Tradable Performance-Based CO2 Emissions Standards: Walking on Thin Ice?

Climate policy, like climate change itself, is subject to debate. Partially due to the political deadlock in Washington, DC, US climate policy, historically, has been driven mainly by state or regional effort until the recently introduced federal Clean Power Plan (CPP). Instead of a traditional mass-based standard, the US CPP stipulates a state-specific performance-based CO2 emission standard and delegates considerable flexibility to the states in achieving the standard. Typically, there are two sets of policy tools available: a tradable performance-based and a mass-based permit program. We analyze these two related but distinct standards when they are subject to imperfect competition in the product and/or permit markets. Stylized models are developed to produce general conclusions. Detailed models that account for heterogenous technologies and the transmission network are developed to evaluate policy efficiency. Depending on the scenarios under consideration, the resulting problem could be either a complementarity problem or a Stackelberg leaderfollower game, which is implemented as a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC). We overcome the nonconvexity of MPECs by reformulating them as mixed integer problems. We show that while the cross-subsidy inherent in the performance-based standard that might effectively reduce power prices, it could inflate energy demand, thereby rendering permits scarce. When the leader in a Stackelberg formulation has a relatively clean endowment under the performancebased standard, its ability to manipulate the electricity market as well as to lower permit prices might worsen the market outcomes compared to its mass-based counterpart. On the other hand, when the leader has a relatively dirty endowment, the "cross-subsidy" could be the dominant force leading to a higher social welfare compared to the mass-based program. This paper contributes to the current policy debates in regulating emissions from the US power sector and highlights different incentives created by the mass- and performance-based standards

Changing the Allocation Rules in the EU ETS: Impact on Competitiveness and Economic Efficiency

We assess five proposals for the future of the EU greenhouse gas Emission Trading Scheme (ETS): pure grandfathering allocation of emission allowances (GF), output-based allocation (OB), auctioning (AU), auctioning with border adjustments (AU-BA), and finally output-based allocation in sectors exposed to international competition combined with auctioning in electricity generation (OB-AU). We look at the impact on production, trade, CO2 leakage and welfare. We use a partial equilibrium model of the EU 27 featuring three sectors covered by the EU ETS – cement, steel and electricity – plus the aluminium sector, which is indirectly impacted through a rise in electricity price. The leakage ratio, i.e. the increase in emissions abroad over the decrease in EU emissions, ranges from around 8% under GF and AU to -2% under AU-BA and varies greatly among sectors. Concerning the overall economic cost, OB appears to be the least efficient policy, even when taking into account its ability to prevent CO2 leakage. On the other hand, this policy minimises production losses and wealth transfers among stakeholders, which is likely to soften oppositions. GF and AU are the most efficient policies from an EU perspective, even when leakage is accounted for. From a world welfare perspective and whatever the emission reductioEmission Trading, Allowance Allocation, Leakage, Spillover, Climate Policy, Kyoto Protocol, Border Adjustment

Strategic Action in the Liberalised German Electricity Market

Nowadays, a process can be observed in Germany where electricity producing and trading firms react to the electricity market liberalisation by merging market shares, since the year 2000, which reduces the number of suppliers and influences production and consumer prices. This paper discusses whether the liberalisation process will have positive or negative impacts on the environmental situation and whether this process together with a phase out of nuclear power can guarantee the intended improvement of environmental conditions without governmental regulation in Germany. This is done by modelling different strategic options of energy suppliers and their impacts on the economic and environmental situation in the liberalised German electricity market by a computational game theoretic model. Calculations with this model show that when German firms act strategically (e.g. a change in action of one firm affects the electricity price and, hence, the payoffs of other firms), the environment is better off at the cost of higher electricity prices. This result is robust to perturbations as shows by performing a sensitivity analysis.Electricity market liberalisation, game theoretic model, environmental effectiveness

Environmental Regulationand the Eco-Industry

This paper re-examines environmental regulation, under the assumption that pollution abatement technologies and services are provided by an imperfectly competitive environment industry. It is shown that each regulatory instrument (emission taxes and quotas; design standards; and voluntary agreements) has a specific impact on the price-elasticity of the polluters’ demand for abatement services, hence on the market power of the eco-industry and the resulting cost of abatement. This implies that the optimal pollution tax will be higher than the marginal social cost of pollution, while a voluntary approach to pollution abatement may fail unless the eco-industry itself is willing to participate.Pollution regulation, End-of-pipe pollution abatement, Environment industry

Incomplete Environmental Regulation, Imperfect Competition, and Emissions Leakage

For political, jurisdictional and technical reasons, environmental regulation of industrial pollution is often incomplete: regulations apply to only a subset of facilities contributing to a pollution problem. Policymakers are increasingly concerned about the emissions leakage that may occur if unregulated production can be easily substituted for production at regulated firms. This paper analyzes emissions leakage in an incompletely regulated and imperfectly competitive industry. When regulated producers are less polluting than their unregulated ounterparts, emissions under incomplete regulation can exceed the level of emissions that would have occurred in the absence of regulation. Converseley, when regulated firms are relatively more polluting, aggregate emissions under complete regulation can exceed aggregate emissions under incomplete regulation. In a straightforward application of the theory of the second best, I show that incomplete regulation can welfare dominate complete regulation of emissions from an asymmetric oligopoly. The model is used to simulate greenhouse gas emissions from California's electricity sector under a source-based cap-and-trade program. Incomplete regulation that exempts out-of-state producers achieves approximately a third of the emissions reductions achieved under complete regulation at more than twice the cost per ton of emissions abated.

