Social influence and social learning in young children and infants

This thesis examines the motivations underlying social influence and behaviour matching in young children. In my General Introduction, I argue that, in adults, behaviour matching is often motivated by goals to learn from and affiliate with other group members (or by a combination of these two factors). In addition to explicit forms of behaviour matching, however, adults also subconsciously assimilate their behaviour to those around them. I argue that imitation in young children may be similarly motivated by goals to learn from and affiliate with others. In other words, that imitation performs an instrumental and a social function in development. Further, I argue that young children may also subconsciously assimilate their behaviour to those around them. The following experimental chapters test aspects of these claims. Chapter 2 investigates verbal imitation. Focusing on the instrumental aspects of this ability, I test whether young children copy the perceived intentions behind speech. Results show that children correct the ungrammatical utterances of an intentional model, but copy the utterances of a non-intentional model exactly. Chapter 3 investigates social imitation. In that chapter, I test whether children increase their imitation when they have a goal to affiliate. Results show that children who have been given a goal to affiliate (through priming with social exclusion) copy the actions of a model significantly more closely than children who have been given a neutral prime. Chapter 4 investigates unintentional, or subconscious, behaviour matching and tests whether even infants assimilate their behaviour to social primes. Results show that infants primed with affiliation are significantly more likely to help an experimenter than infants primed with individuality. Taken together, these experiments demonstrate that behaviour matching is a diverse and important phenomenon in development. It occurs both intentionally and unintentionally, and enables children to learn from and affiliate with those around them.EThOS - Electronic Theses Online ServiceGBUnited Kingdo

Interactive intelligence: behaviour-based AI, musical HCI and the Turing Test

The field of behaviour-based artificial intelligence (AI), with its roots in the robotics research of Rodney Brooks, is not predominantly tied to linguistic interaction in the sense of the classic Turing test (or, "imitation game"). Yet, it is worth noting, both are centred on a behavioural model of intelligence. Similarly, there is no intrinsic connection between musical AI and the language-based Turing test, though there have been many attempts to forge connections between them. Nonetheless, there are aspects of musical AI and the Turing test that can be considered in the context of non-language-based interactive environments–-in particular, when dealing with real-time musical AI, especially interactive improvisation software. This paper draws out the threads of intentional agency and human indistinguishability from Turing’s original 1950 characterisation of AI. On the basis of this distinction, it considers different approaches to musical AI. In doing so, it highlights possibilities for non-hierarchical interplay between human and computer agents

Automatic imitation of biomechanically possible and impossible actions: effects of priming movements versus goals

Recent behavioral, neuroimaging, and neurophysiological research suggests a common representational code mediating the observation and execution of actions; yet, the nature of this representational code is not well understood. The authors address this question by investigating (a) whether this observation execution matching system (or mirror system) codes both the constituent movements of an action as well as its goal and (b) how such sensitivity is influenced by top-down effects of instructions. The authors tested the automatic imitation of observed finger actions while manipulating whether the movements were biomechanically possible or impossible, but holding the goal constant. When no mention was made of this difference (Experiment 1), comparable automatic imitation was elicited from possible and impossible actions, suggesting that the actions had been coded at the level of the goal. When attention was drawn to this difference (Experiment 2), however, only possible movements elicited automatic imitation. This sensitivity was specific to imitation, not affecting spatial stimulus–response compatibility (Experiment 3). These results suggest that automatic imitation is modulated by top-down influences, coding actions in terms of both movements and goals depending on the focus of attention

