Secure Routing Protocols Comparison Analysis Between RNBR, SAA, A-UPK

The advent of wireless communications and the development of mobile devices have made great strides in the development of roaming communications. The MANET mobile network was developed with the ability for mobile devices to quickly self-configure and extend wireless coverage without infrastructure support. Security is one of the most important areas of research and plays a vital role in determining the success of personal and commercial telephone systems.Therefore, this study focuses on systematically examining MANET security and accountability issues and analyzing the performance of solutions proposed by three different design approaches to security systems.First, it provides an approach for identifying trusted nodes employing the proposed RNBR method for secure routing.it provides a Self-Assured Assessment (SAA) method to estimate node stability. Its main goal is to contribute to a self-assessment-based reliability assessment mechanism that provides a reliable and reliable pathway.it provides a new authentication method to prevent forgery attacks. It supports authentication mechanisms to prevent RF attacks and ensure secure routing development.The main Objective of this paper is compare to packet delivery Ratio ,Control Overhead, Packet Drop Ratio in different secure RNBR,SAA,A-UPK Routing Protocols in MANETS

Evaluation of on-demand routing in mobile ad hoc networks and proposal for a secure routing protocol

Secure routing Mobile Ad hoc Networks (MANETs) has emerged as an important MANET research area. Initial work in MANET focused mainly on the problem of providing efficient mechanisms for finding paths in very dynamic networks, without considering the security of the routing process. Because of this, a number of attacks exploit these routing vulnerabilities to manipulate MANETs. In this thesis, we performed an in-depth evaluation and performance analysis of existing MANET Routing protocols, identifying Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) as the most robust (based on throughput, latency and routing overhead) which can be secured with negligible routing efficiency trade-off. We describe security threats, specifically showing their effects on DSR. We proposed a new routing protocol, named Authenticated Source Routing for Ad hoc Networks (ASRAN) which is an out-of-band certification-based, authenticated source routing protocol with modifications to the route acquisition process of DSR to defeat all identified attacks. Simulation studies confirm that ASRAN has a good trade-off balance in reference to the addition of security and routing efficiency

Vulnerability Analysis of the Simple Multicast Forwarding (SMF) Protocol for Mobile Ad Hoc Networks

If deployments of Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs) are to become common outside of purely experimental settings, protocols operating such MANETs must be able to preserve network integrity, even when faced with careless or malicious participants. A first step towards protecting a MANET is to analyze the vulnerabilities of the routing protocol(s), managing the connectivity. Understanding how these routing protocols can be exploited by those with ill intent, countermeasures can be developed, readying MANETs for wider deployment and use. One routing protocol for MANETs, developed by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) as a multicast routing protocol for efficient data dissemination, is denoted "Simplified Multicast Forwarding" (SMF). This protocol is analyzed, and its vulnerabilities described, in this memorandum. SMF consists of two independent components: (i) duplicate packet detection and (ii) relay set selection, each of which presents its own set of vulnerabilities that an attacker may exploit to compromise network integrity. This memorandum explores vulnerabilities in each of these, with the aim of identifying attack vectors and thus enabling development of countermeasures.Afin d'augmenter le nombre de déploiements de réseaux ad hoc dehors des "testbeds" purement expérimentals, des protocoles de routage des réseaux ad hoc doivent être en mesure de préserver l'intégrité du réseau, même lorsqu'ils sont confrontés avec des participants imprudents ou malicieux. Un premier pas vers la protection d'un réseau ad hoc est d'analyser les vulnérabilités du protocole de routage qui gère la connectivité du réseau. En comprenant comment ces protocoles de routage peuvent être exploités par des personnes ayant de mauvaises intentions, des contre-mesures peuvent être développées. Un protocole de routage pour des réseaux ad hoc, développé par l'Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) comme protocole de routage de multicast pour la diffusion efficace des données, est appelé "Simplified Multicast Forwarding" (SMF). Ce protocole est analysé, et ses vulnérabilités décrites dans ce rapport. SMF est constitué de deux composantes indépendantes: (i) la détection des paquets dupliqués et (ii) la sélection des relais, dont chacun présente son propre ensemble de vulnérabilités qu'un attaquant peut exploiter pour compromettre l'intégrité du réseau. Ce rapport explore des vulnérabilités dans chacune des deux composantes, afin d'identifier les vecteurs d'attaque, ainsi de permettre de développer des contre-mesures