29 research outputs found

    Risk assessment in centralized and decentralized online social network.

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    One of the main concerns in centralized and decentralized OSNs is related to the fact that OSNs users establish new relationships with unknown people with the result of exposing a huge amount of personal data. This can attract the variety of attackers that try to propagate malwares and malicious items in the network to misuse the personal information of users. Therefore, there have been several research studies to detect specific kinds of attacks by focusing on the topology of the graph [159, 158, 32, 148, 157]. On the other hand, there are several solutions to detect specific kinds of attackers based on the behavior of users. But, most of these approaches either focus on just the topology of the graph [159, 158] or the detection of anomalous users by exploiting supervised learning techniques [157, 47, 86, 125]. However, we have to note that the main issue of supervised learning is that they are not able to detect new attacker's behaviors, since the classifier is trained based on the known behavioral patterns. Literature also offers approaches to detect anomalous users in OSNs that use unsupervised learning approaches [150, 153, 36, 146] or a combination of supervised and unsupervised techniques [153]. But, existing attack defenses are designed to cope with just one specific type of attack. Although several solutions to detect specific kinds of attacks have been recently proposed, there is no general solution to cope with the main privacy/security attacks in OSNs. In such a scenario, it would be very beneficial to have a solution that can cope with the main privacy/security attacks that can be perpetrated using the social network graph. Our main contribution is proposing a unique unsupervised approach that helps OSNs providers and users to have a global understanding of risky users and detect them. We believe that the core of such a solution is a mechanism able to assign a risk score to each OSNs account. Over the last three years, we have done significant research efforts in analyzing user's behavior to detect risky users included some kinds of well known attacks in centralized and decentralized online social networks. Our research started by proposing a risk assessment approach based on the idea that the more a user behavior diverges from normal behavior, the more it should be considered risky. In our proposed approach, we monitor and analyze the combination of interaction or activity patterns and friendship patterns of users and build the risk estimation model in order to detect and identify those risky users who follow the behavioral patterns of attackers. Since, users in OSNs follow different behavioral patterns, it is not possible to define a unique standard behavioral model that fits all OSNs users' behaviors. Towards this goal, we propose a two-phase risk assessment approach by grouping users in the first phase to find similar users that share the same behavioral patterns and, then in the second phase, for each identified group, building some normal behavior models and compute for each user the level of divergency from these normal behaviors. Then, we extend this approach for Decentralized Online Social Networks (i.e., DOSNs). In the following of this approach, we propose a solution in defining a risk measure to help users in OSNs to judge their direct contacts so as to avoid friendship with malicious users. Finally, we monitor dynamically the friendship patterns of users in a large social graph over time for any anomalous changes reflecting attacker's behaviors. In this thesis, we will describe all the solutions that we proposed

    Risk assessment in centralized and decentralized online social network.

    Get PDF
    One of the main concerns in centralized and decentralized OSNs is related to the fact that OSNs users establish new relationships with unknown people with the result of exposing a huge amount of personal data. This can attract the variety of attackers that try to propagate malwares and malicious items in the network to misuse the personal information of users. Therefore, there have been several research studies to detect specific kinds of attacks by focusing on the topology of the graph [159, 158, 32, 148, 157]. On the other hand, there are several solutions to detect specific kinds of attackers based on the behavior of users. But, most of these approaches either focus on just the topology of the graph [159, 158] or the detection of anomalous users by exploiting supervised learning techniques [157, 47, 86, 125]. However, we have to note that the main issue of supervised learning is that they are not able to detect new attacker's behaviors, since the classifier is trained based on the known behavioral patterns. Literature also offers approaches to detect anomalous users in OSNs that use unsupervised learning approaches [150, 153, 36, 146] or a combination of supervised and unsupervised techniques [153]. But, existing attack defenses are designed to cope with just one specific type of attack. Although several solutions to detect specific kinds of attacks have been recently proposed, there is no general solution to cope with the main privacy/security attacks in OSNs. In such a scenario, it would be very beneficial to have a solution that can cope with the main privacy/security attacks that can be perpetrated using the social network graph. Our main contribution is proposing a unique unsupervised approach that helps OSNs providers and users to have a global understanding of risky users and detect them. We believe that the core of such a solution is a mechanism able to assign a risk score to each OSNs account. Over the last three years, we have done significant research efforts in analyzing user's behavior to detect risky users included some kinds of well known attacks in centralized and decentralized online social networks. Our research started by proposing a risk assessment approach based on the idea that the more a user behavior diverges from normal behavior, the more it should be considered risky. In our proposed approach, we monitor and analyze the combination of interaction or activity patterns and friendship patterns of users and build the risk estimation model in order to detect and identify those risky users who follow the behavioral patterns of attackers. Since, users in OSNs follow different behavioral patterns, it is not possible to define a unique standard behavioral model that fits all OSNs users' behaviors. Towards this goal, we propose a two-phase risk assessment approach by grouping users in the first phase to find similar users that share the same behavioral patterns and, then in the second phase, for each identified group, building some normal behavior models and compute for each user the level of divergency from these normal behaviors. Then, we extend this approach for Decentralized Online Social Networks (i.e., DOSNs). In the following of this approach, we propose a solution in defining a risk measure to help users in OSNs to judge their direct contacts so as to avoid friendship with malicious users. Finally, we monitor dynamically the friendship patterns of users in a large social graph over time for any anomalous changes reflecting attacker's behaviors. In this thesis, we will describe all the solutions that we proposed

