974 research outputs found
The structure of thoughts
In this paper I examine one well-known attempt to justify the claim that thoughts are intrinsically structured, Evans’s justification of the Generality Constraint. I compare this with a rival account, proposed by Peaocke. I end by suggesting that a naïve, Aristotelian realist has no difficulty at all in providing a justification of the Generality Constraint, which is therefore a view that deserves serious consideration
Ontology-based model abstraction
In recent years, there has been a growth in the use of reference conceptual models to capture information about complex and critical domains. However, as the complexity of domain increases, so does the size and complexity of the models that represent them. Over the years, different techniques for complexity management in large conceptual models have been developed. In particular, several authors have proposed different techniques for model abstraction. In this paper, we leverage on the ontologically well-founded semantics of the modeling language OntoUML to propose a novel approach for model abstraction in conceptual models. We provide a precise definition for a set of Graph-Rewriting rules that can automatically produce much-reduced versions of OntoUML models that concentrate the models’ information content around the ontologically essential types in that domain, i.e., the so-called Kinds. The approach has been implemented using a model-based editor and tested over a repository of OntoUML models
Is the Object Concept Formal?
Uncorrected ProofsThis review article explores several senses in which it can be held that the (actual, psychological) concept of an object is a formal concept, as opposed, here, to being a sortal concept. Some recent positions both from the philosophical and psychological literature are analyzed: Object-sortalism (Xu), quasi-sortalist reductive strategies (Bloom), qualified sortalism (Wiggins), demonstrative theories (Fodor), and anti-sortalism (Ayers)
A Modal-tense Sortal Logic with Variable-Domain Second-order Quantification
We propose a new intensional semantics for modal-tense second-order languages with sortal predicates. The semantics provides a variable-domain interpretation of the second-order quantifiers. A formal logical system is characterized and proved to be sound and complete with respect to the semantics. A contemporary variant of conceptualism as a theory of universals is the philosophical background of the semantics. Justification for the variable-domain interpretation of the second-order quantifiers presupposes such a conceptualist framework
Sortal concepts and modality
What is the modal significance of sortal concepts? It is generally accepted that sortal concepts provide persistence conditions with modal implications that are de re, and not merely de dicto. I do not think that this important assumption has received the scrutiny that it deserves. In this paper, I examine the contrast between a ‘pure de dicto’ theory of the persistence conditions associated with sortal concepts and a variety of de re theories, both essentialist and non-essentialist. I conclude that although there is a defensible argument against the pure de dicto theory, it has two interesting implications. First, the argument lends no support to an essentialist version of the de re theory. Secondly, it appears to support the rejection of the pure de dicto theory only by a theorist who is also a pluralist about coincidence. Hence it appears to provide no justification for the rejection of the pure de dicto theory on the part of a contingent identity theorist
Moderate monism, persistence and sortal concepts
Coincidence (e.g., of a statue and the piece of bronze which constitutes it) comes in two varieties – permanent and temporary. Moderate monism (about coincidence) is
the position that permanent coincidence, but not temporary coincidence, entails identity. Extreme monism (also known as the stage theory) is the position that even
temporary coincidence entails identity. Pluralists are opponents of monism tout court. The intuitively obvious, commonsensical position (= my own position) is moderate
monism. It is therefore important to see if it can be sustained
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Essential properties: analysis and extension
This thesis is an attempt to understand the essential properties of concrete objects. The
underlying motivation of this investigation is the hope that by understanding essential
properties we will be in a better position to construct a satisfactory metaphysical account of the things that populate the world around us.
The initial chapter introduces two questions that this thesis will attempt to answer.
The first, ‘what are essential properties?’ is the Analysis Question. Answering it occupies chapters two through five. The second, ‘what essential properties are there?’ is the Extension Question. This is dealt with in the final three chapters.
Chapter two provides the beginnings of an answer to the Analysis question,
introducing the modal analysis of essential properties. Eight ways modality and essentiality might be related are raised. Of these, two entail the modal analysis. By eliminating the undesirable six, justification for the modal analysis could be provide. In the remainder of the chapter, five of the six are quickly dismissed.
Chapter three is an examination of Fundamentalism. Focusing upon the views of E.J. Lowe and Kit Fine, I argue that there are modal facts which cannot be grounded upon essence facts and that certain modal concepts are employed in the construction of the Fundamentalist account. Consequently, Fundamentalism cannot succeed in grounding modality, and therefore cannot be the correct way to understand essentiality. This concludes the argument by elimination, thereby justifying accepting the modal analysis.
Chapter four explores the modal analysis. After distinguishing between various
formulations, it is argued that an existence-dependent version of the modal analysis is best.
An objection by McLeod concerning contingent existence and essential properties is then
dealt with, setting the stage for a more troubling objection from Kit Fine. Fine argues that all forms of the modal analysis ‘get the essential properties wrong’, relying upon a series of example properties, including the relation between Socrates and {Socrates}. After breaking down Fine’s argument, the remainder of the chapter concerns examining and dismissing several bad responses to Fine’s argument, including attempts by Della Rocca and Gorman.
In chapter five I advance a new response to Fine which centres upon appealing to the
sparse/abundant property distinction. Incorporating this distinction into the modal criteria, I demonstrate that a form of the modal analysis can avoid Fine’s attack. I then conclude that this suitably modified modal analysis is an excellent answer to the Analysis Question.
The remaining three chapters are part of an attempt to answer the Extension Question. Chapter six critically examines Wiggins’ sortal essentialism, the position that
objects are essentially instances of their sorts. After rendering Wiggins’ essentialist argument, I demonstrate that it is either inconclusive or question begging. As such, there is no reason to accept sortal essentialism.
Chapter seven looks at the Byzantine arguments concerning origin essentialism. It is shown that these arguments are either inconclusive - in that they do not entail origin essentialism - or assume origin essentialism at the out-set, leaving us little reason to accept origin essentialism.
Chapter eight examines Mackie’s minimalist essentialism. After laying out the position, I then examine a series of objections it faces. In particular, I show that even if we
accept minimalist essentialism, it would not help us answer the Extension Question. As such, we have no reason to do so.
I conclude that essential properties can best be understood as those sparse properties
of an object which satisfy a specific modal criterion, as demonstrated in chapter five.
However, the number of properties that satisfy this criterion might be quite small, as indicated by the results of chapters six through eight. This result is a mixed one for the essentialist: while we now know what essential properties are, it seems like we lost them all somewhere along the way
The Sortal Concept in the Context of Biomedical Record Linkage
Biomedical Record Linkage is especially designed for linking data of patients in different data repositories. An important question in this context is whether singling-out is sufficient for identifying a patient, and if not, what is in general required for identification. To provide hints for an answer, we will extend previous works on the concept of identity and extend the sortal concept, stemming from analytical philosophy and upper-level ontologies. A sortal is a concept that is associated with an identity criterion. For example, the concept "set" has the identity criterion "having the same members". Based on a description of a record linkage setting, we operationalize the sortal concept by providing a distinction between the digital representation of a person (d-sortal) and the person in flesh (b-sortal)
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