Sterilized Foreign Exchange Market Interventions in a Chartist-Fundamentalist Exchange Rate Model

Sterilized foreign exchange market interventions are commonly dismissed by economists as an ineffective policy instrument. Nevertheless many central banks operating under independently floating exchange rates regimes are often engaged in sales and purchases of foreign exchange in order to manipulate the current value of their currencies. In this paper we argue that the skepticism of many economists can be ascribed to their orientation on fundamental-based, efficient-market exchange rate models. Given their weak empirical support, however, it is unreasonable to evaluate the effectiveness of sterilized foreign exchange interventions against the background of this class of models. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to investigate the effectiveness of sterilized foreign exchange market interventions on the basis of a more suitable model. Using a chartist-fundamentalist model we show that central banks can influence exchange rates by using sterilized interventions. In particular, turning points occur earlier and exchange rate misalignments are substantially reduced. --Foreign exchange,central bank intervention,heterogeneous expectation

Why a simple herding model may generate the stylized facts of daily returns: Explanation and estimation

The paper proposes an elementary agent-based asset pricing model that, invoking the two trader types of fundamentalists and chartists, comprises four features: (i) price determination by excess demand; (ii) a herding mechanism that gives rise to a macroscopic adjustment equation for the market fractions of the two groups; (iii) a rush towards fundamentalism when the price misalignment becomes too large; and (iv) a stronger noise component in the demand per chartist trader than in the demand per fundamentalist trader, which implies a structural stochastic volatility in the returns. Combining analytical and numerical methods, the interaction between these elements is studied in the phase plane of the price and a majority index. In addition, the model is estimated by the method of simulated moments, where the choice of the moments reflects the basic stylized facts of the daily returns of a stock market index. A (parametric) bootstrap procedure serves to set up an econometric test to evaluate the model's goodness-of-fit, which proves to be highly satisfactory. The bootstrap also makes sure that the estimated structural parameters are well identified. --structural stochastic volatility,method of simulated moments,autocorrelation pattern,fat tails,bootstrapped p-values

Is Dual Agency in Real Estate Transactions a Cause for Concern?

We study dual agency in residential real estate, where the same agent/agency represents both the buyer and seller. We assess the extent to which dual agency suffers from an inherent conflict of interest, where the dual agent furthers the interest of one client at the expense of the other client’s, as well as principal-agent incentive misalignment where the agent furthers her own interest at the expense of one or both clients. And, we examine how these incentive conflicts affect agent behavior and transaction outcomes. To do so, we analyze 10,891 residential real estate transactions in Long Island, NY, from 2004- 2007. Specifically, we (i) identify how dual agency is correlated with house prices and time-to-sale, (ii) describe and assess agent behaviors that could generate these correlations, and (iii) provide some intuition as to the economic effects of prohibiting dual agency in real estate transactions. We find that the incidence of dual agency is uncorrelated with sale price and negatively correlated with time-to-sale. However, on very fast deals, list prices and sale prices are significantly higher on houses sold via dual agency. These findings are consistent with first-resort selling (agents first showing houses to in-house buyer clients) and strategic pricing (agents inducing their seller clients to set a higher list price in anticipation of an internal client agreeing to it) on some deals, in conjunction with agents leaning on sellers to accept a lower sale price on other deals. First-resort selling is indicative of incentive misalignment, while the latter two behaviors reflect a conflict of interest: strategic pricing transfers surplus from the buyer to the seller, and leaning on the seller transfers surplus from the seller to the buyer. Further, our results indicate little difference between dual-agent (same agent) and within-agency (same agency, but different agent) deals. Our findings provide some evidence of distorted outcomes associated with dual agency, mainly on fast deals, but the evidence indicates mild overall effects, suggesting that prohibiting the practice is not likely to substantially increase welfare.

