Two-Sided B2B Platforms

This chapter provides a roadmap to the burgeoning literature on two-sided markets with a specific focus on BtoB market places. On-line intermediation involves two-sided network effects between buyers and sellers, and the implications for optimal BtoB platforms’ tariffs are discussed. The chapter discusses first the monopoly case, drawing attention to the distinction between upfront registration and transaction fees. Then the competitive case is discussed, with different degrees of differentiation, the distinction between single-homing and multi-homing, and different business models. The last section is devoted to non-price issues such as tying, the design of the matching process and the ownership structure.

Making apartments affordable: moving from speculative to deliberative development

Urban consolidation policies in Australia presuppose apartments as the new dominant housing type, but much of what the market has delivered is criticised as over-development, and as being generic, poorly-designed, environmentally unsustainable and unaffordable. In contrast to the usual focus on planning regulation and construction costs as the primary issues needing to be addressed in order to increase the supply of quality, affordable apartment housing this paper uses Ball’s (1983) ‘structure of provision’ approach to outline the key processes informing apartment development to reveal a substantial gap in critical understanding of how apartments are developed in Australia, and identifies economic problems not previously considered by policymakers. Using mainstream economic analysis to review the market itself, the authors found high search costs, demand risk, problems with exchange, and lack of competition present key barriers to achieving greater affordability and limit the extent to which ‘speculative’ developers can respond to the preferences of would be owner-occupiers of apartments. The existing development model, which is reliant on capturing uplift in site value, suits investors seeking rental yields in the first instance and capital gains in the second instance, and actively encourages housing price inflation. This is exacerbated by lack of density restrictions, such as have existed in inner Melbourne for many years, which permits greater yields on redevelopment sites. The price of land in the vicinity of such redevelopment sites is pushed up as landholders\u27 expectation of future yield is raised. All too frequently existing redevelopment sites go back onto the market as vendors seek to capture the uplift in site value and exit the project in a risk free manner. The paper proposes three major reforms. Firstly, that the market for apartment development be re-designed following insights from the economic field of ‘Market Design’ (a branch of Game Theory). A two-sided matching market for new apartments is proposed, where demand-side risks can be mitigated via consumer aggregation. Secondly, consumers should be empowered through support for  ‘deliberative’, or ‘do-it-yourself’ (DYI) development models, in order to increase competition, expand access, and promote responsiveness to consumer needs and preferences. Finally, planning schemes need to impose density restrictions (in the form of height limits, floor space ratios or bedroom quotas) in localities where housing demand is high, in order to dampen speculation and de-risk development by creating certainty. However restrictions on over-development on larger infill sites needs to be offset by permitting intensification of ‘greyfield’ suburbs. Aggregating existing housing lots to enable precinct regeneration and moderate height and density increases would permit better use of airspace thus allowing design outcomes that can optimise land use while retaining amenity

The rise of the sharing economy: estimating the impact of Airbnb on the hotel industry

Peer-to-peer markets, collectively known as the sharing economy, have emerged as alternative suppliers of goods and services traditionally provided by long-established industries. We explore the economic impact of the sharing economy on incumbent firms by studying the case of Airbnb, a prominent platform for short-term accommodations. We analyze Airbnb's entry into the state of Texas, and quantify its impact on the Texas hotel industry over the subsequent decade. We estimate that in Austin, where Airbnb supply is highest, the causal impact on hotel revenue is in the 8-10% range; moreover, the impact is non-uniform, with lower-priced hotels and those hotels not catering to business travelers being the most affected. The impact manifests itself primarily through less aggressive hotel room pricing, an impact that benefits all consumers, not just participants in the sharing economy. The price response is especially pronounced during periods of peak demand, such as SXSW, and is due to a differentiating feature of peer-to-peer platforms -- enabling instantaneous supply to scale to meet demand.Accepted manuscrip

Self-Enforcing Labour Contracts and the Dynamics Puzzle

To properly account for the dynamics of key macroeconomic variables, researchers incorporate various internal-propagation mechanisms in their models. In general, these mechanisms implicitly rely on the assumption of a perfect equality between the real wage and the marginal product of labour. The author proposes a theoretical validation of a micro-founded internal-propagation mechanism: he builds a model that features a limited-commitment economy, and derives endogenous self-enforcing labour contracts that produce a different linkage between the real wage and the marginal product of labour. The risk-sharing between the entrepreneur and the worker, both faced with enforcement problems, provides an admissible explanation of the prolonged comovements observed between consumption and labour. Since these co-movements are at the core of the persistence of the impulse response of output to exogenous technology shocks, this persistence can, in turn, be rationalized with the endogenous real rigidity emerging from the economy. The author shows that, in this framework, the persistence ultimately depends on the initial bargaining power and the magnitude of the risk-sharing.Business fluctuations and cycles; Economic models; Labour markets