    Analyzing and Enhancing Routing Protocols for Friend-to-Friend Overlays

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    The threat of surveillance by governmental and industrial parties is more eminent than ever. As communication moves into the digital domain, the advances in automatic assessment and interpretation of enormous amounts of data enable tracking of millions of people, recording and monitoring their private life with an unprecedented accurateness. The knowledge of such an all-encompassing loss of privacy affects the behavior of individuals, inducing various degrees of (self-)censorship and anxiety. Furthermore, the monopoly of a few large-scale organizations on digital communication enables global censorship and manipulation of public opinion. Thus, the current situation undermines the freedom of speech to a detrimental degree and threatens the foundations of modern society. Anonymous and censorship-resistant communication systems are hence of utmost importance to circumvent constant surveillance. However, existing systems are highly vulnerable to infiltration and sabotage. In particular, Sybil attacks, i.e., powerful parties inserting a large number of fake identities into the system, enable malicious parties to observe and possibly manipulate a large fraction of the communication within the system. Friend-to-friend (F2F) overlays, which restrict direct communication to parties sharing a real-world trust relationship, are a promising countermeasure to Sybil attacks, since the requirement of establishing real-world trust increases the cost of infiltration drastically. Yet, existing F2F overlays suffer from a low performance, are vulnerable to denial-of-service attacks, or fail to provide anonymity. Our first contribution in this thesis is concerned with an in-depth analysis of the concepts underlying the design of state-of-the-art F2F overlays. In the course of this analysis, we first extend the existing evaluation methods considerably, hence providing tools for both our and future research in the area of F2F overlays and distributed systems in general. Based on the novel methodology, we prove that existing approaches are inherently unable to offer acceptable delays without either requiring exhaustive maintenance costs or enabling denial-of-service attacks and de-anonymization. Consequentially, our second contribution lies in the design and evaluation of a novel concept for F2F overlays based on insights of the prior in-depth analysis. Our previous analysis has revealed that greedy embeddings allow highly efficient communication in arbitrary connectivity-restricted overlays by addressing participants through coordinates and adapting these coordinates to the overlay structure. However, greedy embeddings in their original form reveal the identity of the communicating parties and fail to provide the necessary resilience in the presence of dynamic and possibly malicious users. Therefore, we present a privacy-preserving communication protocol for greedy embeddings based on anonymous return addresses rather than identifying node coordinates. Furthermore, we enhance the communication’s robustness and attack-resistance by using multiple parallel embeddings and alternative algorithms for message delivery. We show that our approach achieves a low communication complexity. By replacing the coordinates with anonymous addresses, we furthermore provably achieve anonymity in the form of plausible deniability against an internal local adversary. Complementary, our simulation study on real-world data indicates that our approach is highly efficient and effectively mitigates the impact of failures as well as powerful denial-of-service attacks. Our fundamental results open new possibilities for anonymous and censorship-resistant applications.Die Bedrohung der Überwachung durch