760 research outputs found
An auction for collaborative vehicle routing: Models and algorithms
Increasing competition and expectations from customers pressures carriers to further improve efficiency. Forming collaborations is essential for carriers to reach their targeted efficiency levels. In this study, we investigate an auction mechanism to facilitate collaboration amongst carriers while maintaining autonomy for the individual carriers. Multiple auction implementations are evaluated. As the underlying decision problem (which is a traditional vehicle routing problem) is known to be NP-hard, this auction mechanism has an important inherent complexity. Therefore, we use fast and efficient algorithms for the vehicle routing problem to ensure that the auction can be used in operational decision making. Numerical results are presented, indicating that the auction achieves a savings potential better than the thus far reported approaches in the literature. Managerial insights are discussed, particularly related to the properties of the auction and value of the information
Applications of Negotiation Theory to Water Issues
The purpose of the paper is to review the applications of non-cooperative bargaining theory to water related issues â which fall in the category of formal models of negotiation. The ultimate aim is that to, on the one hand, identify the conditions under which agreements are likely to emerge, and their characteristics; and, on the other hand, to support policy makers in devising the ârules of the gameâ that could help obtain a desired result. Despite the fact that allocation of natural resources, especially of trans-boundary nature, has all the characteristics of a negotiation problem, there are not many applications of formal negotiation theory to the issue. Therefore, this paper first discusses the non-cooperative bargaining models applied to water allocation problems found in the literature. Particular attention will be given to those directly modelling the process of negotiation, although some attempts at finding strategies to maintain the efficient allocation solution will also be illustrated. In addition, this paper will focus on Negotiation Support Systems (NSS), developed to support the process of negotiation. This field of research is still relatively new, however, and NSS have not yet found much use in real life negotiation. The paper will conclude by highlighting the key remaining gaps in the literature.Negotiation theory, Water, Agreeements, Stochasticity, Stakeholders
Cheap Talk, Gullibility, and Welfare in an Environmental Taxation Game
We consider a simple dynamic model of environmental taxation that exhibits time inconsistency. There are two categories of firms, Believers, who take the tax announcements made by the Regulator to face value, and Non-Believers, who perfectly anticipate the Regulator's decisions, albeit at a cost. The proportion of Believers and Non- Believers changes over time depending on the relative profits of both groups. We show that the Regulator can use misleading tax announcements to steer the economy to an equilibrium that is Pareto superior to the solutions usually suggested in the literature. Depending upon the initial proportion of Believers, the Regulator may prefer a fast or a low speed of reaction of the firms to differences in Believers/Non-Believers profits.Environmental policy, Emissions taxes, Time inconsistency, Heterogeneous agents, Bounded rationality, Learning, Multiple equilibria, Stackelberg games
Allocation in Practice
How do we allocate scarcere sources? How do we fairly allocate costs? These
are two pressing challenges facing society today. I discuss two recent projects
at NICTA concerning resource and cost allocation. In the first, we have been
working with FoodBank Local, a social startup working in collaboration with
food bank charities around the world to optimise the logistics of collecting
and distributing donated food. Before we can distribute this food, we must
decide how to allocate it to different charities and food kitchens. This gives
rise to a fair division problem with several new dimensions, rarely considered
in the literature. In the second, we have been looking at cost allocation
within the distribution network of a large multinational company. This also has
several new dimensions rarely considered in the literature.Comment: To appear in Proc. of 37th edition of the German Conference on
Artificial Intelligence (KI 2014), Springer LNC
A political economy model of infrastructure allocation: an empirical assessment
"In dieser Untersuchung wird ein simultanes Gleichungssystem zur SchÀtzung des
Beitrags von Verkehrsinfrastrukturinvestitionen zu regionalem Wachstum verwendet.
Es wird explizit der politische ProzeĂ modelliert, der Infrastrukturinvestitionen
determiniert; dadurch wird eine mögliche Ursache einer verzerrten ParameterschÀtzung
vermieden, die eintreten kann, wenn Produktionsfunktionen einzeln geschÀtzt werden.
Gleichzeitig flieĂen in das Modell weitere empirisch ĂŒberprĂŒfbare Hypothesen ĂŒber die
Determinanten von Infrastrukturpolitik ein. Die empirischen Ergebnisse fĂŒr einen
Paneldatensatz mit 21 französischen Regionen im Zeitraum 1985-1991 zeigen, daĂ
unterstĂŒtzende AktivitĂ€ten in der Tat einen signifikanten EinfluĂ auf die regionale
Allokation von Verkehrsinfrastrukturinvestitionen haben. DarĂŒber hinaus werden nur
wenig empirische Hinweise dafĂŒr gefunden, daĂ auch erwartete ProduktivitĂ€tseffekte
von Infrastruktur bei der regionalen Allokation in Frankreich von Bedeutung sind." (Autorenreferat)"This paper proposes a simultaneous-equation approach to the estimation of the contribution of transport infrastructure accumulation to regional growth. We model explicitly the political-economy process driving infrastructure investments; in doing so, we eliminate a potential source of bias in production-function estimates and generate testable hypotheses on the forces that shape infrastructure policy. Our empirical findings on a panel of France's regions over 1985-91 suggest that influence activities were, indeed, significant determinants of the cross-regional allocation of transportation infrastructure investments. Moreover, we find little evidence of concern for the maximization of economic returns to infrastructure spending, even after controlling for pork-barrel and when imposing an exogenous preference for convergence in regional productivity levels." (author's abstract
An Economic Model for Bioprospecting Contracts
This paper explores the use of a micro-economic model to analyse the provisions and parties of bioprospecting contracts. It focuses on the pharmaceutical industry as the representative biodiversity buyer, presenting an original theoretical framework that explains the main contract characteristics or stylised facts. Against this background, it considers the main contractors involved in these private contracts, i.e. biodiversity sellers and biodiversity buyers, analysing both the magnitude and distribution of the respective payoffs. Particular attention is devoted to the different, mixed impacts of bioprospecting contracts and patenting on social welfare. The positive welfare impacts delivered by bioprospecting contracts are associated with the potential discovery of a new drug product, i.e. productivity gains, non-monetary benefit-sharing or transfers and royalty revenues. The negative welfare impact results from the legal creation of a monopoly and the related well-known effect on the consumer surplus. Finally, the potential redistribution effects are limited, and a potential enforcement of this objective may jeopardise the desirability of the contracts since this action would lead to a significant increase in the transaction costs.Bioprospecting Contract, Genetic Resource, Biodiversity Buyer, Biodiversity Seller, Patenting, Welfare Analysis, Benefit Sharing
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