The Question of Generation Adequacy in Liberalised Electricity Markets

This paper presents an overview of the reasons why unregulated markets for the production of electricity cannot be expected to invest sufficiently in generation capacity on a continuous basis. Although it can be shown that periodic price spikes should provide generation companies with sufficient investment incentives in theory, there are a number of probable causes of market failure. A likely result is the development of investment cycles that may affect the adequacy of capacity. The experience in California shows the great social costs associated with an episode of scarce generation capacity. Another disadvantage is that generation companies can manipulate price spikes. This would result in large transfers of income from consumers to producers and reduce the operational reliability of electricity supply during these price spikes. We end this paper by outlining several methods that have been proposed to stabilise the market, which provide better incentives to generation companies and consumers alike.Generation adequacy, Liberalised electricity market

Políticas de cambio climático basadas en incentivos: impuestos y derechos de emisión

Tesis inédita de la Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales, leída el 12/01/2016The reduction of Greenhouse Gases (GHG) plays a central role in the environmental policies considered by countries for implementation not only at its own level but also at supranational levels. This thesis is dedicated to investigate some aspects of two of the most relevant climate change policies. The first part is dedicated to emission permit markets and the second part to optimal carbon taxes. On emission permit markets we explore the strategic behavior of oligopolistic firms operating in polluting industrial sectors that are regulated by cap and trade systems. Our aim is to identify how market power influences the main results obtained under perfect competition assumptions and to understand how actions taken in one market affects the outcome of the other related market. A partial equilibrium model is developed for this purpose with specific abatement cost functions. In Chapter 2 we use the model to explain some of the most relevant literature results. In Chapter 3 the model is used to analyze different oligopolistic structures in the product market under the assumption of competitive permits market. There are two significant findings. Firstly, under the assumption of a Stackelberg oligopoly, firms have no incentives for lobbying in order to manipulate permit prices up, as they have under Cournot competition...La reducción de gases de efecto invernadero juega un papel fundamental en las políticas de los países, tanto a nivel nacional como internacional. Esta tesis se dedica a investigar algunos aspectos de las dos políticas más relevantes sobre el cambio climático. La primera parte se dedica a los mercados de derechos de emisión y la segunda a la imposición óptima sobre emisiones. En la primera parte estudiamos el comportamiento estratégico de empresas que operan en sectores industriales contaminantes sometidos a limitación de emisiones a través de derechos negociables, con el propósito de identificar las diferencias entre los resultados obtenidos cuando hay poder de mercado o en competencia perfecta. Y además entender como las acciones tomadas en uno de esos mercados afectan al otro. Para ello se desarrolla un modelo de equilibrio parcial con funciones específicas de costes de reducción de emisiones. En el Capítulo 2 este modelo se utiliza para explicar alguno de los resultados más relevantes de la literatura. En el Capítulo 3 se utiliza para analizar diferentes estructuras de oligopolio cuando el mercado de permisos es competitivo. Encontramos dos hechos significativos...Depto. de Análisis Económico y Economía CuantitativaFac. de Ciencias Económicas y EmpresarialesTRUEunpu

Pollution Abatement in the Netherlands: A Dynamic Applied General Equilibrium Assessment

This paper deals with an assessment of the economic costs of environmental policies in the Netherlands, using a dynamic Applied General Equilibrium model with bottom-up information on abatement techniques. Empirical abatement cost curves are used to determine substitution possibilities between pollution and abatement and the characteristics of abatement goods. The results show that an absolute decoupling of economy and environment is possible. Smog formation is the most costly environmental theme, due to the absence of technical abatement options. For all environmental themes, the least-cost way to reduce emissions is via a combination of technical abatement measures and substantial economic restructuring.Applied general equilibrium, Pollution abatement, Dynamics, Environmental policy, Netherlands

Addressing leakage in the EU ETS : Border adjustment or output-based allocation ?.

The EU ETS has been criticised for threatening the competitiveness of European industry and generating carbon leakage, i.e., increasing foreign greenhouse gas emissions. Two main options have been put forward to tackle these concerns : border adjustments and output-based allocation, i.e., allocation of free allowances in proportion to current production. We compare various configurations of these two options, as well as a scenario with full auctioning and no border adjustment. Against this background, we develop a model of the main sectors covered by the EU ETS: electricity, steel, cement, and aluminium. We conclude that the most efficient way to tackle leakage is auctioning with border adjustment, which generally induces a negative leakage (a spillover). This holds even if the border adjustment does not include indirect emissions, if it is based on EU (rather than foreign) specific emissions, or (for some values of the parameters) if it covers only imports. Another relatively efficient policy is to combine auctioning in the electricity sector and output-based allocation in exposed industries, especially if free allowances are given both for direct and indirect emissions, i.e., those generated by the generation of the electricity consumed. Although output-based allocation is generally less effective than border adjustment to tackle leakage, it is more effective to mitigate production losses in the sectors affected by the ETS, which may ease climate policy adoption.Emission trading; border adjustment; output‐based allocation; competitiveness; carbon leakage;