shown to achieve first best as ƒÂ ¨ 1. The optimal contract when ƒÂRepeated Moral Hazard, Private Monitoring, Efficiency Wages

Risk and Insurance in Sharecropping

This essay summarizes some recent empirical contributions on two aspects of sharecropping: (i) the effects of the contractual form (incentive power and contract length) on resource allocation and farm performance; and (ii) the exogenous elements behind the choice of different contractual forms.Empirical, Sharecropping, Survey

The Organizational Design of Intelligence Failures

While the detection, and prevention, of the September 11, 2001 plot would have been ideal, I argue that the more major intelligence failures occurred after the attacks of September 11. The erroneous intelligence concerning the WMD presence in Iraq permitted the Bush Administration to order the invasion of Iraq. Systematic underestimates of the budgetary costs and personnel requirements of the war meant that Congress did not give the matter the debate that it warranted. Finally, incorrect (or incomplete) intelligence concerning the extent of the informal opposition to the U.S. led forces resulted in inadequate numbers of allied forces being deployed and a protracted period of conflict and disruption in Iraq. These facts are all well known to anyone who reads newspapers. I make three arguments in this paper. First, the collection of the intelligence data and its evaluation does not occur in a vacuum. There must always be an organizing theory that motivates the collection and evaluation of the data and that this theory is formulated at the highest levels of the decision making process. Second, it is not possible to construct a truly neutral or objective (analytical) hierarchy. Third, it is impossible to separate the analytical evaluation of the data from the decision that will be based on such evaluation. As an inevitable consequence of these arguments, intelligence analysis and the resulting conclusions are driven by top-down considerations rather than bottom-up as has been argued by some reviewers of recent intelligence failures. Key Words: stable coalitions, self-enforcing agreements, compliance, enforcement, public goods

Content Analysis of Sports Illustrated Articles Depicting Women\u27s and Men\u27s College Basketball

Despite an increase in women’s participation in basketball, equal representation and portrayal of female athletes in comprehensive media coverage remains in question. This study examines the portrayal of femininity and masculinity in sports magazine articles and explores how they may reinforce hegemonic masculinity. A content analysis of Sports Illustrated articles for a full season was performed. Three themes support theories of hegemonic masculinity: comparison to male greats, mentioning male family members, and presence of default assumptions. Additionally, two themes emerged involving the tendency for sports authors to depict athletes in accordance with gender inequality. Overall, the Sports Illustrated articles analyzed provide support for literature about bias in media depictions and representations of female athletes

CEO Compensation among Firms Controlled by Large Shareholders: Evidence from Emerging Markets

Using a novel data base for three emerging markets, we find that the type of large shareholder matters for CEO compensation. In particular, we find a compensation premium of about 30 log points for professional (not controller-related) CEOs working in firms controlled by a family compared to firms controlled by other large shareholders. The premium cannot be explained away by standard firm characteristics, observable executive skills (e.g., education or tenure), or the compensation of the CEO in herformer job. The premium comes mostly from family firms with absent founders and when sons are involved.CEO compensation, large shareholders, family firms, emerging markets