staatliche oder kommerzielle Stellen ist ein drĂ€ngendes Problem der modernen Gesellschaft. Heutzutage findet Kommunikation vermehrt ĂŒber digitale KanĂ€le statt. Die so verfĂŒgbaren Daten ĂŒber das Kommunikationsverhalten eines Großteils der Bevölkerung in Kombination mit den Möglichkeiten im Bereich der automatisierten Verarbeitung solcher Daten erlauben das großflĂ€chige Tracking von Millionen an Personen, deren Privatleben mit noch nie da gewesener Genauigkeit aufgezeichnet und beobachtet werden kann. Das Wissen ĂŒber diese allumfassende Überwachung verĂ€ndert das individuelle Verhalten und fĂŒhrt so zu (Selbst-)zensur sowie Ängsten. Des weiteren ermöglicht die Monopolstellung einiger weniger Internetkonzernen globale Zensur und Manipulation der öffentlichen Meinung. Deshalb stellt die momentane Situation eine drastische EinschrĂ€nkung der Meinungsfreiheit dar und bedroht die Grundfesten der modernen Gesellschaft. Systeme zur anonymen und zensurresistenten Kommunikation sind daher von ungemeiner Wichtigkeit. Jedoch sind die momentanen System anfĂ€llig gegen Sabotage. Insbesondere ermöglichen es Sybil-Angriffe, bei denen ein Angreifer eine große Anzahl an gefĂ€lschten Teilnehmern in ein System einschleust und so einen großen Teil der Kommunikation kontrolliert, Kommunikation innerhalb eines solchen Systems zu beobachten und zu manipulieren. F2F Overlays dagegen erlauben nur direkte Kommunikation zwischen Teilnehmern, die eine Vertrauensbeziehung in der realen Welt teilen. Dadurch erschweren F2F Overlays das Eindringen von Angreifern in das System entscheidend und verringern so den Einfluss von Sybil-Angriffen. Allerdings leiden die existierenden F2F Overlays an geringer LeistungsfĂ€higkeit, AnfĂ€lligkeit gegen Denial-of-Service Angriffe oder fehlender AnonymitĂ€t. Der erste Beitrag dieser Arbeit liegt daher in der fokussierten Analyse der Konzepte, die in den momentanen F2F Overlays zum Einsatz kommen. Im Zuge dieser Arbeit erweitern wir zunĂ€chst die existierenden Evaluationsmethoden entscheidend und erarbeiten so Methoden, die Grundlagen fĂŒr unsere sowie zukĂŒnftige Forschung in diesem Bereich bilden. Basierend auf diesen neuen Evaluationsmethoden zeigen wir, dass die existierenden AnsĂ€tze grundlegend nicht fĂ€hig sind, akzeptable Antwortzeiten bereitzustellen ohne im Zuge dessen enorme Instandhaltungskosten oder AnfĂ€lligkeiten gegen Angriffe in Kauf zu nehmen. Folglich besteht unser zweiter Beitrag in der Entwicklung und Evaluierung eines neuen Konzeptes fĂŒr F2F Overlays, basierenden auf den Erkenntnissen der vorangehenden Analyse. Insbesondere ergab sich in der vorangehenden Evaluation, dass Greedy Embeddings hoch-effiziente Kommunikation erlauben indem sie Teilnehmer durch Koordinaten adressieren und diese an die Struktur des Overlays anpassen. Jedoch sind Greedy Embeddings in ihrer ursprĂŒnglichen Form nicht auf anonyme Kommunikation mit einer dynamischen Teilnehmermengen und potentiellen Angreifern ausgelegt. Daher prĂ€sentieren wir ein PrivĂ€tssphĂ€re-schĂŒtzenden Kommunikationsprotokoll fĂŒr F2F Overlays, in dem die identifizierenden Koordinaten durch anonyme Adressen ersetzt werden. Des weiteren erhöhen wir die Resistenz der Kommunikation durch den Einsatz mehrerer Embeddings und alternativer Algorithmen zum Finden von Routen. Wir beweisen, dass unser Ansatz eine geringe KommunikationskomplexitĂ€t im Bezug auf die eigentliche Kommunikation sowie die Instandhaltung des Embeddings aufweist. Ferner zeigt unsere Simulationstudie, dass der Ansatz effiziente Kommunikation mit kurzen Antwortszeiten und geringer Instandhaltungskosten erreicht sowie den Einfluss von AusfĂ€lle und Angriffe erfolgreich abschwĂ€cht. Unsere grundlegenden Ergebnisse eröffnen neue Möglichkeiten in der Entwicklung anonymer und zensurresistenter Anwendungen
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