Collective dynamics of belief evolution under cognitive coherence and social conformity

Human history has been marked by social instability and conflict, often driven by the irreconcilability of opposing sets of beliefs, ideologies, and religious dogmas. The dynamics of belief systems has been studied mainly from two distinct perspectives, namely how cognitive biases lead to individual belief rigidity and how social influence leads to social conformity. Here we propose a unifying framework that connects cognitive and social forces together in order to study the dynamics of societal belief evolution. Each individual is endowed with a network of interacting beliefs that evolves through interaction with other individuals in a social network. The adoption of beliefs is affected by both internal coherence and social conformity. Our framework explains how social instabilities can arise in otherwise homogeneous populations, how small numbers of zealots with highly coherent beliefs can overturn societal consensus, and how belief rigidity protects fringe groups and cults against invasion from mainstream beliefs, allowing them to persist and even thrive in larger societies. Our results suggest that strong consensus may be insufficient to guarantee social stability, that the cognitive coherence of belief-systems is vital in determining their ability to spread, and that coherent belief-systems may pose a serious problem for resolving social polarization, due to their ability to prevent consensus even under high levels of social exposure. We therefore argue that the inclusion of cognitive factors into a social model is crucial in providing a more complete picture of collective human dynamics

Bounded Confidence under Preferential Flip: A Coupled Dynamics of Structural Balance and Opinions

In this work we study the coupled dynamics of social balance and opinion formation. We propose a model where agents form opinions under bounded confidence, but only considering the opinions of their friends. The signs of social ties -friendships and enmities- evolve seeking for social balance, taking into account how similar agents' opinions are. We consider both the case where opinions have one and two dimensions. We find that our dynamics produces the segregation of agents into two cliques, with the opinions of agents in one clique differing from those in the other. Depending on the level of bounded confidence, the dynamics can produce either consensus of opinions within each clique or the coexistence of several opinion clusters in a clique. For the uni-dimensional case, the opinions in one clique are all below the opinions in the other clique, hence defining a "left clique" and a "right clique". In the two-dimensional case, our numerical results suggest that the two cliques are separated by a hyperplane in the opinion space. We also show that the phenomenon of unidimensional opinions identified by DeMarzo, Vayanos and Zwiebel (Q J Econ 2003) extends partially to our dynamics. Finally, in the context of politics, we comment about the possible relation of our results to the fragmentation of an ideology and the emergence of new political parties.Comment: 8 figures, PLoS ONE 11(10): e0164323, 201

Randomized Consensus with Attractive and Repulsive Links

We study convergence properties of a randomized consensus algorithm over a graph with both attractive and repulsive links. At each time instant, a node is randomly selected to interact with a random neighbor. Depending on if the link between the two nodes belongs to a given subgraph of attractive or repulsive links, the node update follows a standard attractive weighted average or a repulsive weighted average, respectively. The repulsive update has the opposite sign of the standard consensus update. In this way, it counteracts the consensus formation and can be seen as a model of link faults or malicious attacks in a communication network, or the impact of trust and antagonism in a social network. Various probabilistic convergence and divergence conditions are established. A threshold condition for the strength of the repulsive action is given for convergence in expectation: when the repulsive weight crosses this threshold value, the algorithm transits from convergence to divergence. An explicit value of the threshold is derived for classes of attractive and repulsive graphs. The results show that a single repulsive link can sometimes drastically change the behavior of the consensus algorithm. They also explicitly show how the robustness of the consensus algorithm depends on the size and other properties of the graphs

Network polarization, filter bubbles, and echo chambers: An annotated review of measures and reduction methods

Polarization arises when the underlying network connecting the members of a community or society becomes characterized by highly connected groups with weak inter-group connectivity. The increasing polarization, the strengthening of echo chambers, and the isolation caused by information filters in social networks are increasingly attracting the attention of researchers from different areas of knowledge such as computer science, economics, social and political sciences. This work presents an annotated review of network polarization measures and models used to handle the polarization. Several approaches for measuring polarization in graphs and networks were identified, including those based on homophily, modularity, random walks, and balance theory. The strategies used for reducing polarization include methods that propose edge or node editions (including insertions or deletions, as well as edge weight modifications), changes in social network design, or changes in the recommendation systems embedded in these networks.Comment: Corrected a typo in Section 3.2; the rest remains unchange