Structural stochastic volatility in asset pricing dynamics: Estimation and model contest

In the framework of small-scale agent-based financial market models, the paper starts out from the concept of structural stochastic volatility, which derives from different noise levels in the demand of fundamentalists and chartists and the time-varying market shares of the two groups. It advances several different specifications of the endogenous switching between the trading strategies and then estimates these models by the method of simulated moments (MSM), where the choice of the moments reflects the basic stylized facts of the daily returns of a stock market index. In addition to the standard version of MSM with a quadratic loss function, we also take into account how often a great number of Monte Carlo simulation runs happen to yield moments that are all contained within their empirical confidence intervals. The model contest along these lines reveals a strong role for a (tamed) herding component. The quantitative performance of the winner model is so good that it may provide a standard for future research. --Method of simulated moments,moment coverage ratio,herding,discrete choice approach,transition probability approach

Exchange Rates Dynamics in a Target Zone – A Heterogeneous Expectations Approach

The target zone model of Krugman (1991) has failed empirically. In this paper, we develop a model of the exchange rate with heterogeneous agents in a free floating and a target zone regime. We show that this simple model mimics the empirical puzzles of exchange rates: excessive volatility, fat tails, volatility clustering, and disconnection from the fundamentals. In addition, the target zone regime replicates a reduced nominal volatility for the same level of fundamental volatility as in the free floating regime and the distribution of the exchange rate within the band is hump-shaped.exchange rate, heterogeneous agents, target zones

Herd behavior and contagion in financial markets

Imitative behavior and contagion are well-documented regularities of financial markets. We study whether they can occur in a two-asset economy where rational agents trade sequentially. When traders have gains from trade, informational cascades arise and prices fail to aggregate information dispersed among traders. During a cascade all informed traders with the same preferences choose the same action, i.e., they herd. Moreover, herd behavior can generate financial contagion. Informational cascades and herds can spill over from one asset to the other, pushing the price of the other asset far from its fundamental value

Paradigm shift? A critique of the IMF’s new approach to capital controls

The global financial crisis forcefully highlighted the importance of developing mechanisms to curb the effects of large and volatile capital inflows on growth and financial stability in developing countries. It led the IMF to reconsider its long-standing rejection of capital controls. This paper explores the analytical framework underlying the IMF’s new position, arguing that its sequencing strategy offers a formulaic solution that neglects the institutional make-up of money and currency markets, is asymmetric in its emphasis on the upturn of the liquidity cycle and sanctions capital-controls only as a last-resort solution. The new approach can have perverse impacts, increasing vulnerability where banks play an important role in the intermediation of capital inflows. The paper offers alternative policy solutions that focus on realigning bank incentives towards longer horizons and sustainable growth models, combining carefully designed central bank liquidity strategies and institutional changes in the banking sector.IMF, capital controls, financial crisis, global liquidity, shadow banks, sterilizations, central banks.

Factores Macroecon�micos en Retornos Accionarios Chilenos

We evaluate the growth effects of real exchange rate (RER) misalignments and their volatility. We calculate RER misaligments as deviations of actual RERs from their equilibrium for 60 countries over 1965-2003 using panel and time series cointegration methods. Using dynamic panel data techniques we find that RER misalignments hinder growth but the effect is non-linear: growth declines are larger, the larger the size of the overvaluation. Although large undervaluations hurt growth, small to moderate undervaluations enhance growth. However, we find that it is difficult to follow a pro-growth RER policy. Finally, growth is hampered by highly volatile RER misalignments.

A prototype model of speculative dynamics with position-based trading

To avoid the indeterminate and generally unbounded positions of the agents in financial market models with order-based trading, the paper considers the alternative of position-based strategies. To this end it extracts a prototype model from the literature, with fundamentalists, chartists, and a risk-averse market maker. The deterministic formulation of the model leads to a neutral delay differential equation of the price, whose mathematical analysis is non-standard. The stability conditions are nevertheless quite analogous to the order-based Beja–Goldman model. The effects of parameter variations are also studied in a stochastic setting, where special emphasis is put on the misalignment between price and the time-varying fundamental value, and on the differential profits of fundamentalists and chartists