Social influence and social learning in young children and infants

This thesis examines the motivations underlying social influence and behaviour matching in young children. In my General Introduction, I argue that, in adults, behaviour matching is often motivated by goals to learn from and affiliate with other group members (or by a combination of these two factors). In addition to explicit forms of behaviour matching, however, adults also subconsciously assimilate their behaviour to those around them. I argue that imitation in young children may be similarly motivated by goals to learn from and affiliate with others. In other words, that imitation performs an instrumental and a social function in development. Further, I argue that young children may also subconsciously assimilate their behaviour to those around them. The following experimental chapters test aspects of these claims. Chapter 2 investigates verbal imitation. Focusing on the instrumental aspects of this ability, I test whether young children copy the perceived intentions behind speech. Results show that children correct the ungrammatical utterances of an intentional model, but copy the utterances of a non-intentional model exactly. Chapter 3 investigates social imitation. In that chapter, I test whether children increase their imitation when they have a goal to affiliate. Results show that children who have been given a goal to affiliate (through priming with social exclusion) copy the actions of a model significantly more closely than children who have been given a neutral prime. Chapter 4 investigates unintentional, or subconscious, behaviour matching and tests whether even infants assimilate their behaviour to social primes. Results show that infants primed with affiliation are significantly more likely to help an experimenter than infants primed with individuality. Taken together, these experiments demonstrate that behaviour matching is a diverse and important phenomenon in development. It occurs both intentionally and unintentionally, and enables children to learn from and affiliate with those around them

Nonseparability of Shared Intentionality

According to recent studies in developmental psychology and neuroscience, symbolic language is essentially intersubjective. Empathetically relating to others renders possible the acquisition of linguistic constructs. Intersubjectivity develops in early ontogenetic life when interactions between mother and infant mutually shape their relatedness. Empirical findings suggest that the shared attention and intention involved in those interactions is sustained as it becomes internalized and embodied. Symbolic language is derivative and emerges from shared intentionality. In this paper, we present a formalization of shared intentionality based upon a quantum approach. From a phenomenological viewpoint, we investigate the nonseparable, dynamic and sustainable nature of social cognition and evaluate the appropriateness of quantum interaction for modelling intersubjectivity

A kinematic study on (un)intentional imitation in bottlenose dolphins

The aim of the present study was to investigate the effect of observing other's movements on subsequent performance in bottlenose dolphins. The imitative ability of non-human animals has intrigued a number of researchers. So far, however, studies in dolphins have been confined to intentional imitation concerned with the explicit request to imitate other agents. In the absence of instruction to imitate, do dolphins (un)intentionally replicate other's movement features? To test this, dolphins were filmed while reaching and touching a stimulus before and after observing another dolphin (i.e., model) performing the same action. All videos were reviewed and segmented in order to extract the relevant movements. A marker was inserted post hoc via software on the videos upon the anatomical landmark of interest (i.e., rostrum) and was tracked throughout the time course of the movement sequence. The movement was analyzed using an in-house software developed to perform two-dimensional (2D) post hoc kinematic analysis. The results indicate that dolphins' kinematics is sensitive to other's movement features. Movements performed for the "visuomotor priming" condition were characterized by a kinematic pattern similar to that performed by the observed dolphin (i.e., model). Addressing the issue of spontaneous imitation in bottlenose dolphins might allow ascertaining whether the potential or impulse to produce an imitative action is generated, not just when they intend to imitate, but whenever they watch another conspecific's behavior. In closing, this will clarify whether motor representational capacity is a by-product of factors specific to humans or whether more general characteristics such as processes of associative learning prompted by high level of encephalization could help to explain the evolution of this ability

'Obsessed with goals': functions and mechanisms of teleological interpretation of actions in humans

Humans show a strong and early inclination to interpret observed behaviours of others as goal-directed actions. We identify two main epistemic functions that this ‘teleological obsession’ serves: on-line prediction and social learning. We show how teleological action interpretations can serve these functions by drawing on two kinds of inference (‘action-to-goal’ or ‘goal-to-action’), and argue that both types of teleological inference constitute inverse problems that can only be solved by further assumptions. We pinpoint the assumptions that the three currently proposed mechanisms of goal attribution (action-effect associations, simulation procedures, and teleological reasoning) imply, and contrast them with the functions they are supposed to fulfil. We argue that while action-effect associations and simulation procedures are generally well suited to serve on-line action monitoring and prediction, social learning of new means actions and artefact functions requires the inferential productivity of teleological reasoning